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Abstract 
A stochastic approach to decision-making in defined benefit pension schemes is presented. 
Existing decision-making tools in the form of actuarial valuations and asset and liability 
modelling are discussed. These tools are shown to be inadequate to fully address the 
objectives of the various stakeholders. 
Pension fund control using a quadratic criteria with linear factors is studied in the case 
where the fund is invested in a risk-free asset and a risky asset. Optimal asset allocation 
strategies are shown to be counter-intuitive. The optimal strategy is shown to involve 
increasing the allocation in the risky asset as the fund deficit increases and increasing 
the allocation in the risk-free asset as the fund deficit decreases. It is further shown that 
increasing the weight on the linear factors leads to an increase in the optimal allocation 
in the risky asset. 
A risk management approach to decision-making is presented. This is shown to be a more 
satisfactory decision-making tool in terms of setting the funding and investment strategies. 
The objectives of the stakeholders are addressed through downside risk measures and a 
performance measure for the cost. Methods of solving the problem are discussed: an 
indifference curve approach and a stochastic multi-objective approach leading to Pareto 
optimal solutions. 
It is shown that, in the indifference curve approach, an "efficient region" exists. This 
efficient region is such that all funding and investment strategies outside this region are 
inefficient; that is, such strategies can be improved by choosing strategies in the region. 
On the other hand, in the multi-objective approach, pareto optimal investment strategies 
are located along an "efficient frontier". 
An extension to the stochastic approach is presented. Optimal funding and asset allocation 
strategies, over a range of projection horizons, are determined by taking into account the 
probability of default by the sponsoring employer. It is shown that, over a short-term 
horizon, bond-only asset allocation strategies are optimal, whilst over a longer horizon 
equity-backed asset allocation strategies are optimal. 
11 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The management of defined benefit pension schemes is a challenging exercise due 
to the complexities involved. Such pension schemes involve several crucial elements. 
Firstly, there is a promise to pay a wage-related benefit at retirement. Thus such a 
promise will be affected by various demographic and economic uncertainties. Sec- 
ondly, there are various stakeholders to such schemes. Stakeholders will have their 
own objectives. Taken as a whole, such objectives can often be conflicting. 
Furthermore, there is the fact that wage-related liabilities are non-marketable. This 
implies that such liabilities cannot be traded in existing financial markets. This is a 
problem since, at the very least, it means that matching assets do not exist for such 
liabilities. 
The actuary's duty is to manage such schemes whilst taking into account the various 
uncertainties and also the objectives of the stakeholders. Actuaries have tradition- 
ally used actuarial valuations and, in recent times, asset and liability modelling 
techniques as decision-making tools. 
However, such tools are inadequate in several respects. Firstly, actuarial valuations 
are a deterministic framework and thus do not adequately take into account the 
stochastic nature of the environment in which defined benefit pension schemes op- 
erate. Such frameworks also have, traditionally, placed more emphasis on funding 
strategies than on, investment strategies. 
Secondly, some common formulations of the objectives under the asset and liability 
modelling techniques are inadequate as they mostly only involve the probability but 
not the severity. Such techniques can be made more robust by, for instance, properly 
linking the investment decision with the funding decision; and also by reformulating 
some of the common objective functions. 
14 
Thirdly, actuarial decision-making tools have to be seen in the light of the recent 
Myners' review of institutional investment. Myners (2001) set forth principles cod- 
ifying "... best practice for pension fund decision-making... " 
Among others, he proposed that the pension fund's investment objective should take 
into account the trustees' attitude to risk and "... should not be expressed in terms 
which have no relationship to the fund's liabilities... " (p. 148). 
He further proposed that "... [s]trategic asset allocation decisions should receive a 
level of attention... that fully reflect the contribution they can make towards achiev- 
ing the fund's investment objective... [and also that]... [a]sset allocation should reflect 
the fund's own characteristics... " (p. 148). 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider the problem of decision-making and risk 
management in a scheme-centred approach. We present a decision-making approach 
that addresses the shortcomings of the traditional tools. At the same time this ap- 
proach is robust enough to stand-up to the `Myners test'. By the Myners test we 
refer to the kind of questions that ought to be asked of any pension fund decision- 
making approach following the best practice principles set out by Myners (2001). 
The objective functions that we consider are downside functions. We also make 
the modelling as realistic as possible in order to be directly applicable to practical 
situations. Hence, analytical solutions are not possible. As a result we employ Monte 
Carlo simulations. As an extension of the decision-making approach we present an 
approach which explicitly includes the probability that the sponsor might default 
on his/her pension obligations. 
1.2 Overview of the thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows: in Chapter 2 we review the traditional decision 
making process in defined benefit pension schemes. We consider how actuaries have 
traditionally addressed the main concerns of the stakeholders. We discuss the ade- 
quacy of the actuarial valuation as a decision-making tool. And we suggest possible 
ways of extending the approach. 
In Chapter 3 we review the Asset and Liability Modelling approach to decision mak- 
ing in defined benefit pension schemes. We discuss various problems that could arise 
in using this approach and suggest possible solutions. 
In Chapter 4 we present a dynamic programming approach to the problem of pension 
funding and investment. We consider a criterion with quadratic and linear factors 
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and show that such a criterion leads to higher funding levels and lower contribution 
levels than a purely-quadratic criterion. We let the asset allocation be the control 
variable and show that the optimal strategy is counter-intuitive. We discuss possible 
extensions of this approach and problems that could arise when considering realistic 
scenarios. 
In Chapter 5 we present the stochastic approach to decision making. Under this 
approach we show that the funding and investment strategies can be considered si- 
multaneously. We present downside risk measures for solvency risk and contribution 
rate risk and a performance measure for the cost. We also show how choices can be 
introduced in the setting of the `Normal contribution rate' and, thus, enabling us 
to consider a large spectrum of possible funding strategies. Each of these choices is 
combined with a choice for the asset allocation strategy. 
An analysis of these combinations is undertaken by using the risk and performance 
measures over pre-set projection horizons. We also show how the choice of different 
projection horizons offers flexibility in the decision making process. Two methods of 
finding the solutions are considered: an indifference curve approach and a stochastic 
multi-objective approach. 
In Chapter 6 we present a case study illustrating the stochastic approach to decision 
making. We show how to obtain strategies that are efficient under both the solvency 
risk and the contribute rate risk. We also show that such strategies are also efficient 
under the cost performance measure. We further undertake investigations into the 
effect of different amortization periods and initial funding levels. Also, we compare 
fixed and dynamic investment strategies and show that a counter-intuitive strategy 
is optimal. 
In Chapter 7 we consider asset model risk in the decision making process. We present 
an asset model built on modern asset pricing theory using the idea of pricing kernels 
and compare the results to those obtained under the Wilkie model. We show that 
the general principles underlying the stochastic approach hold regardless of the asset 
model but that the location of the efficient strategies depend on the asset model. 
In Chapter 8 we extend the stochastic approach to decision making by considering 
the probability that the sponsoring employer might default on the pension obliga- 
tions. We design the probability of default by considering the return on a tangency 
portfolio. A default risk measure, which takes into account the probability of de- 
fault event and the amount of defaulted deficit should a default occur, is introduced. 
We show that for short-term projections investment strategies with full-weighting 
in bonds are optimal under the default risk. Whilst for medium-term and long- 
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term projections we show that the optimal investment strategies under the default 
risk are not significantly different from the optimal strategies under the solvency risk. 
In Chapter 9 we present some concluding remarks and possible ways of extending 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
A Review of Traditional Actuarial 
Valuation Techniques 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we discuss actuarial valuation techniques. These techniques have tra- 
ditionally been used as a decision-making tool in the management of defined benefit 
pension schemes. We present an assessment of the adequacy of these techniques in 
addressing the various aspects of such pension schemes. 
The responsibility of the actuary in a defined benefit pension scheme is to manage 
the scheme with the goal of meeting stakeholders' objectives. The main stakeholders 
include the sponsoring employer, the members and trustees of the scheme, and the 
government. The sponsoring employer (or sponsor) might have the objective that 
the contributions be stable. Meanwhile, the objective of the members and trustees 
might be to ensure that the promised benefits are secure. On the other hand, 
the government might introduce legislation governing the running of such pension 
schemes. 
These objectives indicate the type of risks faced by defined benefit pension schemes. 
Firstly, the contribution could be unstable. This implies that there is a risk that, 
from one valuation to the next, the sponsor could be requested to make highly un- 
predictable contributions. Secondly, the benefits could be insecure. This could be 
the case, for example in a wind-up, if the accumulated assets are inadequate to meet 
with the liabilities. These risks are generally referred to in the actuarial literature 
as `contribution risk' and `solvency risk'. 
We assess the adequacy of actuarial valuations in the management of such risks 
and other aspects in a defined benefit pension scheme. We begin in Section 2.2 
with some principles that have historically governed actuarial valuations. In Sec- 
tion 2.3 we consider factors that influence the way actuaries approach a valuation. 
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In Section 2.4 we consider the funding methods used by actuaries in deciding the 
sponsoring employer's payment plan. And in Section 2.5 we consider their catego- 
rization. In Section 2.6 we consider the sources and treatment of gains and losses in 
the pension fund. Lastly, in Section 2.7 we consider ways by which the traditional 
actuarial valuation approach can be extended. 
2.2 Historical Aspects 
Actuaries have traditionally approached the problem of management of defined ben- 
efit pension schemes through actuarial valuations of the pension fund. Such valua- 
tions have mainly been carried out periodically, for instance triennially. However, 
special valuations could also be undertaken, for instance, due to a significant change 
in the law governing pension schemes. 
One of the earliest papers into the subject of actuarial valuations is King (1905). He 
sets out the principles for dealing with pension valuation problems. His principles 
have, over the years, essentially formed the basis of modern techniques in pension 
fund valuations. 
King (1905) suggested that the first step is one of data collection for investigating 
the experience of the defined benefit scheme and for undertaking the valuation. He 
introduced the idea of supplying the required information on "cards". In modern 
times this could be thought of as computer spreadsheets. 
He suggested that for each member of the pension scheme the required information 
would be their date of birth, date of entry into the scheme and age at entry, date of 
exit from the scheme and age at exit, their mode of exit (for example withdrawal, 
death or retirement), and any past contributions into the scheme. Such information 
would be gathered for all the members and, upon adoption of a scale of salaries, 
a service table would be drawn up. The service table would show, for each age 
group, the number of active members, the number of members withdrawing from 
the scheme (that is, withdrawals), the number of deaths, the number of retirees, and 
the salary scale. 
Once the service table is done, King (1905) suggested that the particulars for the 
valuation could be prepared. This would include, for each age group, the age at- 
tained, the number of members, and the total contributions. 
He further developed formulas, in the form of commutation functions, to be used in 
valuing future and past contributions, withdrawal benefits, and normal retirement 
benefits. 
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What is clearly missing from these principles is a specification of how to choose the 
valuation rate of interest, how to deal with the valuation of assets, and how to in- 
troduce the effects of price and wage inflation. This is understandable, nevertheless, 
since before the First World War interest rates were stable in Britain and inflation 
was not a major problem. Thus assets were only being taken at either the book 
value or market value (or the lower of the two). 
Puckridge (1947) introduced a new principle in the valuation of pension schemes. 
He argued that assets and liabilities should be valued "... at the rate of interest which 
it is anticipated can be earned on future investments... " (p. 2). This principle was 
also supported by Gilley and Funnell (1960) who further observed that due to the 
effects of inflation "... the yield on the accumulated fund [bore] little relation to the 
yield obtainable on new moneys and the book value of the assets [bore] little relation 
to their market value... " (p. 44). 
With the introduction of Puckridge's principle it was no surprise that the antici- 
pated rate of return on equities was used as the valuation rate for liabilities. In the 
pre-war years pension funds were mainly invested in fixed-interest assets. However, 
in the post-war years, Gilley and Funnell (1960) observe that there was a shift in 
pension fund investment from fixed-interest assets into equities "... as a hedge against 
inflation... " (p. 53). 
Seldon (1960) concurs by noting that the "... tendency to favour ordinary shares... rather 
than gilt-edged securities reflected the desire to offset inflation, avoid losses in the 
capital values of the... Government stocks, and increase yields... " (p. 17). 
2.3 Modern approach to the Actuarial Valuation 
The modern approach to the actuarial valuation of pension funds has essentially 
maintained the principles set by the early researchers like King (1905). The approach 
taken by actuaries has mainly been determined by two main factors: the purpose 
of the valuation and the setting of actuarial assumptions (or actuarial basis). In 
this section we consider each of these factors and we also consider the traditional 
approach to the choice of investment strategies. 
2.3.1 Purposes of a Valuation 
The purpose of a valuation significantly affects the way that the valuation itself 
is carried out and the way that assumptions are set and assets and liabilities are 
treated. In the actuarial literature the purposes of actuarial valuations have been 
described in different, but related, ways. 
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Gilley and Funnell (1960) observe that the "... purpose of a pension fund valuation is 
to compare the [fund's] expected future income and outgo with a view to determin- 
ing the size of any adjustments which should be made to the future contributions 
or benefits of the fund, so that the income over its lifetime may as nearly as pos- 
sible meet the expected benefit outgo or at least be unlikely to fall short of it... ". 
In this case we could say that the valuation is being undertaken on an ongoing basis. 
Heywood and Lander (1961) observe that the approaches in early actuarial valua- 
tions of pension funds were influenced by actuarial valuations of life funds. They 
observe that the actuarial valuation of a pension fund was naturally regarded as 
"... a process in which the first stage was to arrive at the difference between the 
present value of the liabilities on the one hand and the present value of the future 
premiums or contributions on the other, thus producing the net liability... " (p. 316). 
They further consider the idea that the actuarial valuation of a pension fund is 
"... an instrument [for determining or checking] the pace of funding the benefits of 
the [pension] scheme 
... 
" (p. 317). This idea is in a way a summary of that pro- 
posed by Gilley and Funnell (1960). This will be further discussed under 'Funding 
Methods'. 
Daykin (1976) observes that the actuarial valuation of a pension fund "... is a means 
of assessing what progress is being made towards satisfying... " pension funding aims 
(p. 288). The main aim could be to accumulate enough assets to meet with the 
promised benefits. Thus through a valuation an assessment is made as to what 
progress has been made since the last valuation and what steps should be taken 
until the next valuation. 
Worthington (1985) observes that the purpose of a valuation is "... to provide the 
actuary with all the information he requires to give sound actuarial advice to his 
client, normally the trustees or the employing company, to enable him to satisfy 
any legal requirements in relation to that scheme, 
... 
and to provide any actuarial 
statements about the financial position of the scheme that may be required... " (p. 
3). This `sound actuarial advice' could be advice on required adjustments as noted 
by Gilley and Fennell; or advice on the net liability and pace of funding as noted 
by Heywood and Lander; or, indeed, advice on the fund's progress as concluded by 
Daykin. 
Booth et al. (1999) note that the purpose of a valuation is "... to look at the long-term 
position... " of a pension fund and to meet with the needs of various stakeholders. 
We have already listed the main stakeholders; however, others include the tax au- 
thorities, accountants and financial regulators. 
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Thus in general an actuarial valuation has a three-fold purpose. Firstly, the valu- 
ation gives the actuary more insight into the position of pension scheme regarding 
various pre-set goals. Secondly, armed with the new insight the actuary is better 
able to recommend to the sponsoring employer and/or trustees the necessary way- 
forward for the pension scheme. Using an appropriate funding method the actuary 
will recommend a contribution rate applicable until the next valuation. Thirdly, 
following the valuation the actuary will be able to comply with the requirements of 
the various authorities. 
Currently in the UK preparation of valuation reports must be made in compliance 
with a Guidance Note, called GN9, prepared by the Institute and Faculty of Actu- 
aries. GN9 sets out the type of information that the actuary must include in the 
valuation report. 
2.3.2 The Valuation Basis 
The valuation basis is the set of assumptions which the actuary sets, using his/her 
judgement, in order to conduct the valuation. The choice of valuation assumptions 
is one of the most important areas of an actuarial valuation. This is because most 
of the deviations of predicted results from actual results stems from the deviations 
of the scheme's actual experience from that anticipated in the valuation assumptions. 
The valuation assumptions normally fall into one of two groups: demographic as- 
sumptions and economic assumptions. 
Demographic assumptions 
Demographic assumptions concern mortality rates and rates of withdrawal. Rates 
of mortality are further subdivided into pre-retirement mortality (that is, concern- 
ing current members) and post-retirement mortality (that is, concerning pensioners). 
Whilst withdrawal rates can be subdivided into various categories such as withdrawal 
from the scheme due to ill-health and withdrawal due to termination of employment. 
These assumptions can either depend on a specified mortality table showing the 
various rates of decrement or could be constructed by considering the scheme's past 
experience. 
The effect of demographic assumptions on the valuation results could depend on 
the size of the scheme. The characteristics of small schemes differ significantly from 
those of a large scheme. Two such characteristics are `nonhomogeneity' and `limited 
exposure'. Small schemes tend to have a nonhomogeneous membership profile due 
to the small total number of members and also the number of members at each age 
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group. 
Shapiro (1983, p. 19) observes that "... [i]n many small plans the bulk of the total 
annual contribution is attributable to the funding of anticipated benefits of a few 
owner-employees. The financial demands on plan assets generally are dominated 
by the specific experience of these few. Such nonhomogeneity can disturb the cash 
flow... " 
. 
Thus, for example, the sudden exit of a member with considerable past service could 
easily lead to deficits in the scheme. Such an exit could also threaten the existence of 
the scheme since, for example, the sponsor might not be financially able to cover the 
deficit or, indeed, the withdrawing member might also be the owner of the business. 
Shapiro further observes that "... [i]n small plans, actual experience is likely to devi- 
ate substantially from expected experience... [since, for example, ] the historical data 
generally are insufficient to develop such things as decrement factors... [and also] the 
limited exposure would undoubtedly lead to considerable variation from anticipated 
experience... " (p. 19). 
These observations imply that for pension schemes of a small size the deviation of 
the demographic experience from that anticipated on the valuation date could have 
a significant effect on the financial position of the scheme. 
Economic assumptions 
The economic assumptions concern three main areas. The first area is the return 
from investments. The actuary will have to make an assumption about the expected 
return from the fund's assets. Such an assumption would be required in the chosen 
actuarial funding method to value the pension liabilities (that is, as a valuation rate 
of interest). 
Booth et al. (1999) note that "... because the fund is accumulated to meet the liabil- 
ities, [the return from investments] also represents the rate of return at which the 
value of liabilities is determined. That is, it is used to represent both the gross yield 
earned on the fund as well as the rate of return used to discount the liabilities... " 
(p. 504). 
The second economic area concerns future inflation outlook. This can be subdivided 
into price inflation and wage inflation. Price inflation can be taken as one of the 
main drivers of wage inflation. Also pensions-in-payment are directly affected by 
price inflation since they are supposed to increase in line with the Limited Price 
Indexation (LPI). 
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Wage inflation would concern the scheme members' future salary improvements. 
Traditionally, actuaries have either used salary rates specified in a service table or 
have to construct a table of salary rates specific to a given scheme. Assumptions 
about future salary improvements are mainly required by those actuarial funding 
methods where the benefits are valued with reference to future salaries. An example 
of such a method is the Projected Unit Credit method (see Section 2.5). 
Most uncertainty in the valuation results arises from economic assumptions. Clark 
(1992) notes that "... in practice it is likely that the uncertainties in the economic 
elements of the [valuation] basis will far outweigh those connected with the decre- 
ments... ". As noted above, the effect of demographic assumptions could depend on 
the size of the scheme. On the other hand, the effect of economic assumptions might 
not depend on the size of the scheme but on the differences between the return on 
assets and inflation. 
Wright (1998) notes that "... the actual values chosen for each element of the valu- 
ation basis is not particularly important, but the relative differences between each 
are critical, particularly between [the rate of return on investments] and [the rate of 
earnings inflation]... " (p. 867). 
Thus, for example, if the return on investments is lower than anticipated and the 
wage inflation is higher than anticipated then we could get losses in the scheme. 
Such losses could arise from low accumulated assets (due to the low investment re- 
turns) and/or higher prospective benefits due to the higher salary levels. 
The criteria for setting valuation assumptions have been widely discussed in the 
actuarial literature. Shapiro (1985) suggests that the valuation assumptions ought 
to be conservative, consistent, best estimate, prudent, precise and flexible (also see 
Thornton and Wilson (1992). 
According to Shapiro, a valuation basis is said to be conservative if the basis tends 
to lead to actuarial gains. In this case the actuary will be in a position to know the 
net effect of his assumptions but may not know the extent of the actuarial gain. 
On the other hand, a valuation basis is said to be a best estimate basis if the as- 
sumptions are not too different from some best estimates. For example, the inflation 
assumption could be set by considering the mean or median of the underlying sta- 
tistical distribution for inflation. 
Meanwhile, Shapiro observes that "... [a]ssumptions are prudent ' in the aggregate if 
the contribution they generate is appropriate, in the sense that it would be developed 
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by a prudent actuary in similar circumstances... " (p. 490). The understanding here 
is that a prudent actuary would seek to adopt assumptions that are within the range 
commonly used by other actuaries. 
2.3.3 Investment Strategy 
In the traditional actuarial valuation approach the choice of investment strategy is 
treated, if at all, as a separate exercise from the valuation process itself. Indeed, in 
the early actuarial literature fairly little is said about how to approach the problem 
of choosing an investment strategy. This is even more noticeable if one compares it, 
for example, with the work on funding methods. 
Clark (1992) observes that "... [traditionally] actuaries have provided limited advice 
on long-term or strategic asset allocation, either formally or informally. Historically 
this was based on the actuary's general knowledge of the particular plan's liabilities, 
the policy being pursued by other similar plans and the actuary's general knowledge 
of investments... " (p. 28). 
This observation contains two of the principles that have generally been used in 
assessing the suitability of a pension scheme's investment strategy. These are the 
scheme's liability profile and the assets available in the markets. 
Actuaries have traditionally used the principle that real asset classes should be used 
to hedge real liabilities; and that as the membership profile of a scheme changes, 
the investment strategy should also be changed accordingly. Thus, for example, 
although a mainly equity-backed strategy might be used for a young scheme, a more 
bond- or cash-backed strategy might be necessary for a mature scheme with a high 
proportion of retirees. One of the reasons being that liquidity is necessary for a 
mature scheme with pensioners whilst for young schemes the main problem is one 
of matching the salary-related liabilities. 
2.4 Spectrum of Funding Methods 
In this section we consider the various funding methods used by actuaries in the 
management of defined benefit pension schemes. The subject of funding methods 
is a very wide area of research. Some of the early work on this subject include 
Trowbridge (1952,1963) and Bowers et al. (1976,1979). 
Despite the immensity of this subject, the definition of a funding method is simple. 
For instance, Bronson (1949) defines a funding method as "... any method of financ- 
ing the benefits of a plan... " (p. 250). Whilst Trowbridge (1952) defines a funding 
method as "... the budgeting scheme or the payment plan under which the benefits 
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are to be financed... " (p. 17). Thus in seeking a funding method we are essentially 
seeking a financing method which best meets the objectives of the stakeholders. 
There is a very wide spectrum of funding methods. The extreme funding methods 
are the so-called Pay-As-You-Go method and the Complete method: 
2.4.1 Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) 
Under this method the sponsor only contributes to meet the benefit outgo. Thus 
no fund is accumulated up and the cost of pension provision is not met during the 
member's working life. 
The cost for a new plan would start at zero but would steadily increase as members 
start retiring. A long period may elapse before the cost stabilizes. Furthermore, if 
the cost stabilizes it may do so at too high a level for the sponsor to sustain. This 
might also coincide with fluctuations in the employment levels and the sponsor's 
financial strength (Anderson (1992, p. 6,7)). 
Thus such schemes äre not allowed for private pension plans but are still used by 
some public pension providers. 
2.4.2 Complete Method 
Under this method the sponsor does not pay regular contributions to the scheme. 
However, at the inception of the pension plan the sponsor sets aside an amount large 
enough to meet all future benefits. 
There are two clear drawbacks with such a method. Firstly, it is almost impossible 
to exactly calculate the necessary amount. And secondly, even if such an amount 
was calculable, it might be too high for most private sponsors. 
2.4.3 Other funding methods 
Due to the inherent problems of the PAYG and the Complete methods, different 
funding methods have been suggested in the literature. In the next section we will 
deal with the categorization of these funding methods; whilst in this section we con- 
sider the basic rationale and fundamental criteria of these funding methods. 
The basic rationale behind all these funding methods is that, firstly, the cost of 
pension provision should be met during the member's working life. And secondly, 
the funding method should be such that a fund is accumulated at such a pace that a 
member's pension is exactly met at the time of retirement (Anderson (1992, p. 6,7)). 
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Booth et al. (1999, p. 526-530) describe in detail four fundamental criteria for funding 
methods. These are security, stability, durability, and liquidity. Firstly, the security 
criterion concerns the security of the past service benefits, taking into account future 
expected salary improvements, in the event of, for instance, discontinuance of the 
scheme. That is, the chosen funding method should be such that at any given time 
the value of the assets should be large enough to cover the discontinuance liabilities. 
Secondly, the stability criterion concerns the financial needs of the sponsor. For 
management purposes the sponsor would prefer a funding method which leads to a 
stable contribution rate. Stability might be measured, for example, in relation to 
the current salary roll. An unstable contribution rate could mean that the employer 
would face an uncertain future financial outflow. 
Thirdly, a funding method would be said to be durable if significant sudden changes 
in the pension scheme's circumstances would not lead to significant changes in the 
contribution rate. A change in the circumstances could, for instance, be the closing 
of the scheme to new entrants as the case has been in the UK in recent years. 
And lastly, the liquidity criterion refers to the ability of a funding method to ensure 
that enough cash is available to meet the benefit outgo. This should not be a prob- 
lem if the contribution income is higher than the benefit outgo. 
Furthermore, even though such may not be the case, the investment return might 
help to ensure that there is enough liquidity in the scheme. This would be especially 
the case if the contribution and investment incomes and the benefit outgo took place 
around the same time 
- 
at the end of the year, for example. 
2.5 Categorization of Funding Methods 
In the actuarial literature funding methods are categorized in several ways. The 
first way is to categorize funding methods as either Individual or Aggregate Funding 
Methods. Another way is to categorize funding methods as either Accrued Benefit 
or Prospective Benefit Methods. Furthermore, funding methods can also be broadly 
categorized by the way gains and losses are treated under each method. We consider 
the treatment of gains and losses in Section 2.6. 
2.5.1 Individual and Aggregate Funding Methods 
Funding methods are categorized as either Individual or Aggregate depending on 
whether the calculations of the Normal Cost and Accrued Liability are done indi- 
vidually for each member of the scheme or in aggregate. 
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Under the Individual funding methods, the Normal Cost is determined as the sum of 
individual Normal Costs for each member of the scheme. The Normal Cost would ei- 
ther be defined directly or else be derived from the definition of the Accrued Liability. 
Individual funding methods include the Unit Credit Family of methods, the Entry 
Age Normal method and the Attained Age Normal method. Turner (1984) refer to 
these methods, together with the Aggregate method, as the basic methods. 
Unit Credit family of methods 
The most common methods under this family are the Current Unit Credit method 
and the Projected Unit Credit method. Under this family of methods the Normal 
Cost is derived from the definition of the Accrued Liability. 
For each member of the scheme the Accrued Liability is defined as the present value 
of the member's accrued benefit (deferred until the normal retirement age). The 
difference between the Current Unit Credit and the Projected Unit Credit meth- 
ods is that for the Projected Unit Credit method the accrued benefit is calculated 
by referring to the member's projected final salary; whilst under the Current Unit 
Credit method the accrued benefit is calculated by referring to the member's current 
salary; that is, the salary at the date of the valuation. 
For the Unit Credit family of methods the Normal Cost for each member is calculated 
by considering the increase in the member's accrued benefit in the year following a 
valuation. This can be derived from the Accrued Liability by comparing the Accrued 
Liability at the valuation date and the Accrued Liability a year later (or at the next 
valuation). 
Entry Age Normal method 
Under the Entry Age Normal method the Normal Cost is defined directly and the 
Accrued Liability follows as a corollary. For each member, the Normal Cost is de- 
fined as the level contribution, calculated at the new entrant age, such that the 
present value of future Normal Costs would equal the present value of the member's 
future benefits, taking into account future salary improvements. 
The Accrued Liability is then calculated, for each member, as the difference between 
the present value of future benefits and the present value of future Normal Costs, 
taking into account future salary improvements. This also works out as the present 
value of prior Normal Costs. 
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Attained Age Normal method 
Similarly to the Entry Age Normal method the Normal Cost is defined directly. 
For each member, the Normal Cost is calculated as the level contribution at the 
attained age (that is, the member's age at the valuation date) such that the present 
value of future Normal Costs would equal the present value of future benefits (that 
is, benefits accruing after the valuation date), taking into account future salary im- 
provements. 
The Accrued Liability for a given member under this funding method is calculated 
in a similar way as under the Projected Unit Credit Method. That is, the Accrued 
Liability is calculated as the present value of the member's accrued benefit, taking 
into account the member's projected final salary. 
Aggregate method 
Colbran (1982, p. 361) notes that the idea underlying the Aggregate method is 
to "... produce a cost [... or contribution rate... ] as a percentage of salary which if 
continued until the last member of the present [group] retires will provide a sum ex- 
actly equal to the liability to set up each member's retirement benefits and exhaust 
the fund for active employees... ". If applied in isolation to a given member such a 
contribution rate might not work since it might be too low for some members or too 
high for others. 
Thus under the aggregate method the current position of the scheme is considered 
by looking at the difference between the present value of benefits (due to both past 
and future service). We then decide a contribution rate required to finance this 
difference over the membership period by considering the total projected salaries. 
That is, in order to produce the contribution rate, firstly a present value of all past 
and future benefits for all members is calculated. From this is subtracted the value 
of the pension scheme's assets. The difference is then divided by the present value 
of the total projected future salaries for all members. This gives the contribution 
rate. 
2.5.2 Accrued and Prospective Benefit Methods 
The second way is to categorize funding methods as either accrued benefit or 
prospective benefit methods. 
Accrued Benefit methods tend to focus on the member's accrued benefits (since join- 
ing the pension scheme) with or without reference to future salary improvements. 
Clearly, the Unit Credit method, which focuses on the present value of accrued ben- 
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efits without reference to future salaries, and the Projected Unit Credit method, 
which also focuses on the present value of accrued benefits but with future salary 
projections, both fall into this category. 
Cooper and Hickman (1967) consider a family of accrued benefit methods by propos- 
ing a "pension purchase density function". Such a function works like a rule of allo- 
cation. It turns out that a uniform rule, without future salary improvements, leads 
to the Unit Credit method. Whilst a uniform rule, with future salary improvements, 
leads to the Projected Unit Credit method. By varying the rule of allocation we get 
a family of accrued benefit methods. 
Pugh (2003) refers to such methods as being "security driven" in the sense that 
accrued benefit methods "... attempt to establish and maintain a sound relationship 
between the fund assets and the accruing liabilities... ". 
On the other hand, prospective benefit methods focus on the member's prospective 
benefits taking into consideration future salary improvements. Following our discus- 
sion above, the Entry Age Normal and the Attained Age Normal methods clearly 
fall into this category since they both focus on the present value of the member's 
future benefits. 
Thus the aim of such methods is to find and maintain a level contribution rate. The 
calculation can either be individually for each member of the scheme or in aggregate 
and also either the entry or attained ages can be used. 
Pugh (2003) observes that these methods "... are contribution driven, and the pri- 
mary objective is stability of such contributions... ". Thus the aggregate method 
would also fall into this category since, even though present values of both accrued 
and prospective benefits are calculated, the main focus is on the contribution rate. 
2.6 Gains and Losses in a Pension Fund 
2.6.1 Sources of gains/losses 
One of the early papers on the analysis of gains and losses in a pension fund is Dreher 
(1959). He observes that "... if each valuation assumption exactly anticipated the 
experience under a retirement plan from year to year there would never be an actu- 
arial gain or loss... " (p. 589). Thus the main source of actuarial gain or loss is the 
deviation of actual experience of the pension fund from the anticipated experience. 
For a given intervaluation period, Dreher (1959) groups the main elements of an ac- 
tuarial gain or loss under three categories. The first category of sources of gains and 
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losses contains all those elements which influence the pension fund. These include 
the benefit and expense outgoes, and investment income. 
The second category under Dreher's categorization of sources of gains and losses 
contains those elements affecting the future liabilities. These include new entrants, 
exits from the scheme, and salary changes. Depending on the rules of the scheme, 
exits might comprise deaths, withdrawals, early retirements (due, for instance, to 
ill-health), and normal retirements. 
Finally, Dreher's third category consists of sources which affect the estimated actu- 
arial liabilities but may not necessary depend on the experience during the interval- 
uation period. These sources of gain and loss include changes in benefit amounts 
and types, changes in the actuarial valuation method, changes in the asset valua- 
tion method, and changes in the actuarial assumptions underlying the pension fund 
valuation. 
Dreher's approach is to identify and quantify the actuarial gain (with actuarial loss 
as a negative gain) from each of the factors outlined by considering the differences 
between the actual and the expected results. And then the total actuarial gain can 
be calculated as the sum of individual gains and losses. 
Anderson (1971) approaches the problem from the point of view that the actuarial 
gain and loss is implicitly in the pension fund valuation method. Thus he derives 
the formulae for the actuarial gain under various valuation methods and from such 
formulae the sources of gain (and loss) are identified. (Also see Tino (1975) in the 
case of a projected benefit cost method). 
2.6.2 Dealing with gains/losses 
In this section we will talk about ways of dealing with gains and losses in a pension 
scheme. McGill et al. (1996, p. 525) observe that funding methods can also be 
categorized by the way gains and losses are treated under each method. Thus the 
choice of treatment of gains and losses is, implicitly, a foregone conclusion once the 
funding method has been chosen. 
However, as we note below, care has be exercised in categorizing funding methods 
in this way. The treatment of gains and losses under the individual cost methods 
in the US practice differs from the UK practice. (see, for example, Dufresne (1986, 
Chapter 2) and Haberman (1994, pp. 5,6)). 
The approach of finding the total actuarial gain by summing the components from 
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various factors has long been recognized as unpractical by actuaries (see, for example, 
Trowbridge (1952, p. 37)). A more straight-forward method is to consider the 
unfunded accrued liability. This is defined as the difference between the accrued 
liability and the total accumulated assets on the valuation date. 
Amortization method 
This is also referred as a `direct' approach. Under this approach, firstly, at the val- 
uation date a gain or loss is calculated using Anderson's (1971) approach. 
The idea behind the gain is that the sum of the unfunded accrued liability and Nor- 
mal cost at the previous valuation, accumulated at the valuation rate of interest, 
should exactly match the sponsor's contribution, also accumulated at the valuation 
rate of interest, and the unfunded accrued liability at the current valuation, if as- 
sumptions are borne out in experience. 
However, if assumptions differ from experience then a gain, positive or negative, 
will arise. Under the direct method, this gain is amortized over a given period by 
making an explicit adjustment to the Normal cost. 
Booth et al. (1999, p. 658) note that under this method the adjustment "... is the 
total of the intervaluation losses arising during the last M years divided by the 
present value of an annuity for a term of M years... ". 
Spread method 
The term `spread method' is used differently in the US and in the UK. In the US 
this term refers to the treatment of gains and losses in the Aggregate method. 
Anderson (1971) observes that "... [f}or the aggregate funding methods the term 
"gain" is undefined, and therefore no gain can be analyzed... ". Rather, he suggests 
that in the case of the aggregate method we should be analyzing "... the net change 
in unit normal costs (normal cost per dollar of covered payroll or per employee) from 
one [valuation] to the next... " (p. 38). 
We have already noted that the contribution rate under the aggregate method is 
calculated as the difference between present value of total benefits and assets (ex- 
pressed as a percentage of total projected salaries). Any `gains' and `losses' arising 
due to assumptions differing from experience would thus be implicitly incorporated 
in the calculation of the present value of total benefits and the projected salaries. 
Thus McGill et al. (1996, p. 525) conclude that "... [i]n effect, actuarial gains and 
losses are automatically, and without separate identification, spread over the future 
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working lifetimes of all active participants as a component of the normal cost... ". 
Hence by choosing the aggregate funding method we are implicitly choosing to treat 
gains and losses by the spread method. 
On the other hand, in the UK practice the spread method also refers to the way gains 
and losses are dealt with under the individual funding methods. Under the spread 
method the adjustment is determined only from the unfunded accrued liability: 
Adj(t) (AL(t) 
-f (t)). (2.1) am, 
Dufresne (1988) observes that "... this may be interpreted as `spreading' the unfunded 
liability over a period of m years... " (p. 535). 
2.7 Extending the Traditional Approach 
The traditional approach to actuarial valuations is a good set of techniques which is 
backed-up by extensive actuarial research. It has thus served the actuarial commu- 
nity reasonably well as a vital tool for decision-making and can be used a benchmark. 
The foremost advantage of the traditional approach is the ease with which results 
can be presented to the sponsor, trustees or other authorities. The traditional ac- 
tuarial valuation is a deterministic framework. The advantage of such a framework 
is that since the valuation reports are prepared for sponsors, trustees or regulatory 
authorities it is easy for the recipients to understand the report. In the report the 
results of the valuation can easily be summed up in single numbers showing, for 
instance, if there is a surplus or deficit in the scheme and the required contribution. 
Furthermore, in non-turbulent times, the traditional funding methods are capable 
of ensuring the security of benefits or stability of contributions that the stakehold- 
ers might require. Whilst in turbulent times experience might differ greatly from 
actuarial assumptions thus leading to gains and losses which may then need to be 
dealt with by amortization. 
Thus, actuarial valuations will probably continue being employed by actuaries into 
the foreseeable, as long as defined-benefit pension schemes still exist. At the very 
least, actuarial valuations could be used as a benchmark for other techniques. 
Also, although we have noted that actuaries have traditionally not invested as much 
effort in the techniques for dealing with the problem of investment strategy, tradi- 
tional arguments on the choosing of the strategy have been good. For example, we 
have noted that one of the arguments has been that the investment strategy should 
be based on the maturity of the scheme. 
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However, problems do exist with the traditional approach in certain areas. Firstly, 
the use of present values of the accrued liability in the funding methods has been crit- 
icized. Ramsay (1993) observes that by employing the traditional funding methods 
it means that "... [i]n practice, the degree of assurance is never explicitly mentioned 
in terms of probabilities. [Thus]... actuaries cannot readily calculate such quantities 
as... the probability that the accumulation of contributions will ultimately provide 
sufficient funds to pay benefits or... the size of the fund needed to ensure that benefits 
are paid with a specified probability... " (p. 352). 
He thus argues for the use of `a-percentile' funding methods which "... explicitly in- 
clude a degree of confidence (assurance) in payment of future benefits... " and, in 
so-doing, "... shift the valuation process away from expected values to percentiles... " 
(p. 355). 
The notion that traditional funding methods do not give a `degree of confidence' 
also suggests that the objectives of the stakeholders are not properly dealt with. 
In this thesis we argue that a proper way to address the objectives is through a 
target-based approach with well-constructed risk measures. 
Secondly, the traditional approach does not explicitly take into account the stochas- 
tic nature of the environment in which pension schemes operate. Booth et al. (1999) 
observe that since the results of an actuarial valuation "... are presented without ad- 
equate reference to the random nature of the events being predicted, they can give 
a misleading impression of the accuracy... " (p. 502). In this thesis we thus advocate 
that stochastic methods be used as much as possible so that a full picture of the 
pension scheme be established and the interaction between various crucial factors 
be studied. 
Gardener (1987) challenges the pension actuary "... to provide a coherent long-term 
investment strategy... " (p. 179). The lack of a rigorous approach to the problem of 
asset allocation strategy has led to the development of stochastic asset and liability 
modelling. In the next chapter will explore this technique. 
In this thesis we argue that although the technique of asset and liability modelling 
has been successfully employed by actuaries for over a decade in the assessment 
of investment strategies, improvements can be made. We argue that there is still 
a lack of proper interaction between the decision concerning the funding strategy 
and that concerning the investment strategy. This lack of interaction implies that 
two separate decisions are made which result in poor performance compared to one 
simultaneous decision. 
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Chapter 3 
Asset and Liability Modelling 
Approach 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we assess Asset and Liability Modelling (ALM) as a decision-making 
tool for defined-benefit pension schemes. We give a general description of ALM and 
describe ways in which ALM can be extended. 
ALM is a widely used technique in the financial sector. The underlying idea is to 
model the cash-flows representing both the assets and liability taking into account 
the stochastic nature of the cash-flows. 
Lockyer (1990) notes that "... the aim of asset and liability modelling is to deter- 
mine the spread of possible values in the medium and long-run and thereby adopt 
a strategy which has the highest probability of achieving a particular objective... " 
(p. 2). 
Clark (1992) observes that "... the development of asset [and] liability modelling can, 
in part, be attributed to the desire by a number of actuaries to advise pension plan 
sponsors and/or trustees on strategic asset allocation based on a more scientific ap- 
proach to the problem... " (p. 28). 
Kemp (1996) provides a comprehensive review of stochastic asset and liability mod- 
elling for pension funds. He shows how ALM techniques can be extended to the 
cases where the investment strategy is dynamic and to cases where the investment 
strategy includes derivatives. 
In defined benefit pension schemes, the liabilities arise from the promised retire- 
ment benefits whilst the value of the assets depend on the pension scheme's invest- 
ment strategy and market returns. Depending on the scheme's benefit design, the 
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promised benefits could depend on several stochastic factors. As noted in Chap- 
ter 2, actuaries have traditionally taken a deterministic view of the demographic 
and economic assumptions. 
The demographic assumptions concern mortality rates and rates of withdrawal. 
Each of these factors can be modelled stochastically by making assumptions about 
the underlying stochastic process. However, depending on the objective of the mod- 
elling exercise, it is common for researchers to take the view that demographic 
assumptions would not be the main source of uncertainty and hence they are easier 
dealt with deterministically. 
On the other hand, the economic assumptions concern the future price and wage 
inflation rates and the return from various asset classes. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 3.2 we review the various objectives 
of ALM for defined benefit pension schemes. In Section 3.3 we describe the general 
framework of pension fund ALM. Whilst in Section 3.4 we show various approaches 
to the stochastic modelling of demographic rates for ALM. And in Section 3.5 we 
describe how actuaries have generally approached the problem of modelling of eco- 
nomic factors affecting pension schemes. Lastly, in Section 3.6 we describe crucial 
extensions required in order to improve ALM as a decision-making tool. 
3.2 ALM Objectives 
The underlying idea of stochastic ALM is to address the needs of the sponsor and 
trustees/members whilst recognizing the stochastic nature of the pension liabilities 
and of the assets in which the pension funds are invested. 
The common approach is to formulate an objective which meets the needs of the 
sponsor and/or trustees and members. Stochastic ALM is then used to find the in- 
vestment strategy which best meets (that is, maximizes or minimizes) the objective. 
The objectives in Lockyer's (1989) and (1990) papers are set as minimizing the 
contribution rate and maximizing the funding level (that is, assets divided by li- 
abilities), respectively, for a given confidence level and for a given time horizon. 
Lockyer (1990) also suggests that a different objective for stochastic ALM would be 
to find an investment strategy which maximizes the pension increases in the case of 
a mature pension scheme. 
Clark (1992) considers a stochastic ALM study in which the twin objectives are set 
as "... to maximise the surplus that can be expected to emerge in average conditions 
in the [pension] plan on an on-going basis, thereby maximising the funds available 
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either for a reduction in the level of contributions required, pension increases or for 
benefit improvements... " and "... to minimise the variation in the sponsor's likely 
contribution in such circumstances... " (p. 40). 
Yakoubov et al. (1999) illustrate an application of their investment model to an 
ALM problem where the goal is to find an optimal investment strategy in equities 
and conventional bonds. In their study they set the objectives as "... to maintain an 
adequate funding level in all but the worst circumstances, and... to have as low an 
employer contribution as possible... " (p. 262). 
Booth et al. (1999, p. 570) observe that an objective for stochastic ALM could be 
formulated as to find an investment strategy to maximize probability of pension 
scheme surplus at the next valuation for a given contribution level. 
Actuarial researchers have also applied stochastic ALM to broader aspects of de- 
fined benefit pension schemes. For instance, Wright (1998) considered the effect of 
margins in the valuation basis on the long-term security of the accrued benefits in a 
pension fund taking into account the legislative framework applicable to UK pension 
funds at the time. Using stochastic ALM he showed that the long-term security of 
accrued benefits is jeopardized if the actuary assumes a realistic basis (that is, using 
best estimate parameters without including explicit margins). This was due to the 
fact that, assuming a realistic basis, the probability of insolvency was not materially 
affected by the investment strategy. That is, under a realistic basis there was no 
significant trade-off between risk and reward. 
However, under a prudent valuation (that is, best estimates plus explicit margins), 
Wright (1998) showed that the probability of insolvency tended to reduce as the 
proportion invested in less risky asset was increased. Therefore in this case an 
optimal investment strategy can be established. Thus he was able to show that 
stochastic ALM can be broadened to cover more aspects of defined benefit schemes. 
3.3 ALM Framework 
In conducting an ALM study actuaries carry out cash flow projections over a given 
horizon. For example, the length of the horizon may depend on the inter-valuation 
period. This is normally three years in the UK but may be shorter depending on 
the purpose of the valuation. 
The common approach to ALM studies is to assume that a valuation along the lines 
described in Chapter 2 will be conducted at each valuation date. Meanwhile, during 
the inter-valuation period the return from the assets and the growth of the liabilities 
are assumed to stochastic. 
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Thus the actuary would need to make assumptions not just about the situation on 
the valuation date but also about the progress of the pension fund during the projec- 
tion horizon. Kemp (1996) refers to the assumptions governing the progress during 
the projection horizon as "projection assumptions". He observes that "... projection 
assumptions are what we assume will have occurred between the start of the pro- 
jection and the relevant valuation date... [and these assumptions]... describe some 
probability distribution about how we expect the future to evolve... " (p. 8). 
Once these projection assumptions have been set, cash flow projections can then be 
conducted to the end of the projection horizon. Since these assumptions are mostly 
descriptions of probability distributions, the typical approach is to carry out several 
thousand simulations of the pension fund's evolution over the projection horizon. 
At the end of the projection horizon, which might coincide with the next valuation 
date, a set of valuation assumptions would be required. Kemp (1996) observes that 
"... the valuation basis is the set of assumptions that we assume will be used by the 
actuary to carry out an actuarial valuation at the future point in time being consid- 
ered... ". He further observes that "... [i]n pension fund asset/liability modelling the 
valuation basis is often assumed to be largely constant, at least for long-term ongoing 
actuarial valuations... [t]here may also be an element of prudence incorporated within 
these assumptions, which may not be present in the projection assumptions... ". This 
also is the approach taken by, for example, Wright (1998) although he further con- 
siders the effect of margins in the valuation basis. 
In Chapter 2 we observed that the valuation assumptions encompass the demo- 
graphic aspects and the economic aspects. Projection assumptions also encompass 
both of these aspects although the emphasis will depend on the objectives of the 
ALM study. In the following sections we describe how both aspects can be modelled 
stochastically. 
3.4 Stochastic Modelling of Demographic Rates 
Traditionally, stochastic modelling of demographic rates has mainly been applied to 
the modelling of life insurance contracts rather than pension schemes. This could be 
due to the fact that, compared to individual life insurance contracts, a large pension 
scheme could have several thousand members at each age. Thus reference might be 
made to the law of large numbers. 
However, mortality is a stochastic process. We can not say with certainty the time 
of death or the chance of survival of a given life. In a pension fund we would ex- 
tend this argument to other rates of decrement. The merits of including stochastic 
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assumptions for mortality and other decrements in the ALM study depend on the 
study's objectives. 
Clark (1992) notes that "... in practice it is likely that the uncertainties in the eco- 
nomic [assumptions] will far outweigh those connected with the decrements... " He, 
however, observes that "... the effect of a large number of withdrawals from pension 
plans during the 1980s was a significant contributory factor to the surpluses which 
arose... " He further notes that "... it might be thought desirable to allow for differ- 
ent new entrant and/or withdrawal assumptions depending on the economic climate 
prevailing during the course of a particular economic scenario... " (p. 17). 
However, Booth et al. (1999) note that stochastic modelling of decrement rates 
might be fraught with danger due to a lack of data. They observe that "... [m]ost of 
the uncertainty inherent in the results of the pension scheme valuation arises due 
to the volatility of the investment yield available from the fund. The effect of the 
random nature of the interest rates is likely to be significantly greater than that 
of... the retirement or mortality experience. In addition, the data available to derive 
those decrements that do have a high degree of uncertainty, such as withdrawal 
rates, is quite poor and so any underlying assumed probability distribution will be 
unreliable... " (p. 570). 
Nevertheless, in the following sections we describe various approaches to stochastic 
modelling of mortality rates. These approaches can easily be adapted to other types 
of decrement. 
3.4.1 Monte Carlo approach 
One of the early papers on stochastic mortality modelling is Boermeester (1956). 
He described a monte carlo approach to the estimation of the distribution of annu- 
ity costs. Under this approach death events are treated as Bernoulli trials as follows. 
Let q. be the probability that (x) will die within one year as depicted in a given 
mortality table. To conduct the Bernoulli trial we would need to generate a random 
number, say 'Z, between 0 and 1. Then we would define an indicator variable, Ix, 
such that: 
Id 1 ifdZ<qx; (3.1) 
x0 otherwise. 
Then Ig 
=1 would indicate that (x) dies within the next year whilst Iý =0 would 
indicate that (x) survives to age x+1. 
3.4.2 Random walk-type models 
Lee (2000) describes a stochastic mortality model where the probabilities of death 
39 
are simulated as products of the probability of death as depicted in a given mortality 
table and a random factor. Let qg be the probability that (x) will die within one 
year as depicted in a given mortality table. Then the probability that a life aged x 
at time t will die within one year is simulated as 
simqý 
_ 
q; x exp (Z, (t)) (3.2) 
where the stochastic shocks Zl (t) are given by 
Z1(t) 
= 
Z2 (t) + N(0, i) v 
Z2(t) 
= 
Z2(t 
- 
1) + N(0) v2). 
Czernicki et al. (2003) propose an additive model for stochastic mortality with both 
multiplicative and additive shocks to mortality: 
simgx 
- 
a1 4x + o2 (3.3) 
where al is a random variable with mean 1 and variance o and a2 is a random 
variable with mean 0 and variance o, 22. 
Thus these stochastic mortality models introduce shocks to the mortality assump- 
tions. In the deterministic framework such shocks are not taken into account. 
Other decrements in a pension scheme could be treated in a similar way to mortality. 
For instance, random shocks could be introduced in withdrawal rates and ill-health 
retirement rates. 
3.5 Stochastic Modelling of Economic Variables 
The subject of stochastic modelling of economic variables has been widely considered 
in the actuarial literature. As noted in Chapter 2, the main economic assumptions 
in a traditional pension scheme valuation are the rate of price inflation, rate of wage 
inflation and the return from investments. 
These economic variables are treated in different ways in the actuarial literature. 
The common approach is to employ a single model with the economic variables 
being described by sub-models. One of the most widely known such model is the 
Wilkie (1995) model. 
However, for the sake of comparison with the traditional, deterministic approach, 
in this section we consider how actuaries treat the stochastic nature of each of the 
economic variables mentioned above. 
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3.5.1 Price Inflation 
The level of price of inflation affects the liabilities of a defined benefit pension scheme 
in several ways. Firstly, occupational pension schemes in the UK are required by 
legislation to increase pensions in payment in line with a Limited Price Index (LPI). 
The LPI varies in accordance with the Retail Price Index but is subject to a lower 
bound of 1 and a pre-set maximum value. 
Secondly, it is widely recognized that price inflation significantly affects the levels 
of other economic variables. For example, the Wilkie (1995) model has a cascade 
structure where price inflation affects all the other variables. 
Thus although the valuation assumption for the rate of price inflation may be de- 
terministic, a stochastic approach is employed in setting the projection assumption. 
Lockyer (1990) notes that "... by including a distribution for inflation..., and using 
these figures in the projections, the modeller can allow for changes in the liabilities 
caused by different inflation rates... " (p. 2). He further adds that modelling infla- 
tion stochastically may be more necessary in an economy with high inflation and 
discretionary pension increases. 
Actuaries have modelled the force of price inflation in several ways. Price inflation 
has been modelled as either an autoregressive process, an autoregressive process with 
conditional heteroskedaticity, or an autoregressive process with regime switching. 
Another common approach is to model using vector autoregressive processes. 
Autoregressive model 
It is generally recognized amongst actuaries that the force of price inflation ought 
to be modelled as an autoregressive process. The general idea is that the price in- 
flation in a given year will depend on the previous year's inflation and some random 
disturbance. 
The common autoregressive model for the force of price inflation is the one sug- 
gested by Wilkie (1986,1995). He suggested that price inflation be modelled as a 
first order autoregressive process, AR(1), as follows. 
Let I (t) be the force of inflation in the year (t 
- 
1, t). Then, using Wilkie's original 
notation, we have: 
1(t) 
= 
QMU + QA (I (t 
-1) - QMU) + QSD. QZ(t) (3.4) 
where {QZ(t)} is a sequence of i. i. d random variables from the standard normal 
distribution (that is, independent and identically distributed normal random vari- 
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ables with mean 0 and standard deviation 1). 
The autoregressive model enhances the actuary's view of price inflation and is simple 
to justify. Equation 3.4 says that at any given time t the force of price inflation is 
equal to its long-term mean, QMU, plus an autoregressive factor plus some random 
shock. 
As noted above, to conduct the traditional deterministic valuations the actuary as- 
sumes a constant force of price inflation. The actuary may choose to set the valuation 
assumption as equal to QMU because in the autoregressive model this represents 
the long-term mean force of inflation. The values for the parameters QMU, QA 
and QSD will depend upon the data used for estimation. 
The Wilkie autoregressive model has been criticised by a number of researchers in- 
cluding Kitts (1990), Clarkson (1991), Geoghegan et al. (1992) and Huber (1997). 
Geoghegan et al. (1992) observed that the autoregressive model failed to incorporate 
some crucial features in the inflation data. They noted that every price inflation 
model ought to incorporate ARCH effects in the UK inflation data ie heteroscedastic 
tendencies (we will come back to this point in the following section as we talk about 
the ARCH model). They also argued that the model did not incorporate "... the 
existence of large, irregular shocks, such as those of the mid-1970's... " and "... the 
possible non-normality of residuals, through asymmetry... ". 
They also observed that "... the (autoregressive) model provides for negative and pos- 
itive movements in inflation with equal probability and it provides for a significant 
probability of negative inflation.. 
. 
in practice this might be unlikely... ". 
ARCH model 
It is a well-known fact that high inflation levels are usually associated with high 
instability. Thus the idea behind ARCH models is to let the variance of inflation 
depend on past inflation levels. The presence of heteroscedastic tendencies in UK 
inflation data was shown by Engle (1982). 
An autoregressive model with conditional heteroscedasticity was proposed by Ge- 
oghegan et al. (1992) in order to incorporate ARCH effects into the autoregressive 
model. Further investigation on the ARCH model was carried out in Wilkie (1995). 
He states the ARCH model as: 
I (t) 
= 
QMU + QA (I (t 
-1) - QMU) + QSD(t). QZ(t) (3.5) 
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with 
QSD(t)2 
= 
QSA + QSB. (I (t 
-1) - QSC)2 (3.6) 
where {QZ(t)} is a sequence of i. i. d random variables from the standard normal 
distribution. 
Wilkie (1995) observes that the ARCH model "... reflects the notion that, if the rate 
of inflation over any year has been unusually high, then the uncertainty about the 
rate of inflation in the following year is increased. It might be again high or it might 
be much lower. The same applies if the rate of inflation is unusually low, and this 
is made effective through the squared terms... " (p. 799). 
The first problem with the ARCH model is whether or not it performs better than the 
autoregressive model as we might expect. Huber (1997) observes that the "... ARCH 
model is able to deal effectively with the problem of non-normality and heteroscedas- 
ticity... " and "... the ARCH model appears to describe the data better than the [au- 
toregressive] model. Thus, it should generally be used in applications of the model, 
unless the ARCH effect is not significant for those particular applications". 
Threshold autoregressive model 
The main motivation behind a threshold autoregressive model for price inflation 
seems to be the fact that the inflation levels in a recession and out of a recession are 
always different: Clarkson (1991) refers to such periods as `excited' and `quiescent'; 
whilst Whitten and Thomas (1999) call such periods as `high' and `normal'. By 
classifying inflation levels into `high' and `normal' the obvious choice of a Threshold 
model is one with 2 regimes'. 
Whitten and Thomas (1999) set the threshold at 10% and found the following SE- 
TAR(2; 1,0) model to be the most suitable for price inflation: 
I (t) 
- 
QMU1 + QA1 (I (t 
- 
1) 
- 
QMU1) + QSD1. QZ(t), if I (t 
-1) < QR 
QMU2 + QSD2. QZ(t), if I (t 
- 
1) > QR 
(3.7) 
where {QZ(t)} is a sequence of i. i. d random variables with from the standard nor- 
mal distribution. 
Thus the SETAR model says that in the normal periods the force of inflation follows 
an autoregressive process whilst in the high period the force of inflation follows a 
lA simple class of threshold autoregressive models can be defined by: 
Xt 
_ 
µl + a(Xt-i 
- 
pi) + alet, if Xt-1 
_< 
d 
µ2 +, Q(Xt-i 
- 
µa) + a2Et, if Xe-1 >d 
where {et}'t_o is a sequence of i. i. d random variables with zero mean and variance 1; and d is the 
threshold. 
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random process with mean QMU2 and standard deviation QSD2. 
The lack of data is a major hindrance to threshold autoregressive modelling. If more 
inflation data were available more `precise' thresholds and regimes could be set. 
For instance, Whitten and Thomas (1999) point out that apart from 10%, 0% would 
be a plausible choice for a second threshold. Setting thresholds at 0% and 10% would 
lead to a threshold autoregressive model with three regimes: negative inflation (ie 
inflation levels below 0%), normal inflation (ie inflation levels between 0% and 10%), 
and high inflation (ie inflation levels higher than 10%). This would probably be a 
SETAR(3; 1,1,0) model. 
3.5.2 Wage Inflation 
Defined benefit liabilities are always designed to depend on the evolution of the 
scheme members' salaries over the course of their membership. In career-average 
salary schemes the benefits depend on some fraction of the member's average salary 
over their scheme membership. Whilst in final-salary schemes the benefits depend 
on some function of the member's average salary during some period of their mem- 
bership, usually the final n months of the membership, where n is pre-specified in 
the scheme rules. Thus stochastic modelling for the wage inflation is crucial in ALM 
cash flow projections. 
Various models have been suggested for wage inflation in the actuarial literature. In 
this section we review two of these models. 
Wilkie's Wage Inflation Model 
Wilkie (1995) approaches this problem by using a transfer function model. Under 
his model the force of wage inflation at time t depends on the force of price inflation 
at time t, the force of price inflation at time t-1, and an extra term defined as an 
autoregressive process. 
Let J(t) be the force of wage inflation at time t. Then 
J(t) 
= 
WW1. I(t) + (1- WW1) I(t 
- 
1) + WN(t) (3.8) 
where the extra autoregressive term is defined as 
WN(t) 
= 
WMU + WA (WN(t 
-1) - WMU) + WSD. WZ(t). (3.9) 
One of the focal points of Wilkie's approach is the dependence of J(t) on 1(t 
- 
1) 
instead of J(t 
-1). This implies that the current force of wage inflation depends on 
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the current and previous force of price inflation. 
The coefficient 1- WW1 is introduced in order to get "unit gains" between the 
two inflation processes. That is, "... an unexpected change in prices will.. 
. 
produce a 
corresponding change in wages in the long run... " (Wilkie (1995, p. 810)). 
Wilkie also suggests a vector autoregressive model in which the current force of wage 
inflation depends on its own previous values and those of the force of price inflation. 
Similarly, the force of price inflation depends on it own previous values and those of 
the force of wage inflation. 
TY wage inflation model 
Yakoubov et al. (1999) model the force of wage inflation in a similar way to Wilkie 
(1995) but with some crucial differences in the formulation. Using Wilkie's notation, 
the force of wage inflation is defined as 
J(t) 
= 
WMU + a1 1 (J(t 
- 
1) 
- 
WMU) + a2°l (I (t) 
- 
QMU) +W SD. W Z(t). 
(3.10) 
Under this model, the force of wage inflation at time t depends on the force of wage 
inflation at time t 
-1, the force of price inflation at time t, and a random term. This 
is a crucial difference with Wilkie's approach where, as observed above, instead of 
depending on J(t 
- 
1), the force of wage inflation at time t depends on I (t 
- 
1). 
Essentially, the structure of this model implies that we no longer get "unit gains" as 
in Wilkie's approach. Hence, the current force of wage inflation could, depending on 
the values of the parameters aiaý and 4a1, be considerably influenced by the level 
of the previous values of the force of wage inflation and the current force of price 
inflation. 
3.5.3 Return from Investments 
A wide range of investment models have been suggested by actuarial researchers. 
The treatment of each asset class varies from model to model. Lee and Wilkie (2000) 
provide a comprehensive summary of how a number of UK investment models gen- 
erate investment returns. Thus we will not go into the details for each model. We 
will, however, concentrate on how actuaries have moved on from the deterministic 
framework to the stochastic framework in the treatment of returns on pension fund 
investments. 
The common denominator in all stochastic investment ' models is a generation of 
total return indices for the asset classes. In some models these total return indices 
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are generated directly whilst in other models they are derived from other underlying 
series. 
In stochastic ALM investment strategies are varied by changing the weights placed 
on the returns from different asset classes. For example, consider a case where the 
fund is to be invested in n assets, each with return in the year (t 
- 
1, t) given by 
1+ ri(t), i=1,2, 
... , 
n. Then the total return in year (t 
- 
1, t) would be given as a 
weighted sum: 
n 
MR(t)/MR(t 
- 
1) 
_ 
ai (1 + r; (t)) (3.11) 
i=i 
where MR(t) is the total return index at time t and the weights ai signify the 
allocation in the ith asset and they sum to 1. 
A Direct Approach 
Different approaches are employed to model 1+ ri(t). The simplest approach is the 
random walk model where the rate of return follows a Log-Normal distribution 
1+ rs(t) = exp lpi +o N(0,1)}. (3.12) 
This is the approach taken by Smith (1996). He suggests that the rate of return on 
the ith asset class be modelled as 
XA.. (t)/XRa(t- 1) 
= exp{XMUi+XSDiXZ(t)+I(t)} (3.13) 
where XR, (t) is the total return index at time t for the ith asset class, the para- 
meters X MUS and X SD1 depend on the asset class, XZ (t) is a sequence of i. i. d 
random variables and I (t) is the rate of inflation at time t. 
The main weakness of this approach is that there is no separation of capital and in- 
come returns. This can be crucial where these are taxed differently and also where 
the investment is in a real asset class like Equities. In the discussion of Smith 
(1996), Professor Wilkie observes that "... [t]otal return models do not give you div- 
idend yields and interest rates. If you use a completely total return model for your 
simulation, you do not actually know what the basis is for calculating valuation 
returns or minimum funding requirement returns... " (p. 1185). 
Thus the `Indirect approach' described below tends to be more preferable in sto- 
chastic ALM of pension funds. 
An Indirect Approach 
This is the approach used by, among others, Wilkie (1995) and Yakoubov et al. 
(1999). In this case the total return index is not modelled directly but split into a 
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capital component and an income component. 
Let us consider Wilkie's approach. In the case of equities he models the equity 
dividend index at time t, D(t), and the equity dividend yield at time t, Y(t). 
Thus the equity price index at time t, P(t), works out as 
P(t) 
= 
D(t)/Y(t) (3.14) 
and the equity return index at time t, PR(t), is calculated as 
PR(t) 
= 
PR(t 
- 
1) {P(t) + D(t) (1 
- 
tax)}/P(t 
- 
1). (3.15) 
Wilkie uses a similar approach to derive the return index for conventional long-term 
bonds. He models the yield on conventional bonds at time t, C(t), and derives the 
return index at time t, CR(t), as 
CR(t) 
= 
CR(t 
- 
1) {1/C(t) + (1 
- 
tax)} C(t 
- 
1). (3.16) 
With this approach the actuary has to specify models for the equity dividend index, 
equity dividend yield and the yield on fixed-interest bonds. 
3.6 Extensions of the ALM approach 
In recent times it has been observed that room for improvement does exist in most 
stochastic ALM exercises. Two of the areas where it has been argued that improve- 
ments can be made are in the construction of the objectives of the stochastic ALM 
and in the presentation of results. In this section we consider these and other areas 
where possibilities exist for improvement. 
Most ALM studies have tended to focus on finding the investment strategies which 
would minimize the probability of failing to meet a given target. For example, the 
objective could be to minimize the probability of a shortfall at a given time horizon. 
This might then involve looking at the distribution of shortfall for a given invest- 
ment strategy. 
Chapman et al. (2001, p. 613) observe that the objectives of ALM can be improved 
by supplying "... a method of quantifying the value of the different [investment] 
strategies... ". They further add that such a method would "... assess the frequency 
and the magnitude of the shortfalls... ". In Chapter 5 we present a Risk Management 
approach with objectives constructed using risk measures that fully addresses these 
concerns. 
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Another area where more input is necessary is in the presentation of results of a 
stochastic ALM study. The problems in this area arise from several factors. 
Kemp (1996) observes that stochastic ALM "... provides much more information than 
is available from an actuarial valuation. A valuation provides a single `answer' at 
a set point in time (the valuation date). In contrast, asset/liability study provides 
three or more extra dimensions by.. 
. 
providing projections into the future (introduc- 
ing a time dimension);... providing some estimate of the range of likely outcomes (a 
probabilistic dimension); and... indicating the effect of changing investment strategy 
(an asset mix dimension)... " (p. 7). 
Another factor in the presentational problems might arise from the recipients of the 
stochastic ALM results. The kind of recipients would, of course, depend on the 
objectives of study. 
Let us, for the sake of illustration, assume that the trustees of the pension scheme 
would like the actuary to undertake an ALM study of the scheme. The question 
arises as to how the results obtained would be presented, with clarity, to the trustees. 
In the traditional deterministic framework the results are just single numbers. How- 
ever, in the stochastic framework the results are statistical distributions. As stan- 
dard statistics textbooks show, to present information about a statistical distribution 
one has to look at the measures of dispersion. These include the mean, standard 
deviation, median, and the percentiles. 
Actuaries have thus tended to present the results of the stochastic ALMs using per- 
centiles. Chapman et al. (2001, p. 612) observe that further work can be done on 
the presentation of the results since the use of percentiles can lead to "worst scenar- 
ios" being discarded. Thus, for example, the worst scenarios might lie in the tails 
of the distribution and this might require one to consider the 1st percentile or the 
5th percentile. However, in most studies actuaries tend to have the 10th percentile 
as a lower cut-off point. 
Chapman et al. (2001, p. 612) also observe that the presentation of results can be 
further improved by ensuring that the outcomes are always labelled with reference 
to the percentiles from which they originated. In Chapter 5 we construct a presen- 
tational framework which clarifies all these problems. 
Another area that could be improved is the way funding and investment strategies 
are optimised. The funding strategy is usually established using the traditional ac- 
tuarial valuations framework. Meanwhile, the investment strategy is established by 
using stochastic ALM. However, these decisions need not be treated separately. In 
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Chapter 5 we present a stochastic decision making approach under which these two 
key decisions are dealt with simultaneously. 
It has also been suggested that the stochastic ALM approach ignores the risk of 
bankruptcy of the sponsoring employer. Thus there is a tendency, it has been ar- 
gued, by this approach to favour higher-risk equity investment strategies. 
In Chapter 8 we present a framework that addresses this problem by taking into 
account the probability of default by the sponsoring employer. It will be shown 
that for short projection periods the probability of default has a major effect on the 
pension fund's investment strategy. 
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Chapter 4 
Stochastic Pension Fund Control 
4.1 Introduction 
In recent years the problem of pension funding and investment has been viewed as 
an optimal control problem. Four different types of optimal control problems have 
been considered in the actuarial literature depending on whether the horizon is finite 
or infinite and the time is discrete or continuous. 
The quadratic-type performance criterion has been the most commonly used crite- 
rion. Such a criterion leads to analytically-tractable problems and explicit solutions 
for the optimal control functions. Problems involving quadratic criteria are formu- 
lated as `tracking' problems. This means all deviations from the target are equally 
penalized. 
Thus, for pension fund control, surpluses and deficits are treated in a similar way. 
Although this might be a convenient procedure, it does not reflect the way pension 
fund stakeholders might view surpluses and deficits in the scheme. Stakeholders 
might view surpluses as more acceptable than deficits. Hence in pension fund con- 
trol we may require a performance criterion which does not penalize surpluses and 
deficits symmetrically. 
For the sake of analytical tractability, in this paper we consider a quadratic crite- 
rion with linear factors. The linear factors are intended to penalize fund deficits and 
contribution excesses. We assume that the fund is invested in a risk-free asset and 
a risky asset and we show that the optimal asset allocation strategies are counter- 
intuitive: the optimal strategy involves increasing the allocation in the risky asset 
as the fund deficit increases and increasing the allocation in the risk-free asset as 
the fund deficit decreases. We further show that increasing the weight on the linear 
factors leads to an increase in the optimal allocation in the risky asset. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 4.2 we survey the actuarial literature 
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on pension fund control. In Section 4.3 we consider a quadratic performance criterion 
with linear factors. Then in Section 4.4 we introduce the asset allocation choice as a 
control parameter. In Section 4.5 we show the effect of wage inflation on the growth 
of the actuarial liability, Normal Cost and the Benefit outgo. While in Section 4.6 
we solve the pension fund control problem using Dynamic Programming and show 
that the optimal policy is counter-intuitive. In Section 4.7 we investigate the effect 
of various factors on the optimal policy. In Section 4.8 we solve the infinite-horizon 
problem. And in Section 4.9 we present a numerical implementation of the optimal 
policy for the finite-horizon problem. In Section 4.10 we present some concluding 
remarks. Lastly, in Appendix A we show the derivation of the solution to the finite- 
horizon problem. 
4.2 Control with Quadratic Criteria 
Benjamin (1984,1989) explore the applicability of control theory to pension funds. 
Benjamin (1984) views the pension funding process as a problem in control theory 
where the real rate of return on investments is seen as the input signal whilst the 
recommended contribution rate is seen as the output signal. He assumes that the 
pension funding method is the aggregate method and that the valuation rate of 
interest is the average of past real investment rates of return. He employs control 
theory methods to study the effects of changes in the input signal (i. e. investment 
return) on the output signal (i. e. recommended contribution rate). 
Benjamin (1989) further considers two applications of control theory to pension 
funds. The first application is a continuation of Benjamin (1984) with the aggregate 
funding method replaced by the projected unit method. The second application 
involves a minimum energy control problem where the aim is to obtain a "maxi- 
mum smoothness path" for the recommended contribution rates i. e. a path which 
minimizes the year to year deviations in the contribution rates. Thus he suggested 
a criterion of the form 
T 
min E (C(t) 
- 
C(t 
- 
1))2 (4,1) 
c(1),..., c(T-1) t=1 
where c(t) is the contribution rate at time t. 
O'Brien (1987) models the pension fund process as a controlled diffusion process and 
the contribution rate is set as the control parameter. He applies dynamic program- 
ming to find an optimal control function which minimizes both the deviations of the 
funding level from a given target level and the cost as measured by the contribution. 
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He thus sets up a performance criterion of the form 
c(o), m (T-i) 
E [IT e-cot (c(t)2 +ß [17 A(t) 
-f (t)]2) 
1 ýoJ (4.2) 
where A(t) is the present value of future benefits for active members at time t and 
f (t) is the fund at time t. 
O'Brien (1987) shows that for this problem the optimal control function is an affine 
function of the present value of future benefits and the fund at time t. 
Vandebroek (1990) aims to build on O'Brien (1987) by considering the problem of 
finding an optimal contribution function which minimizes the deviations between 
the present value of future benefits and the fund at time t and between the total 
salary at t and the annual contribution at t. However, unlike O'Brien (1987), Van- 
debroek (1990) considers a deterministic framework for the optimal control of the 
pension fund. 
Hence Vandebroek (1990) considers a performance criterion of the form 
min fo T e-`" [c(t) 
- 
aW(t)]2 +, 0[77A(t) 
- 
F(t)]2 }dt (4.3) 
c(0),..., c(T1) J 
where 77 is the target fund ratio and a is the target contribution level. 
Haberman and Sung (1994) generalize the approach O'Brien (1987) and Vandebroek 
(1990). They define the quadratic performance criterion in terms of `contribution 
rate risk' and `solvency risk'. Contribution rate risk is defined in terms of deviations 
of the contribution from a set contribution target. This contribution target need 
not be a fixed proportion of the total salary as in Vandebroek (1990). They point 
out that the contribution target could be set, for example, as the Normal Cost or 
as the expected value of the contribution. 
They define the solvency risk in terms of deviations of the fund level from a set 
funding target. This target need not be a fixed proportion of the present value of 
future benefits for active members as in O'Brien (1987) and Vandebroek (1990). 
They point out that the target could be set, for example, as the Actuarial liability 
or as the expected value of the fund. 
Haberman and Sung (1994) consider the problem of finding an optimal contribution 
function and they set up the stochastic pension fund control problem as 
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T-1 
min El E vt [(c(t) 
- 
CTt)2 + VP (f (t + 1) 
- 
FTt+1)2] 0}. (4.4) c(0),..., c(T-1) t=0 
They show that the optimal contribution at time t is a linear function of the fund 
at time t and the benefit outgo at time t. Their result is thus similar to that of 
O'Brien (1987). 
Extensive work has also been undertaken into the problem of finding optimal asset 
allocation policies when the criterion is of the quadratic type. For further details 
see Boulier et al. (1995,1996), Cairns (1997,2000), Siegmann and Lucas (1999), 
Josa-Fombellida and Rincön-Zapatero (2001). 
One of the main results emerging from these studies is that in the case where the 
criterion is quadratic the optimal asset allocation policy is counter-intuitive. That 
is, the optimal strategy involves increasing the allocation in a risky asset as the fund 
decreases and vice versa. Owadally and Haberman (2004) also find a similar result. 
They observe that "... [t]he contrarian strategy is evidently a consequence of the 
quadratic utility function implied in [the quadratic performance] criterion..., which 
is simplistic as it is symmetric and continuous, and does not admit solvency and 
full-funding constraints. The risk that the plan sponsor winds up the plan or de- 
faults on pension obligations was also disregarded... " (p. 32). 
These arguments thus imply that in considering the optimal stochastic control of 
pension funds we need an objective function which takes into account the various 
pension fund risks. The objective function should further take into account how the 
investor or decision maker views financial risk. 
The obvious problem here is that the stochastic control problem could become math- 
ematically intractable. Indeed this is one of the reasons why stochastic control 
problems with quadratic criteria have been widely considered in the literature. Bert- 
sekas (1976) observes that the quadratic criterion is considered because "... it leads 
to an elegant analytical solution that can often be implemented with relative ease 
in... applications... " (p. 71). 
4.3 Criterion with Quadratic and Linear Factors 
Chang et al. (2003) suggest a performance criterion which takes into account both 
quadratic and linear deviations. They consider a finite-horizon, discrete-time per- 
formance criterion of the form 
53 
V (f (0» 
=EL Vt 
tal C 
NC 
) 
1)2 + a2 V Cl 
-t 
12 
(+ 11) t-o (t) AL 
+ a3 
( 
NC(t) - 1ý + a4 V 
Cl 
- 
AL(t +11) 
J 
11 f (0)1' 
(4.5) 
A downside risk measure would be favoured by a decision maker because such a 
measure treats pension deficits and surpluses differently. Surpluses are treated as 
zero deficits and thus in the event of a pension surplus no cost is incurred. This 
applies to both the fund and contribution levels. For contribution we consider the 
excesses 
- 
that is, contribution above the target. A cost is incurred in the event of 
a positive excess whilst in the event of a negative excess no cost is incurred. 
However, quadratic risk measures treat surpluses and deficits similarly. That is, 
fund deviations above and below the funding target are treated in the same way. 
The linear factors in criterion 4.5 are introduced to give more weight to pension 
fund deficits (that is, `under-funding' risk) and contribution excesses (that is, 'over- 
contribution' risk). A similar criterion is used by Haberman and Vigna (2002) in 
the analysis of a defined contribution pension scheme. 
Chang et al. (2003) use criterion 4.5 to obtain the optimal contribution policy in the 
case where the investment return follows an autoregressive process. They show that 
as the weight on the linear contribution factor increases, the optimal contribution 
decreases thus reducing the over-contribution risk but also leading to lower funding 
levels. 
However, they further show that as the weight on the linear funding factor increases, 
the optimal contribution increases and also the funding level increases. They thus 
conclude that a positive weight on the linear factor can lead to higher funding levels 
and lower probabilities of insolvency (p. 225). 
These results are intuitive. In order to reduce chances of under-funding risk, as- 
suming all other things equal, we have to increase the sponsor's contribution. On 
the other hand, to reduce over-contribution risk, all other things equal, we have to 
reduce the sponsor's contribution and incur the penalty of pension deficits. 
In this chapter we extend the framework of Chang et al. (2003) by considering the 
problem of seeking the optimal asset allocation policy for the finite-horizon and 
infinite-horizon cases. Our goal is to obtain optimal investment policy assuming 
that the contribution rates are set using an individual actuarial cost method. Our 
approach will closely follow that of Owadally and Haberman (2004). 
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4.4 Asset Allocation Problem 
The fund dynamics can be described as 
f (t + 1) = (1 + rt+i) (f (t) + c(t) - B(t)) (4.6) 
where rt+i is the investment return in the year (t, t+ 1). 
We assume the pension fund can be invested in two assets: 
" 
Asset 1 with return rl(t) distributed as N(µl, ai); 
" 
Asset 2 with risk-free return µ2, where p> µ2. 
We further assume that a proportion ir(t) of the fund is invested in the risky asset 
whilst 1- ir(t) is invested in the risk-free asset. Thus the total investment return 
in the year (t, t+ 1) has Normal distribution with mean 1+ ir(t)(Al 
- 
µ2) + P2 and 
variance ir(t)2o 
. 
The fund dynamics can be re-written as 
f (t + 1) = (1 + A2 + ir(t) (ri(t) - µ2)) (f (t) + c(t) - B(t)). (4.7) 
Since the total returns {rt} are independent, f (t) has the markov property. Hence 
Ef (t + 1) I 
. 
ýtý 
=E[f (t + 1) If (t)] (4.8) 
where Ft is the information history up to time t. 
We seek a policy 
ir(t), t=1,2, 
... ,T (4.9) 
which minimizes the downside risk criterion 4.5. 
4.5 Liability growth 
4.5.1 Salary growth 
We assume a constant force of wage inflation, w. Hence the wage index at time t is 
W (t) 
=W (t 
- 
1) exp(w) (4.10) 
where WW(0) = 1. 
We assume that the pension scheme is stable. Thus we get the Actuarial Liability 
and Normal Cost at time t as shown below. 
55 
4.5.2 Actuarial Liability 
This is just the discontinuance liability. Let x be the entry age and NRA be the 
normal retirement age. Then 
1 NRA-1 
AL(t) 
=fZ N(y, t) PS(y, t) S(y, t) NRA_yläy 
Y=X 
NRA-1 
=f> N(y, t- 1) PS(y, t- 1) S(y, t- 1) e" NRA-vl av 
y=x 
= ew AL(t 
- 
1) 
= e"t AL(0) 
where the deferred annuity is 
NRA-yl ay - NRA-yPy (1 + r)-(NRA-y) x 
00 
E, 
z-NRAPNRA 
(1 + r)-(z-NRA) 
z=NRA 
and r is the valuation rate of interest. 
4.5.3 Normal Cost 
(4.11) 
(4.12) 
This is the present value of liabilities accruing over the year following the pension 
scheme valuation. We assume that only withdrawal and normal retirement benefits 
are paid. Hence 
NC(t) 
='°NC(t) +''NC(t). (4.13 
For 'NC(t) we get 
1 NRA-1 1 
'NC(t) 
=f N(y, t) S(y, t) 8My ; -T (4.14) 
Y=X 
1 NRA-1 1 
=fE N(y, t- 1)S(y, t- 1)e"'MýbeDý (4.15) 
Y=X 
= e"NC(t -1) (4.16) 
where 9Myb and 8Dy are commutation functions. 
Similarly for WNC(t). Hence 
NC(t) 
= 
WNC(t) +'NC(t) 
= e' 
{ NC(t-1)+rNC(t-1)] 
= e' NC(t 
-1) 
= et NC(O) (4.17) 
We can write NC(O) as 
NC(O) 
= 
kl AL(O) (4.18) 
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where kl takes a value between 0 and 1 and depends on the pension scheme's benefit 
design, population structure and the valuation rate of interest. 
Thus 
NC(t) 
= 
ki ewt AL(0). 
4.5.4 Benefit Outgo 
(4.19) 
As for the Actuarial Liability and Normal Cost, the Benefit Outgo at time t can be 
rewritten as: 
B(t) 
= ew B(t 
- 
1) 
= ewt B(0). (4.20) 
Similarly as for NC(O) we can write B(O) as 
B(0) 
= 
k2 AL(0) (4.21) 
where k2 takes a value between 0 and 1 and depends on the pension scheme's benefit 
design, population structure and the valuation rate of interest. 
Thus 
B(t) 
= 
k2 ewt AL(0). (4.22) 
4.6 Solution by Dynamic Programming 
4.6.1 Algorithm 
We solve the problem using Bellman's principle of optimality (see Bertsekas (1976)). 
Essentially, the principle of optimality allows us to solve the dynamic problem as a 
number of sub-problems. 
We define 
(. f (t); )IE e-t {I C( s) 
--l 
21f (s + 1) 2 
.ýt (t)min (T) 
ý. ' 
L 
9_t 
v cY1 
\ NC(s) 1+ a2 v l\1- AL(s + 1) 
) 
7r 
+a3 \NC(s) -1 f+ a4 v 
ý1 
- 
ALS +11))J f(t)J. 
/ 
(4.23) 
We can write the Bellman optimality equation as: 
J(. f (t); t) 
_inE{ al ( NCt(t) -1) 
2+ 
a2 v (1- 
AL(t 
f-11)) 
2 
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+ a3 (NC(t) 
- 
1) + a4 v ý1- At 
f+ 
1) 
+vJ(f(t+1); t+1)I f(t)}. 
(4.24) 
4.6.2 Trial solution 
We consider the following trial solution and proceed inductively: 
J(f (t) t) 
= 
Pt 
,f 
(t)2 + Qt 
.f 
(t) + Rt. (4.25) 
This is satisfied as time T with PT = QT = RT =0 since there is no closing cost. 
Now assume that the trial solution is satisfied at time t+1. Then at time t: 
(f (), t) = c(t) 2f 
(t + 1) 2 Jt min E{ ai (NC t  
-1) + a2 v ý1- AL(t + 1) 
+as(NC(t) 
-l) +a4vý1-AL(t+1)ý 
+vPt+lf(t+1)2+vQt+lf(t+1)+vRt+ll f(t)}. 
(4.26) 
Thus 
J(f (t) ; t) = min E{ al ( NC(t) -1) 
2+ 
a3( NCt)t 
- 
1) +v Rt+i + (a2 + a4) V l () 
+v[Qt+i 
- 
(2a2 + a4) 
1] f(t + 1) AL(t + 1) 
+v[Pt+i + a2 AL(t + 1)2] f (t + 1)2 
If (t)j. 
(4.27) 
As a consequence of our assumption concerning the return on the risky asset we get 
E [f (t + 1) 1f (t)] = (1 + µ2 + ir(t) (µi 
- 
P2)) (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t)) 
(4.28) 
and 
E 
[f (t + 1)2 
I 
.f 
(t)] 
= 
((t)2 
7r0, + (1 + ir(t)p1 + (1 
- 
7r(t))µ2)2) (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t))2. 
(4.29) 
Now we set J as J(f (t); t) = min J. Thus 
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J- al ( N(Ct(t) - 1) 
2+ 
a3 (NCt(t) 
- 
1) +v Rt+i + (a2 + a4) v 
+v [Qt+i 
- 
(2a2 + a4) AL(t + 1)ý 
ý1 + A2 + (Al 
- 
µ2)ß(t)) (f(t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t)) 
1 
+V [Pt+l + a2AL(t 
+ 1)21 
(f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t))2 x 
17r (t)2 vi + (1 + lµ2 + (Pi 
- 
[12)lr(t))2}" (4.30) 
Hence 
0a(t) =v 
[Qt+i 
- 
(2a2 + a4)AL(t 
+ 1)] 
(µi 
- 
µ2) (, f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t)) 
1 
+2v [Pt+l + a2 AL(t +1)21 
(f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t))2 x 
{7 (t) Ui + (P1 
- 
M2) (1 + M2 + (µi 
- 
M2) 7r (t)) }. 
(4.31) 
And 
02J v- 2AL(t 
+ 1)2 
(a2 + Pt+iAL(t + 1)2ý i+ (Al 
- 
P2)2} (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t))2. 
(4.32) 
This is always greater than zero as long as 
Pt+i > 
-a2AL(t + 1)-2. (4.33) 
= 
0. Then We now set the first partial derivative equal to zero: 197r( t) 
mo(t) 
-- 
(Al 
- 
P2) [Qt+1AL(t + 1) 
- 
(2a2 + a4)] AL(t + 1) 1 
2 (a2+ Pt+iAL(t +1)2 ) ýai + (µi 
- 
P2)2) (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t)) 
('i 
- 
µ2)(1 + µ2) 
Ui + (µi 
- 
µ2)2 
(4.34) 
We would expect 
Qt+1AL(t + 1) 
- 
(2a2 + a4) <0 (4.35) 
otherwise ir(t) would always be negative. 
We rewrite the contribution at time t, c(t), as 
c(t) = NC(t) +k (AL(t) 
-f (t)). (4.36) 
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This says that the contribution at time t is composed of a normal cost and an ad- 
justment for gains/losses arising at the valuation date. 
We also simplify the equations by writing 
Xt 
= 
Qt AL(t) 
- 
(2 a2 + a4) (4.37) 
Yt 
= a2 + Pt AL(t)2 (4.38) 
110 
= 
(1 + µ2)Q21 (4.39) 
91 
= Qi + (Pl 
- 
µa)2 (4.40) 
112 
= (i (µi 
- 
µ2) + (µi 
- 
µ2)4 (4.41) 
93 
= -(µi - µa) (1 + µ2) (4.42) 
114 
= Ui SZ3 f1 2+ SZ0 SZ1 2. (4.43) 
We note that Sio, 11i, Sl2, S14 are positive; whilst 03 is negative. 
Replacing ir(t) in J then, as shown in the Appendix, J can be written as a quadratic 
in f (t). 
Thus the trial solution is satisfied at time t and the optimal cost is: 
J(. f (t); t) = Pa f (t)2 + Qt f (t) + Rt (4.44) 
where 
Pt 
= al k2 NC(t)'2 +v (1- k)2 Q AL(t + 1)-2 Y+1 (4.45) 
Qt 
=-k NC(t) -2 (2a1 k AL(t) + a3 NC(t)) 
+v (1 
- 
k) S2o SZ-11 AL(t + 1)-1 Xt+l 
+2 v (1 
- 
k) Q4 AL(t + 1)'2 Y+1 (NC(t) +k AL(t) 
- 
B(t)) (4.46) 
Rt 
=v Rt+l +v (a2 + a4) + (al k AL(t) + a3 NC(t)) k AL(t) NC(t)'2 
+v SZo Q-11 AL(t + 1)'1 Xt+l (NC(t) +k AL(t) 
- 
B(t)) 
-I- V S24 AL(t + 1)'2 Y+1 (NC(t) +k AL(t) - B(t)) 
2 
+4výo 
-SZ1)1j1X+1Y+i" (4.47) 
4.6.3 Optimal asset allocation policy 
We can write the optimal asset allocation policy as 
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7r*(t) 
_ 
Qi 1 Qa 
-2 (Al - µa) Sli 1 AL(t + 1) Xt+i ý'e+i x 
{(1- k) f (t) + NC(t) + kAL(t) 
- 
B(t)}-1 
= 
SZi 1 St3 
-2 (µi - µ2) 971 1 AL(t + 1) Xt+i Y; i Xt 1 (4.48) 
where 
Xt = (1-k) f (t) + NC(t) +k AL(t) 
- 
B(t) 
= 
-(1- k) (AL(t) -f (t)) + AL(t) + NC(t) - B(t) 
= -(1 - k) (AL(t) -f (t)) + ewt (AL(0) + NC(O) - B(0)) 
= 
-(1- k) (AL(t) -f (t)) + (1 + ki - k2) ewt AL(O) 
= 
-(1 - k) (AL(t) -f (t))+ ryi ewt AL(0) (4.49) 
where yj =1+ kl 
- 
k2 
. 
Effect of Fund Deficit 
As the deficit AL(t) 
-f (t) increases, Xt decreases since 1-k>0. Hence the ab- 
solute value of (Al 
- 
1µ2)11j' AL(t + 1) Xt+l Yt+i Xt 1 increases. From Equations 4.35 
and 4.37, Xt+l is negative. Thus 
- 
(pi 
- 
µ2) 0i 1 AL(t + 1) Xt+i Yt+i Xt 1 has a 
positive sign. 
So as the deficit increases, lr* (t) the optimal allocation in the risky asset increases. 
Conversely, as the deficit decreases the allocation in the risky asset decreases. 
Thus we get a `contrarian' investment strategy as has been the case in the actuarial 
literature involving quadratic objective functions 
- 
see Section 4.2. This strategy 
entails shifting the fund into the risky asset as the funding position worsens (that 
is, as the deficit increases). On the other hand, we would shift the fund into the 
risk-free asset as the funding position improves (that is, as the deficit decreases). 
4.7 Dissecting the optimal policy 
To analyze the optimal asset allocation policy we write ir* (t), Pt+,, and Qt+l as: 
7r*(t) 
_ 
-Constl - Const2 
[Qt+lAL(t + 1) 
- 
(2a2 + a4)] AL(t + 1) 
[Pt+IAL(t + 1)2 + a2] (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t)) 
(4.50) 
k2 Pt+i 
= al NC(t + 1)2 + Const3 
[Pt+2AL(t + 2)2 + a2] AL(t + 2) -2 (4.51) 
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k2 
AL(t + 1) k Qt+l 2a1 NC(t + 1)2 - a3 NC(t + 1) 
+ Const4 [Qt+2 AL(t + 2) 
- 
(2a2 + a4)] AL(t + 2)'1 
+ Const5 [Pt+2AL(t + 2)2 + a2] AL(t + 2) -2 x 
[kAL(t + 1) + NC(t + 1) 
- 
B(t + 1)] 
(4.52) 
where the constants Constl, Const2i Const3, Const4, and Const5 are all positive. 
Thus Pt+l depends on al and a2i whilst Qt+l depends on al, a2, a3, and a4. 
4.7.1 Contribution linear factor 
The weight a3 affects Qt+l through the factor a3 NC(t+i " Since a3 Nc(t+i is non- 
negative and we expect Qt+l to be negative, then increasing a3, decreases Qt+i (i. e. 
makes Qt+l more negative), all other things equal. 
The effect of this is to make Qt+l AL(t + 1) 
- 
(2a2 + a4) larger and negative. Hence, 
since Const2 is positive, the total effect is to increase the optimal allocation, lr* (t), 
in the risky asset. 
This agrees with intuition: the linear contribution cost factor penalizes overcontri- 
bution but rewards undercontribution. The only way the scheme can remain viable 
whilst the sponsor is undercontributing is when the investment returns are good. 
Thus, all other things equal, we would need to increase the allocation in the higher 
return asset. 
4.7.2 Funding linear factor 
The weight on the funding linear factor, 04, affects lr* (t) in two ways. Firstly, as can 
be seen explicitly in the equation for i*(t), increasing a4 should increase 2a2 + a4 
and hence reduce [Qt+1AL(t + 1) 
- 
(2a2 + a4)] i. e. makes this larger and negative 
since Qt+l is expected to be negative. This should have the effect of increasing ir*(t). 
Secondly, from the formula for Qt+i, increasing a4 reduces Qt+i making it larger and 
negative. Thus in the formula for 7r*(t) the expression [Qt+1AL(t + 1) 
- 
(2a2 + a4)] 
would become larger and negative. The overall effect would thus be to increase lr*(t). 
This is intuitively obvious: increasing the weight on the linear funding cost factor 
would penalize underfunding whilst rewarding overfunding. All other things equal, 
this can only be achieved by increasing the allocation in the risky asset. 
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4.8 Infinite Horizon Problem 
For the infinite horizon problem we follow closely the approach of Owadally and 
Haberman (2004). We assume that the population is stable and that there is no 
price and wage inflation. So AL(t), NC(t), B(t) are constant and we denote them 
as AL, NC and B, respectively. 
We write the performance criteria as: 
V (f (0» 
= 
Tym EL vt lal \NC -1 
12 + a2 V (1- 
f (AL 1) )2 
+a3CNC-1) +a4v(1-f(ÄL1)IJ I f(O)J 
\ (4.53) 
The value function J(f (t); t) does not depend on time, hence we write this as J(f (t)). 
For the Bellman optimality equation backwards induction is not necessary. 
It can be shown that the solution in the infinite horizon case is the steady-state or 
equilibrium solution of the finite horizon case. As noted by Owadally and Haberman 
(2004), convergence as T 
--+ oo is assured since we get a contraction mapping and 
the instantaneous costs are discounted. 
To ensure that the costs are non-negative we could modify the performance criteria 
by adding constants: and v- the adequacy of these constants can be estab- 4al 4a2 
lished by completing the square. This modification would only add a constant to 
the term independent of f (t) in the optimal cost but would have no effect on the 
optimal asset allocation policy. Thus we disregard these constants. 
Hence a trial solution is J(f (t)) =Pf (t)2 +Qf (t) +R where Pt -º P, Qt -º Q 
and Rt 
--> R as t --' oo. 
Thus J may be written as in Equation 4.30 with Pt, Qt, Rt replaced by the constants 
P, Q, R, respectively. Thus 
C(t) 2 c(t) J= al (NC, 
- 
1ý + a3 ýNC, 
- 
1) +vR+ (a2 + a4) v 
+v [Q 
- 
(202 + a4) ýL1 ] (1 + P2 + (µi - µ2)ýoo(t)) (f (t) + c(t) - B)) 
+ [P + a2 
AL2 ](f(t)+c(t)-B)2X 
2 {7rý(t)2 
vi + ý1 + µ2 + (µi 
- 
µa)ýý(t)) }" (4.54) 
Hence 
aa 
it) 
=V 
[Q 
- 
(2a2 + 04) ýL] (Al - µ2) (f (t)'+ c(t) - B) 
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+2v P+ 02 
ÄL2 ] (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B) 2x 
{7r0 (t) ui + (µi 
- 
µ2) ý1 + µ2 + (µi 
- 
IL2)7oo (t)) }" 
(4.55) 
And 
2 
00 
ßt)2 
= 2AL2 (a2 +P AL2) lai + (11, - µa)2} (f (t) + C(t) - B)2. 
(4.56) 
This is always greater than zero as long as 
PAL 2+ a2 > 0. (4.57) 
Set 
a 
9jýti 
= 
0. Then the optimal asset allocation policy is 
(Al 
- 
µ2) [Q AL 
- 
(2a2 + a4)] AL 1 
ý00(t) 2(a2 +P AL2) (C r2 (µi 
- 
µ2)2 (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B) 
_ 
(Pl 
- 
/12)(1 + µ2) 
on+(µi-µ2)2. 
(4.58) 
Now replace 7r;,, (t) in J. Then 
JU (t)) 
=v ý2 
+(1 +ßa)2 
2 
[P + aaAL2] (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B)2 
or, 2' - 112) 
+ {-12) 
2 
[Q 
- 
(2a2 + a4) 
ýLý (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B) +v +(1 (ill 
- 
A2 ) 
1 (µl 
- 
µ2)2 [Q AL - (2a2 + a4)1a 
--v 
a+ (µi 
- 
µ2)2 [a2 +P AL2] 
+a, NC 1)2 + a3 NC 1+vR+ (a2 + a4) v. ((t) 
- 
(c(t) 
- (4.59) 
We can rewrite the contribution at time t, c(t), as 
c(t) = NC +k (AL -f (t)). (4.60) 
Thus the coefficient of f (t)2 in J(f (t)) is: 
a' 
k2 
+v 
0'21 (1 
_ 
µ2)2 (P + a2 
1] (1 
- 
k)2. (4.61) 
NC2 vi + (µi 
-1L2)2 l AL2 
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And the coefficient of f (t) in J(f (t)) is: 
2výý1(1+µz)2 2 
rP+a2AL2] (1-k)(kAL+NC-B) 
i+ (µi - µ2) L 
+v i 
X1(1 +112) 
2 
[Q 
- 
(2a2 + a4) 
1j (1- k) 
Q+ (µi 
- 
µ2) AL 
zk 
-2a1 NC2 AL - as NC 
k (4.62) 
Thus the trial solution is satisfied at time t and the optimal cost is: 
J(f (t)) 
=Pf (t)2 +Qf (t) +R (4.63) 
where 
P= al k2 NC-2 +v (1 
- 
k)2 S24 AL-2 (a2 + PAL2) (4.64) 
Q=-k NC-2 (2a1 k AL + a3 NC) 
+v(1-k)coSZi1AL-1 (Q AL- (2a2 + a4)) 
+2 v (1- k) SZ4 AL-2 (a2 + PAL 2) (NC + kAL 
- 
B) (4.65) 
R=vR+v (a2 + a4) + (al k AL + a3 NC)k AL NC-2 
+v SZo SZi 1 AL-1 (Q AL 
- 
(2 a2 + a4) (NC +k AL 
- 
B) 
+v SZ4 AL-2 (a2 + PAL 2) (NC +k AL 
- 
B)2 
-}- 4v 
(Qi 
- 
Sll) Sti 1 (Q AL 
- 
(2a2 + a4)) 2 (a2 + PAL 2)-l 
(4.66) 
where 521, for i=0,1, """, 4 are as defined in the finite horizon problem. 
Thus P and Q can be re-written as 
P= (a, k2 NC-2 + a2 v (1 
- 
k)2124 AL-2) (1- v (1 
- 
k)2SZ4)-1 (4.67) 
Q=I-k NC-2 (2a1 k AL + a3 NC) 
-v (1- k) Sao 1lj-1 AL-1(2 a2 + a4) 
+2 v (1- k) SZ4 AL-2 (a2 + PAL 2) (NC +k AL 
- 
B)} x 
i (1-v(1-k)1oQll)- 
(4.68) 
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And the optimal asset allocation policy can be written as: 
7* 
- 
23 
- 
(µi 
- 
µa) AL [Q AL 
- 
(2a2 + a4)] 
2i 2521 [a2 +P AL2] (71 AL 
- 
(1- k) [AL 
-f (t)] ) 
(4.69) 
4.9 Numerical Implementation: Finite Horizon 
Problem 
4.9.1 Model Scheme 
We consider a defined-benefit model scheme with the following structure: 
" 
Stable scheme with respect to age, pensionable salary in real terms and past 
pensionable service; 
" 
Funding method: Projected Unit Method; 
" 
Normal Retirement Age (NRA): 65; 
" 
On retirement NRA, a pension of fioth of pensionable salary at retirement for 
each year pensionable service; 
" 
On withdrawal before NRA, a deferred pension; 
" 
On death in service no benefit; 
9 Early retirement no permitted. 
Regular valuations: annual valuations with gains or losses spread over five years. 
Pension Scheme assumed initially fully-funded. 
Discontinuance Liabilities: we assume that the valuation rate of interest (net of 
wage inflation) is 4%. 
4.9.2 Investment Model 
For simplicity we assume that the force of wage inflation, w, equals zero. We further 
assume that the asset returns are as follows: 
Asset 1 Return on Asset 1 assumed to be normally distributed with mean 4.5% 
and standard deviation 5%; 
Asset 2 Risk-free return assumed to be 2% 
We will run 10,000 computer simulations each year for a projection period of 25 
years for the finite-horizon problem. 
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4.9.3 Analysis of results 
Distribution of Funding and Contribution Levels 
In this section we consider the discontinuance funding level, A, and the contribu- 
tion level, NC(t) 
. 
We show how the distribution of the discontinuance funding level 
and the distribution of the contribution level change with the inclusion of the linear 
factors. We analyse the results by considering the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show several percentiles of the funding level and contribution 
level, respectively. In each figure we consider four cases: first case where both linear 
factors are excluded (that is, al = a2 =1 and a3 = a4 = 0); the second case where 
the linear contribution factor is included but the linear funding factor is excluded 
(that is, al = a2 = 1, a3 = 0.5, and a4 = 0); third case where the linear contri- 
bution factor is excluded but the linear factor is included (that is, al = a2 = 1, 
a3 = 0, and a4 = 0.5); and the fourth case where both linear factors are included 
(that is, al = a2 = 1, and a3 = a4 = 0.5). 
We have chosen these particular weights for illustrative purposes only. Our main 
results hold for different choices of weights. 
These figures show that the inclusion of linear factors in the performance criteria 
significantly reduce chances of underfunding and overcontribution whilst increasing 
the chances of overfunding and undercontribution. In the cases where linear fac- 
tors are included we get a significant shift of the distribution of the funding level 
towards higher levels (Figures 4.1) whilst the distribution of the contribution level 
shifts significantly towards lower levels (Figure 4.2). 
For instance, consider the interquartile range (IQR) in each of the four cases: the 
IQR is from approximately 99% to 100% in the first case and in the fourth case the 
IQR is from 103% to 108%. Thus the IQR shifts towards higher funding levels as 
the linear factors are included. 
A similar observation can be made for the distribution of contribution levels: the 
IQR is from 100% to 102% for the first case and from 70% to 86% in the fourth 
case. Thus the IQR shifts towards lower contribution levels following the inclusion 
of linear factors. 
In the next section we show the average optimal asset allocation paths for each of 
these four cases to illustrate how the investment strategy changes with the inclusion 
of the linear factors. 
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Figure 4.1: Percentiles for the discontinuance funding level: 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th 
and 90th percentiles (note change of scale for top left diagram). 
Average Optimal Asset Paths 
In this section we, firstly, illustrate how the investment strategy changes with the 
inclusion of the linear factors. To do so we will use the average optimal asset alloca- 
tion paths for each of the four cases considered in the previous section. These paths 
are meant to show how `on average' the investment strategy changes from one year 
to the next for a given set of weights. 
Secondly, we investigate the effect of the linear funding factor on the average opti- 
mal asset allocation paths. For simplicity we will set this up as a minimum funding 
problem with the contribution factors excluded. 
Figure 4.3 shows four average asset paths for each of the four cases considered in 
the previous section. For example, path A shows the average optimal allocation in 
the risky asset in the case where al = a2 =1 and a3 = a4 = 0. In this case we 
obtain an average optimal allocation of approximately 5% in the risky asset. This 
result is due to the fact that we have set the valuation rate of interest to be higher 
than the risk-free rate. On the other hand, setting the valuation rate equal to the 
risk-free rate would lead to the trivial result that the optimal strategy would involve 
full allocation in the risk-free asset. 
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Figure 4.2: Percentiles for the contribution level: 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th 
percentiles (note change of scale for top left diagram). 
Paths A, B, C and D in Figure 4.3 show that inclusion of the linear funding and 
contribution factors leads to investment strategies which `on average' have a higher 
allocation in the risky asset. This confirms our observations in Section 4.7. 
We further observe that the paths for the case where the linear contribution factor 
is included (that is, C and D) take longer to stabilize than the paths where this 
factor is excluded. Paths C and D also tend to be more affected by the zero closing 
cost condition as evidenced by looking at the progress of the paths for t> 20. This 
implies that care ought to be exercised in setting the linear contribution factor's 
weight, a3, in relation to the other weights. 
Figure 4.4 shows three average asset paths for cases where only the quadratic and 
linear funding factors are included. The weights in these cases are chosen only to 
illustrate the effect of the linear funding factor. We fix a2 as 0.2 but consider three 
values for a4: 0.01 (path A), 0.03 (path B), and 0.05 (path C). 
These paths show that as we increase the weight on the linear funding factor, the 
optimal allocation in the risky asset increases ` on average'. Furthermore, in path 
C we initially short-sell the risk-free asset and the average path takes longer to 
stabilize. 
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Figure 4.3: Average paths for the optimal allocation in the risky asset. 
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Figure 4.4: Average paths for the optimal allocation in the risky asset for different 
linear funding weights. 
Effect of Initial Funding Level 
In this section we study the effect of the initial funding level on the optimal asset 
allocation strategy. We consider three different initial funding levels: 90%, 100% 
and 110%. We amortize the initial deficit or surplus over 5 years in the 90% and 
110% cases. In each of the three cases we disregard the contribution factors and set 
the weight on the quadratic funding factor as 0.2 whilst the weight on the linear 
funding factor is set as 0.01. 
Figure 4.5 shows the average asset allocation paths for the three initial funding level 
cases. We observe that if the scheme is initially in deficit we would, on average, in- 
vest more in the risky asset 
- 
in this case we initially go long in the risky asset (that 
is, we short-sell the risk-free asset). On the other hand, if the scheme is initially in 
surplus we would invest more in the risk-free asset and, in our case, we short-sell 
the risky asset in the first few years. 
We further observe that the three average paths converge after approximately 10 
70 
years. The time taken before convergence will depend on the size of initial deficit 
or surplus and on the period over which the deficit or surplus is amortized. 
These results confirm the observations made in Section 4.6.3 regarding the effect of 
deficits on the optimal asset allocation strategy. 
Figure 4.5: Average paths for the optimal allocation in the risky asset for different 
initial funding levels. 
4.10 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have considered the problem of optimal asset allocation using a 
quadratic criterion with linear factors. We have shown that the optimal policy is 
counter-intuitive: we invest more in the risky asset as the deficit increases and vice 
versa. 
We have further shown that higher funding levels and lower contribution levels can 
be achieved by including linear factors in the performance criteria. And that the 
inclusion of these linear factors leads, on average, to higher optimal allocations in 
the risky asset. 
This work can be extended by considering more assets and different distributions 
of the return on risky assets. In addition, the optimal funding and asset allocation 
policies can be considered simultaneously. 
The clear advantage of using the approach outlined in this chapter is that, in cases 
where an explicit analytical solution exists, it allows the decision-maker to clearly 
analyze the effect of crucial variables on the optimal policy. Thus, for instance, we 
have shown the effect of deficits and also the effect of the weights placed on the 
quadratic and linear factors in the performance criterion. 
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However, in some cases analytical-tractability is achieved at the expense of unreal- 
istic simplifications. For instance, to simplify the mathematics, a zero or constant 
inflation assumption might be made for both prices and wages. This, coupled with 
an assumption that the population is stable, might lead to constant Benefit outgo, 
Actuarial Liability and Normal Cost. 
Furthermore, the number of analytically-amenable criteria is fairly limited. Thus 
over the past decade actuarial researchers have mainly used the quadratic criterion. 
However, the decision-maker might favour other types of criteria for which analytical 
solutions for the optimal policy might be difficult to find. 
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Chapter 5 
Risk Management Approach to 
Decision Making 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we set out a framework for risk management and measurement for 
defined benefit pension schemes. This framework takes into consideration all the 
main factors affecting the decision making process in such pension schemes. 
Firstly, unlike the traditional valuations, this framework fully recognizes the sto- 
chastic factors affecting the promised benefits. Secondly, the main stakeholders' 
objectives, for example security, stability and cost, are fully controlled through risk 
and performance measures. 
In this framework both the investment and funding strategies are taken as crucial 
control variables. And thus the risk and performance measures are simultaneously 
minimized over these variables. 
The stochastic approach also provides a way of considering the effect of other vari- 
ables, for example the amortization period, on the decision making process. Also, 
projection periods are set and their effect on the investment and funding strategies 
are explicitly considered. 
The idea of the `decision maker' is very crucial to this stochastic framework. The 
decision maker could be an individual like the scheme actuary or a collective term for 
the trustees and/or the sponsoring employer. Myners (2001) identifies the trustees 
as the "... ultimate decision-makers for pension funds... " (p. 39). 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2 we present the aims of the 
stochastic approach. Whilst in Section 5.3 we consider the elements of this stochastic 
approach. We consider ways of presenting the results in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5 
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we formulate the stochastic pension fund problem as a multiobjective problem. And 
in Section 5.6 we present some concluding remarks. 
5.2 Aims of the Stochastic Approach 
The main objective of a stochastic approach is to recast the problem of decision 
making in a defined benefit pension scheme in a way which fully accounts for the 
risks and uncertainties in such schemes and also the various (often conflicting) objec- 
tives of the stakeholders. Under the stochastic approach we simultaneously evaluate 
all of the choices at the disposal of the main decision makers for a defined benefit 
pension scheme. 
In so doing, we are able to meet with the needs of the various stakeholders in a 
more satisfactory way. These needs are also met simultaneously in the sense that 
any conflicting aims can be dealt with at the same time. 
The choices available encompass the strategy for funding the promised benefits and 
the investment strategy for the fund. For the funding strategy a number of funding 
methods exist. The common goal amongst all these funding methods will involve 
the determination of the sponsor's contribution rate and how it changes over time. 
Meanwhile, the choices for the investment strategy might involve the choice of as- 
set classes, for example, equities, bonds (fixed-interest and index-linked), cash and 
property. Furthermore, the decision makers will have to make choices about propor- 
tions to be invested in each of the chosen asset classes and how these proportions 
will change over time. 
In the traditional deterministic approach set out in Chapter 2, the funding and in- 
vestment strategies are taken as separate decisions during the periodic valuations. 
Traditionally, actuaries have tended to concentrate more on the areas affecting the 
funding strategy. These areas include the choice of funding method, the pace of 
funding, and the strength of the actuarial valuation basis. 
In the Asset and Liability Modelling approach, set out in Chapter 3, most of the 
emphasis has been on investment strategies with the funding strategy being treated 
as in the traditional approach. Thus the main application of ALM has been in the 
choice of optimal investment strategies and, in most cases, the objective has been 
to minimize the probability of insolvency or shortfall at some preset horizon, for 
example, 25 years. 
A stochastic approach to decision-making involves the calculation of explicit and 
quantifiable risk and performance measures for all possible combinations of funding 
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and investment strategies. These measures are constructed in such a way that the 
objectives of the stakeholders and the risks facing the scheme are taken into account. 
5.3 Elements of the Stochastic Approach 
In this section we introduce the main elements of the framework for the stochastic 
approach. We discuss the choice of the funding strategy, the investment strategy, 
the risk and performance measures, and the decision points and projection horizons. 
5.3.1 Funding Strategy 
In Chapter 2 we discussed how the funding strategy is chosen in the tradition ac- 
tuarial valuation framework. We observed that although a spectrum of actuarial 
cost methods exists, one of two main class classifications is used to describe each 
method: individual versus aggregate cost methods, and accrued versus prospective 
benefit cost methods. Actuaries have traditionally chosen a funding method by con- 
sidering the funding method's characteristics, the scheme design, and the legislative 
environment. 
The common goal of these actuarial cost methods is to establish a recommended 
contribution rate. Under the individual funding methods the recommended con- 
tribution rate will essentially be made up of two factors: the normal cost and an 
adjustment for gains and losses, that is, 
c(t) = NC(t) + Adj (t). (5.1) 
where c(t) is the recommended contribution rate in year (t, t+ 1), NC(t) is the 
Normal cost and Adj(t) is the adjustment for gains and losses. 
Both of these factors, NC(t) and Adj(t), could vary from one valuation date to the 
next depending on the experience of the scheme during the intervaluation period 
and on the changes in the valuation basis. 
Firstly, the changes in the adjustments depend on the changes in the intervaluation 
gains and losses, and hence, on the differences between the valuation basis and the 
actual experience of the scheme. Secondly, the development of the Normal cost over 
time will depend on the characteristics of the actuarial cost method and on the 
changes in the valuation basis. 
In the stochastic approach, however, we deal with the recommended contribution 
rate in a simple way. We view the normal contribution rate and the adjustment 
as simply a method for dividing the total contribution rate into a fixed part and a 
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variable part. We thus assume that the normal contribution rate remains fixed over 
time by definition. 
Definition 5.1 Normal contribution rate We define the Normal contribution rate, 
NC, as the fixed part of the total contribution rate and is the rate payable if the 
scheme is fully-funded and there is no surplus or deficit. 
Thus the total contribution rate can now be written as 
c(t) = NC + Adj(t) (5.2) 
and changes in the recommended contribution rate are purely due to the intervalu- 
ation gains and losses. 
This development offers the decision maker extensive choice in setting the funding 
strategy. The decision maker could, for example, set NC depending on the financial 
circumstances of the sponsoring employer. And, thus, offering great flexibility in 
the funding strategy. Furthermore, NC could be set as a factor of NC(t). This 
not only offers a whole spectrum of choices but also offers a good reference point or 
benchmark. 
However, the essence of the stochastic approach is that the choice of NC should not 
be made in isolation as is the case for the traditional actuarial valuations. In the 
stochastic approach NC is just one of the control variables. 
Some actuarial researchers have argued that the choice of the contribution rate does 
not matter. For instance, Exley et al. (1997) argue that "... [t]he consequence of [set- 
ting a lower rate] is to shift contributions from one year to the next, which may have 
a small economic effect 
... 
overall... " (p. 856). Thus, assuming that the contribution 
rate is adjusted annually, a lower (higher) contribution in one year only leads to a 
higher (lower) contribution in the next year. 
This argument can not be dismissed in some economic circumstances. For example, 
if a low contribution rate was to coincide with poor investment returns we could get 
a scenario where a higher contribution might be required. However, in our stochastic 
framework we consider the effect on the risk and performance measures. 
In the stochastic framework choosing a high Normal contribution rate will mean that, 
all things equal, there will be less risk of scheme insolvency, less risk of increase in the 
current recommended contribution rate and a higher average contribution rate over 
a finite time horizon. Similarly, a lower Normal contribution rate will increase both 
risks of scheme insolvency and contribution rate excess but will reduce the average 
contribution rate. This gives the necessity for a stochastic approach to establish an 
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optimal funding strategy. 
We do not, however, completely ignore funding methods. The adjustment at time 
t, Adj(t), must be made by considering the difference between the value of the fund 
at time t, f (t), and a measure of the accrued liability, AL(t), at time t: 
Adj(t) 
=k (AL(t) -f (t)) (5.3) 
where k equals 1/ä-m-, and m is the spread period. 
To calculate the accrued liability a funding method is required. For this we propose 
that the Projected Unit Credit method be employed since it is a `security-driven' 
model which aims at a certain level of funding and the accrued liability is calculated 
with reference to projected future salaries. 
5.3.2 Investment Strategy 
The investment strategy adopted by the pension scheme is one of the most impor- 
tant factors in the future progress of the fund. Traditionally, actuaries have argued 
that the investment strategy should depend on the liability profile or maturity of 
the scheme. That is, a young scheme might adopt a high expected return but 
volatile strategy backed by, for instance, equities. Whilst a mature scheme might 
adopt a low expected return but less volatile strategy backed, for instance, by bonds. 
Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 4, analytical models show that counter-intuitive 
strategies are optimal. That is, strategies which entail shifting the pension fund into 
risky assets as the scheme deficit increases; and shifting into risk-free or less risky 
assets as the scheme surplus increases. 
Seldon (1960) observes that "... the investment of pension funds demands a sensitive 
response to changing market conditions... " (p. 17). Thus, deciding how to allocate 
the fund is just one half of the coin. The other half concerns how these allocations 
will have to be changed as the fund progresses. 
The investment strategy is also crucial to the cost of the pension plan. McGill (1962) 
observes that "... the investment returns on the pension fund assets are a substantial 
factor in reducing [the employer's]... contributions toward the cost of the plan. The 
higher the yield on the fund investments the lower the cost to the employer... " (p. 
286). 
McGill et al. (1996) add that the "... productive deployment of [the scheme's] assets 
reduces the direct cost of a defined benefit plan... ". They further note that "... if the 
assets of a fully-funded defined benefit plan can be invested in a manner that earns 
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on average a total return of 6 percent in a stable economic environment, about 70 
percent of the plan's benefits will be paid from investment earnings, leaving only 30 
percent to be met from contributions to the plan... " (p. 645). 
We concur with these observations. But we further note that we also need to link 
the investment decision with the funding decision. In this case these two crucial 
decisions will be made, not separately, but simultaneously. 
Following McGill et al. 's comments it is easy to see the advantages of this ap- 
proach. On the one hand, good returns from assets reduce the sponsor's contribu- 
tions. Whilst a high contribution could significantly increase the fund if returns are 
good thus leading to a reduction in the future excess contributions. 
5.3.3 Risk and Performance Measures 
We noted above that to evaluate the consequences of alternative strategies we need to 
use performance measures. In this section we present risk and performance measures 
which are necessary for a stochastic approach to decision-making in defined benefit 
pension schemes. 
Downside Risk Measures 
Downside risk measures have been considered by actuaries in various investment 
problems. Clarkson (1989) suggests several axioms for the measurement of invest- 
ment risk. Firstly, he argues that "... [i]nvestment risk is a function both of the 
probability of the return being below a certain threshold and also of the severity of 
the financial consequences arising from these values of return... " (p. 145). 
He thus suggests that the investment risk measure be calculated as 
Risk= 
fL L 
W(L- r)g(r)dr (5.4) 
where W (s) is a loss function, L is a pre-set threshold and g(r) is the probability 
density function for the investment return. 
Albrecht (1993) considers shortfall risk in the case where the returns follow normal 
and lognormal distributions. He observes that "... [i]n contrast to... the variance of 
returns, shortfall-risk is more consistent with the investors' intuitive perception of 
risk in that it focuses more on the real economical risk of an investor, whereas the 
variance 
... 
measure[s] 
... 
the volatility of financial assets... " (p. 417). 
He defines shortfall risk in terms of the probability of the event that the return will 
be below some threshold. However, he does not include the severity of the event. 
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Thus this formulation of shortfall risk does not satisfy Clarkson's axioms. 
Albrecht (1994) considers a more general approach to downside risk. He considers 
an approach similar to that of Clarkson (1989) by suggesting a power loss function. 
That is, setting W (s) = s" in Equation 5.4. 
Setting n=0 leads to the shortfall probability as in Albrecht (1993). Meanwhile, a 
linear loss function (n 
= 
1) leads to the shortfall expectation; and a quadratic loss 
function (n 
= 
2) leads to the shortfall semivariance. This approach to shortfall risk 
is similar to the lower partial moment approach considered, for instance, by Fish- 
burn (1977). (Also see Albrecht, Maurer and Stephan (1995) and Albrecht, Maurer 
and Timpel (1995) for applications to options). 
Another downside risk measure which has been widely covered in financial risk 
management is the Value at Risk (VaR). Dowd (1998) defines the VaR as "... the 
maximum expected loss over a given horizon period at a given level of confidence... " 
(p. 39). This expressed mathematically as 
VaRc(X) 
= 
inf {x 1 Prob(X < x) > cl (5.5) 
where X is the random variable representing the loss and 1- c is the confidence level. 
Artzner et al. (1997,1999) criticize the VaR because it fails to satisfy some `coherence 
axioms'. Let p, a mapping from the set. of loss random variables to real numbers, 
be a risk measure. Then p is said to be coherent if it satisfies the following axioms: 
Axiom S: Subadditivity This is the property that for any loss random variables 
X and Y the risk of the sum of losses should be less than the sum of the 
individual risks. That is, 
p(X +Y) < p(X) + p(Y). (5.6) 
Axiom H: Homogeneity This is a reverse property imposed following Axiom S: 
p(AX) =, \P(X) (5.7) 
for all positive real numbers p. 
Axiom M: Monotonicity This ensures that p is a monotonic function (nonin- 
creasing, in this case) 
X<Y= p(X) > p(Y). (5.8) 
Axiom T: Translation Invariance This states that 
p(X +a r) = p(X) -a (5.9) 
and in particular p(X + p(X) r) = 0. 
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Artzner et al. (1999) show that the VaR risk measure does not satisfy the subad- 
ditivity axiom (Axiom S). They conclude that "... with respect to the addition of 
risks... " the VaR creates "... severe aggregation problems... ". They further note that 
the VaR "... prohibits diversification because 
... 
[it] does not take into account the eco- 
nomic consequences of the events, the probabilities of which it controls... " (p. 218). 
They suggest that a coherent alternative to the VaR is the "TailVaR" or conditional 
tail expectation (CTE). Wirch and Hardy (1999) define this as "... the expected value 
of the loss given that the loss falls in the upper (1 
- 
a) tail of the distribution... " 
(p. 339). 
In other words 
CTEE(X) 
= 
E[X 1X> VaRa(X)] (5.10) 
where V aRa (X) is as defined in Equation 5.5. 
This risk measure is shown to be coherent. As an alternative to this measure, Wirch 
(1999) considers the Mean Excess Loss. The Mean Excess Loss is defined, for a 
benchmark x, as 
rl MEL(x) 
=E [X 
-xIX> x]. (5.11) 
The connection between the CTE and the MEL can easily be established by setting 
the benchmark x equal to the VaR. (see Albrecht et al. (2001, p. 4)). 
Albrecht et al. (2001) observe that the shortfall expectation, defined above using a 
linear loss function, works out as the product of the probability of shortfall (loss) 
and the mean excess loss. (also see Maurer and Schlag (2002, pp. 3,4)). 
We apply these ideas in the formulation of the Solvency and Contribution risks 
below. 
Solvency Risk Measure 
The Solvency risk concerns the security of the benefits. Lee (1986) observes that 
"... the mere existence of a trust fund separate from the assets of the employer obvi- 
ously does not guarantee security of pension rights. The size of the fund in relation 
to its liabilities is crucial... " (p. 158). Thus, the solvency risk is the risk that at time 
t the accumulated fund, f (t), will be inadequate to meet with the accrued liability, 
AL(t). 
A common approach is to consider deficits: AL(t) -f (t). Then the solvency risk 
is measured in terms of the probability of deficit: P (AL(t) 
-f (t) > 0). As 
shown in Chapter 4 solvency risk can also be measured in terms of square deficits: 
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(AL(t) 
-f (t))2. 
However, these approaches do not satisfy Clarkson's axioms. Firstly, the probabil- 
ity of deficit does not include the amount of deficit. Secondly, in the case of square 
deficits, the surpluses are negative deficits and hence, upon squaring, deficits and 
surpluses are treated similarly. 
A more satisfactory approach would be to follow Axiom 1 of Clarkson and consider 
the probability of deficit and the severity of the deficit should it occur. An immedi- 
ate consequence of this is to treat all surpluses as zero deficits (instead of negative 
deficits) and calculate the solvency risk as the expected (mean) shortfall, MSt("). 
In the stochastic approach the solvency risk, given some initial information, will 
depend on the investment strategy, ir, and the funding strategy, NC. Hence, we can 
write the Mean Shortfall risk at time t as 
MSt(-7r, NC) 
= 
EoImax(AL(t) 
-f (t), 0) ] (5.12) 
where f (t) is the market value of the assets at time t, AL(t) is the discontinuance 
liability at time t and c(t) is the contribution rate at time t. 
This risk measure is of the form 
Prob(AL(t) 
-f (t) > 0) xE {AL(t) -f (t) 1 AL(t) -f (t) > 0]. (5.13) 
In a simulation setting this works out as follows. Consider N simulations where 
simulations 1, 
... , 
ND lead to (positive) deficits. Then 
MSt(ir, NC) 
=NE max(AL(t) -f (t), 0) 
1 
No 
=NE (AL(t) 
-f (t)) 
1 
N° N ND 
-DZ 
(AL(t) 
-f (t)) 
= 
Prob(AL(t) 
-f (t) > 0) "E [AL(t) -f (t) IAL(t) -f (t) > 0]. 
(5.14) 
Thus this measure has the required form: it satisfies Clarkson's axioms and is a 
coherent risk measure in accordance with the coherence properties of Artzner et al. 
(1997,1999). 
Contribution Rate Risk Measure 
The Contribution rate risk concerns the stability of the contribution plan. Lee (1986) 
observes that the "... employer will look for a contribution plan which will not be un- 
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duly disturbed by random fluctuations in the membership of the scheme... " (p. 159). 
As in the case of the Solvency risk, the Contribution rate risk can also be formulated 
as a downside risk measure. In this case the decision maker would need a target for 
the contribution. An intuitive choice for this target would be, as in the theoretical 
analysis of Chapter 4, the normal contribution rate. 
To formulate this risk measure we would need to consider the deviations: c(t) 
- 
NC, 
where c(t) is the contribution rate in year (t, t+ 1). The sponsoring employer would 
consider positive deviations as `unacceptable'. Meanwhile, negative deviations would 
not be considered `acceptable' since such deviations imply that c(t) is less than the 
preset target of NC. 
Then a risk measure could be constructed in a similar way to the Mean Shortfall 
using Eo [max (c(t) 
- 
NC, 0) ]. However, instead of an end-of-horizon measure, we 
need to consider all deviations over a given horizon. 
Thus we define the Excess Contribution rate risk as 
T-1 
ECRT(lr, NC) 
=E vt Eo [max(c(t) 
- 
NC, 0)]. (5.15) 
t=o 
Hence, the Excess Contribution rate risk is just the sum of all the (discounted) 
expected excess contribution rates over a given projection horizon. 
Average Contribution Rate 
The sponsoring employer would also be concerned about the cost of benefit provision 
over a given horizon. Thus the decision maker would need to include a `performance 
measure' of the various investment and funding strategies. 
For this purpose the expected contribution rate, Eo [c(t)], over a given year would be 
the natural choice. The reason being that we measure the cost in terms of the spon- 
sor's "out-of-pocket contributions" (McGill (1962, p. 286)). Over a period longer 
than one year the expected annual contribution rates would need to be summed (or 
averaged). 
Hence, we can calculate the average contribution rate performance measure over t 
years as 
1 t-i ACt (ir, NC) 
=E Eo [c(s)]. (5.16) t 
8_0 
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5.3.4 Decision Points and Projection Horizons 
The choice of appropriate decision points and projection horizons is very critical in 
the stochastic framework. The optimal strategies for funding and investment will 
depend, to some extent, on the chosen projection horizons (see, example, Lockyer 
(1990, p. 7) and Clark (1992, p. 40) and the results contained therein). 
There is an unresolved debate in the financial literature about long-term invest- 
ments and `time diversification'. Our goal in this thesis is not to endorse either 
side of the debate but to give a stochastic methodology for establishing optimal as- 
set allocation strategies for a given set of asset classes and a given projection horizon. 
In our stochastic approach the choice of the projection horizons and the factors that 
need to be taken into account is a crucial decision. We propose that projection 
horizons be classified as short-term, medium-term and long-term. Then, a finan- 
cially weak sponsoring employer might choose the short-term horizon. Meanwhile, 
a financially strong sponsor might choose the long-term horizon. 
Furthermore, for a given projection horizon, decision points have to be set. These 
decision points would be necessary for periodic reviews of the investment strategy 
and the funding strategy. 
5.4 Presentation of Results 
Due to the number of factors involved in the formulation of the stochastic problem, 
the presentation of results is a challenging exercise. In this section we consider pre- 
sentational methods that are based on our construction of the risk and performance 
measures. 
5.4.1 Multi-Dimensional Problem 
Each of the risk and performance measures can be written as Z= H(X, Y). Thus 
the results can be presented as three-dimensional surfaces. To illustrate the general 
results consider the surfaces in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. We depict here a case where the 
fund is allocated in equities and other assets. 
Figure 5.1 shows a possible surface for the risk, either Mean Shortfall risk or Ex- 
cess Contribution rate risk, at the end of some projection horizon. Each point on 
the surface shows the risk arising from a choice of the asset allocation and Normal 
contribution rate. This figure serves to illustrate several general principles. 
Firstly, as the Normal contribution rate increases, the risk decreases and vice versa. 
Secondly, as the asset allocation is varied, the risk varies in such a way that we get 
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an allocation leading to the lowest risk. Ultimately, this allocation will depend on 
such factors as the type of asset classes available, the maturity of the scheme and 
its funding level, and the projection period. 
Figure 5.2 shows a possible surface for the average contribution rate over a given 
projection period. Each point on the surface shows the average contribution rate 
arising from a choice of the asset allocation and Normal contribution rate. Several 
general principles can also be illustrated from this graph. 
Firstly, as the Normal contribution rate increases, the average contribution rate 
increases and vice versa. Secondly, as the asset allocation is varied, the average 
contribution rate varies in such a way that we get an allocation leading to the 
lowest average contribution rate. 
N 
O 
Ox ö 
ä 0 
4ýý 
ýw, 
sýy cT s 
ýti 
qA 
Figure 5.1: Risk at the end of T years 
5.4.2 Indifference Curve Analysis 
AV 
Presentation of results using 3-D surfaces might be mathematically correct but it 
offers little help to the decision-making process. What is necessary is to consider 
the lines of equal risk or cost: contours. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
We will refer to these contours as Indifference curves. Sloman (1999, p. 115) defines 
an Indifference curve as follows: 
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Definition 5.2 Indifference Curve An indifference curve is a line showing all those 
combinations of two goods which give the same level of utility. 
The contours show combinations of asset allocation (7r) and Normal contribution 
rate (NC) which lead to the same level of risk or cost. Hence, all things equal, the 
decision maker would be indifferent between combinations on the same contour. 
Then the optimal investment strategies can be worked out as follows: 
Definition 5.3 Efficiency An asset allocation lr* will be said to efficient for a given 
level h of the risk or performance measure H(ir, NC) if lr* lies on the intersection 
between the indifference curve (or contour) for h and the vertical NC 
-H plane 
passing through some value of the Normal contribution rate. 
We note that if we project onto the it 
- 
NC plane, then instead of the NC 
-H plane 
we get a horizontal line passing through some value of the Normal contribution rate. 
This idea is pursued further in Chapter 6. 
5.5 Vector Stochastic Optimization 
In this section we formulate the stochastic pension fund problem as a multiobjective 
problem. 
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Figure 5.3: Average Contribution Rate at the end of T years with contours 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The underlying idea of vector stochastic optimization is to set up a multiobjective 
problem in order to obtain "Pareto optimal" solutions. Such solutions owe their 
name to the economist Vilfredo Pareto. 
A multiobjective optimization problem can be set up as follows: 
min [Hi(ir), H2 (7r), 
... , 
HN(lr)] (5.17) 
where the objective functions Hi (7r), i=1, """, N, are linear or nonlinear functions 
of the decision variables 7r =(7r,,.. 
., 
7r, ß). 
The objective functions are usually set up as conflicting goals of the decision maker 
and may also involve an element of randomness due to the decision maker's financial 
environment. 
Eschenauer et al. (1990, p. 10) define Pareto optimality as follows: 
Definition 5.4 Pareto-optimality A decision variable 7r* is said to be Pareto opti- 
mal for the multiobjective problem 5.17 if and only if there is no decision variable 
ir with the characteristics 
HH (7r) < Hj (ir') for all jE {1, 
... , 
N} 
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and 
H3 (ir) < Hj(ir*) for at least one jE{1, 
... , 
N} (5.18) 
Thus a decision variable lr* is Pareto optimal if and only if any other decision 
variable -7r leads to worse values than those at lr* for at least one of the objective 
functions (Chankong and Haimes (1983, p. 115-116)). 
Several methods of solving the multicriteria problem are described in the literature 
on optimization. These methods include 
Method 1: Weighting 
Under this method weights are introduced in order to reduce the multicriteria prob- 
lem to a single criterion problem of the form 
N 
min > wi Hi(7r) (5.19) 
i=1 
where the weights could be set so that ýN 1 ws = 1. 
Method 2: c-constraint 
Under this method the multiobjective problem is reduced to a single objective prob- 
lem with N-1 constraints: 
min Hi(ir) 
7r 
subject to H3 (ir) C Ej for j=1, 
... , 
N, ji (5.20) 
5.5.2 Application to Pension Fund problems 
Formulation of the Problem 
It is possible to formulate the stochastic pension fund problem as a multiobjective 
problem. The goal is to find pareto optimal solutions to this problem. For simplicity 
we only consider one decision variable : 7r = ir. The formulation can be done in 
several ways. 
Firstly, consider the solvency and contribution rate risks. The multiobjective prob- 
lem can be written as: 
min [MST(lr, NC), ECRT(ir, NC) I. (5.21) 
Following Definition 5.4, the set of pareto optimal solutions will be the set of deci- 
sion variables such that any other decision variable would either decrease the Mean 
Shortfall risk and increase the Excess Contribution Rate risk or increase the Mean 
Shortfall risk and decrease the Excess Contribution Rate risk. 
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Secondly, consider the solvency risk and the performance measure. The multiobjec- 
tive problem can be written as: 
min [MST (7r, NC), ACT (7r, NC)]. (5.22) 
The set of pareto optimal solutions will be the set of decision variables such that any 
other decision variable would either decrease the Mean Shortfall risk and increase 
the Average Contribution rate or increase the Mean Shortfall risk and decrease the 
Average Contribution rate. 
Finding Pareto Solutions 
Seeking analytic solutions to such problems would certainly be a very formidable 
task (except in the cases of very simple pension models). However, using com- 
puter simulations simplifies the analysis regardless of the complexity of the pension 
model. The use of computers to solve multiobjective problems is well-established in 
the literature 
- 
see, for example, Novak and Ragsdale (2003) for an application to a 
stochastic linear programming problem. 
In our case, pareto optimal solutions can be obtained using the following steps: 
Step 1: Formulate the pension model and set the evolution of the various crucial 
economic factors. 
Step 2: Set the projection period and decision points. 
Step 3: Fix the Normal contribution rate, NC. 
Step 4: Project the fund for different values of ir. 
Step 5: Calculate the risk and performance measures. 
Step 6: Find the Pareto solutions by considering the trade-offs of the two criteria 
for various values of 7r. These will be those values of ir such that one of the 
measures can not be improved without worsening the second measure. 
Step 7: Repeat Steps 4 to 6 for various choices of NC. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have presented a stochastic approach to decision making in de- 
fined benefit pension schemes. We have considered two downside risk measures and 
a cost performance measure. 
It is possible to extend this framework by considering other downside risk formu- 
lations for solvency and contribution rate risks. For example, depending on the 
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population structure of the scheme, it might be more appropriate to consider the 
contribution amounts instead of the contribution rate. 
In Chapter 6 we consider a case study to illustrate the ideas presented in this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
A Case Study of the Risk 
Management Approach 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we present a case study in order to illustrate the stochastic approach 
set out in Chapter 5. We have considered the modelling framework in Appendix B. 
In this case study we carry out stochastic projections of the pension scheme over 
five 3-year periods. Thus the longest projection horizon is 15 years. 
It is possible to consider longer horizons depending on the circumstances of the em- 
ployer: a financially weak employer might prefer a short horizon whilst a financially 
strong employer might prefer a long horizon. In our case we chose to project only 
up to 15 years as this provided the best compromise between seeking a long-term 
horizon and the available computer power. 
As will be discussed below, the 3-year periods were chosen as the intervaluation 
periods. This is a common approach to pension scheme valuations in the UK. At 
the end of every intervaluation period we measure, for each initial asset allocation 
(in equities and bonds) and Normal contribution rate, the Mean Shortfall risk, the 
Excess Contribution rate risk and the Average contribution rate. These performance 
measures have already been defined in Chapter 5. However, for the particular cal- 
culations we introduce some scaling factors: which necessitates some changes to the 
definitions. 
Mean Shortfall risk 
This is calculated at the end of every intervaluation period as follows. Let ir be the 
initial allocation in equities (and hence, the initial allocation in bonds is 1-7r) and let 
NC be the Normal contribution rate. Then the Mean Shortfall risk, MST(Ir, NC), 
at the end of T years is: 
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MST(lr, NC) 
= f(0) Eo[max 
(L(T) 
-f (T), 0)] 
= f(0) Pr 
(L(T) 
-f (T) > 0) E [L(T) - 
.f 
(T) I L(T) 
-f (T) > 0] 
(6.1) 
where L(T) and f (T) are the discontinuance liability and the market value of assets, 
respectively, at the end of T years; and f (0) is the market value of assets at the 
start of the projections, and is used as a scaling factor. 
Excess Contribution rate risk 
The Excess Contribution rate risk, ECRT(lr, NC), over T years is calculated as 
follows: 
T 
ECRT (7r, NC) 
=1 vt Eo [ max (c(t) - NC, 0) 
a(T) e-o (6.2) 
where T is the time at the end of the period, and a(T) represents the present value 
of aT year annuity-due calculated at a real rate of interest. We take this real rate 
of interest to be the difference between the long-term mean for the yield on undated 
fixed-interest gilts and the long-term mean for the force of earnings inflation. 
Treatment of Gains and Losses 
As noted above, we set the intervaluation period to be 3 years. We further set the 
spread period to be 3 years. The effect of other choices of these two parameters will 
be investigated later in the chapter. 
Thus we amortize all surpluses and deficits over 3 years at the end of each 3-year 
period. That is, having set the Normal contribution rate at the start of the sto- 
chastic projections we adjust it every three years depending on whether surpluses 
or deficits have arisen during the intervaluation period. So a normal contribution 
rate of 0 does not imply a recommended contribution rate of 0. However, over the 
first period, for an initially fully-funded scheme the recommended contribution rate 
is just the normal contribution rate. Hence, even though the Mean Shortfall Risks 
can be calculated at the end of every period, we can only calculate the Excess Con- 
tribution rate risks at the end of the second, third, fourth and fifth periods. 
The results in this chapter depend on the assumptions of our modelling framework. 
As a consequence, extensive sensitivity analysis is undertaken in the appendices. 
91 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 6.2 we consider the concept of 
indifference curves for the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate 
risk. In Section 6.3 we consider the concept of an efficient region as a way of 
reconciling the optimal asset allocations under the two risk measures. Then in 
Section 6.4 we investigate the Average Contribution rate as a measure of the cost 
for the sponsoring employer. We carry out an analysis of different amortization 
periods on the optimal policies in Section 6.5. Whilst in Section 6.6 we compare the 
results for static and dynamic investment strategies. The effect of the initial funding 
level is investigated in Section 6.7. And in Section 6.8 we reconsider the problem of 
seeking optimal asset allocation strategies as a problem of seeking Pareto optimal 
policies in a multi-objective setting. We end in Section 6.9 with some concluding 
remarks. 
6.2 The concept of indifference curves 
In this section we consider the concept of indifference curves. We analyze the Mean 
Shortfall and Excess Contribution rate risks separately and construct indifference 
curves showing all choices of asset allocation and Normal contribution rate that lead 
to similar levels of risk. For illustrative purposes we will only consider the situation 
at the end of the second and fifth intervaluation periods. 
6.2.1 Mean Shortfall Risk 
Figure 6.1 shows the Mean Shortfall risk levels at the end of the second period (i. e. 
at the end of 6 years). We have shown the Mean Shortfall risk levels at the end of 
6 years instead of at the end of 3 years in order to match the Excess contribution 
rate risk levels which can only be calculated from the end of 6 years (i. e. end of the 
second period). In this case the scheme is initially fully-funded and we employ a 
static asset allocation strategy (with annual rebalancing). 
We illustrate our results by considering 4 curves although it is possible to draw 
a curve passing through any given point on the graph. Each curve shows all the 
combinations of initial allocation in equities and normal contribution rate that lead 
to a given Mean Shortfall Risk. For instance, all combinations along the top curve 
lead to a Mean Shortfall Risk of 0.051. 
It is not possible to consider all combinations of initial allocation in equities and normal 
contribution rate in the computer simulations. Hence for a given Mean Shortfall risk interpolations 
are carried out, where necessary, to calculate the combinations along the curves. To reduce the 
interpolation error simulations are carried out for 21 initial allocations in equities ie 0%, 5%, 
10%... 100%; and 17 normal contribution rates ie 0,0.02,0.04 
... 
0.32. So for a given normal 
contribution rate, 21 initial allocations in equities are considered. 
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As a further illustration, we consider six points on the graph: A, B, C, D, E, and 
F. The points A, B and C stand for asset allocation strategies with a high bond 
proportion whilst points D, E and F stand for asset allocation strategies with a high 
equity proportion. 
Furthermore, points A and B have a similar Normal contribution rate; points B and 
C have a similar asset allocation strategy; points C, D and E have a similar Nor- 
mal contribution rate; whilst points D and F have a similar asset allocation strategy. 
Additionally, although points B and D have different asset allocations and Normal 
contribution rates, they lie on the same curve and thus lead to the same level of risk 
of 0.05. Similarly, points C and F both lie on the bottom curve and lead to the level 
of risk of 0.065. 
Each point on the graph can thus be identified by 3 coordinates (x, y, z), where z 
is the initial allocation in equities, y is the normal contribution rate, and z is the 
Mean Shortfall Risk. 
For example, point A has coordinates (7.6%, 0.196,0.06) and point D has coordi- 
nates (81%, 0.146,0.05). This means that if our normal contribution rate is 0.196 and 
we initially invest 7.6% in Equities then we would expect a Mean Shortfall risk of 
0.06 at the end of the second period. On the other hand if our normal contribution 
rate is 0.146 and we initially invest 75% in Equities then we would expect a Mean 
Shortfall risk of 0.05 at the end of the second period. 
This analysis leads to the concept of indifference curves as explained in Chapter 5. 
The decision maker would be expected to be indifferent between a combination of 
17% initial allocation in equities and normal contribution rate of 0.196 (i. e. point 
B) and a combination of 75% initial allocation in equities and normal contribution 
rate of 0.146 (i. e. point D). This is due to the fact that both combinations lead to 
the same level of Mean Shortfall risk. 
We observe from Figure 6.1 that the two most important concepts of indifference 
curves hold in our case. Firstly, combinations along the lower curves lead to higher 
Mean Shortfall Risks, and vice versa. For example, point B and point D along the 
top curve lead to a lower Mean Shortfall Risk of 0.05, while point C and point F 
along the lowest curve lead to a higher Mean Shortfall Risk of 0.065. Thus a ra- 
tional decision maker will, all things being equal, try to reach the highest possible 
indifference curve (Sloman (1999), page 117). 
Secondly, it is impossible for two indifference curves to intersect, all things being 
equal (Sloman (1999), page 117). In our case it is impossible for a given combination 
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Figure 6.1: Mean Shortfall risk levels at the end of 6 years 
of initial allocation in equities and normal contribution rate to lead to two different 
Mean Shortfall Risks. 
As shown in Chapter 5, to find the optimal asset allocations we need the minimum 
points of the indifference curves. Hence, in Figure 6.1 we draw the line PQ through 
all the minimum points of the indifference curves. It is impossible to draw a line 
which passes `exactly' through the minimum points unless if one solves the impossi- 
ble problem of considering every contribution rate and every asset allocation. Hence, 
PQ is a best-fit line which passes either through or very close to the minimum points 
of the indifference curves. Thus PQ is a good approximation to the `curve' which 
passes through all the minimum points. Hence we obtain two regions, region I and 
region II. Such a division is very important for decision making, as we will show 
below. 
Decision-making under Mean Shortfall risk 
Points A and B in Figure 6.1 have the same normal contribution rate of 0.196 but 
different initial allocation in equities of 7.6% and 17%, respectively. Furthermore, 
point A leads to a higher Mean Shortfall risk than point B i. e. 0.06 and 0.05, re- 
spectively. 
This implies that a decision maker can improve their position by choosing point B 
(i. e. increasing initial allocation in equities) rather than point A. This also holds 
in general: that is, for positions in region I, for a given normal contribution rate 
a decision maker can improve their position by increasing their initial allocation in 
equities (i. e. by shifting horizontally from left to right). This means that for a given 
normal contribution rate the decision maker should choose points that are nearer to 
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(or on) the line PQ than, for example, point A. 
We also note that points D and E have the same normal contribution rate of 0.146 
but different initial allocations in equities of 75% and 90%, respectively. A decision 
maker can improve their position by choosing point D (decrease initial allocation in 
equities) rather than point E. This is due to the fact that D leads to a lower Mean 
Shortfall risk than E. 
Hence, for positions in region II, for a given normal contribution rate a decision 
maker can improve their position by decreasing their initial allocation in equities 
(i. e. by shifting horizontally from right to left). This means that for a given normal 
contribution rate the decision maker should choose points that are nearer to (or on) 
the line PQ than, for example, point E. 
Other possible movements, like C to B and F to D, lead to lower Mean Shortfall Risk 
positions (i. e. Mean Shortfall Risk decreases from 0.065 to 0.05) but the normal 
contribution rate increases from 0.146 to 0.196 and 0.082 to 0.146, respectively. 
Whilst movements like A to C and E to F lead to higher Mean Shortfall risk positions 
(i. e. 0.06 to 0.065 and 0.055 to 0.065, respectively) but the normal contribution rate 
decreases from 0.196 to 0.146 and 0.146 to 0.082, respectively. Such movements can 
only be analysed by considering their effect on the Excess Contribution Rate Risk. 
This will be covered in a later section. 
6.2.2 Excess Contribution Rate Risk 
Having considered the Mean Shortfall risk we now turn to the Excess Contribution 
rate risk. We will show that the general ideas of indifference curves discussed under 
the Mean Shortfall risk also hold under the Excess Contribution rate risk. 
Figure 6.2 below shows the Excess Contribution Rate Risk levels at the end of 6 
years. Each curve shows all the combinations of initial allocation in equities and 
normal contribution rate that lead to a given Excess Contribution Rate Risk. For 
instance, all combinations along the top curve lead to an Excess Contribution Rate 
Risk of 0.035. 
Each point on the graph can be identified by 3 coordinates (x, y, z), where x is the 
initial allocation in equities, y is the normal contribution rate, and z is the Excess 
Contribution Rate Risk. For example, point A has coordinates (8%, 0.157,0.04) 
and point F has coordinates (80%, 0.15,0.045). This means that if our normal 
contribution rate is 0.157 and we initially invest 8% in Equities then we would 
expect an Excess Contribution Rate risk of 0.04 at the end of the second period. On 
the other hand if our normal contribution rate is 0.15 and we initially invest 80% 
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in Equities then we would expect an Excess Contribution Rate Risk of 0.045 at the 
end of the second period. 
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Figure 6.2: Excess contribution rate risk levels at the end of 6 years 
The indifference curve concepts, discussed in Section 6.2.1, also hold in this case. 
For example, point B and point D along the top curve lead to a lower Excess Con- 
tribution Rate Risk of 0.035 whilst point C along the lowest curve leads to a higher 
Excess Contribution Rate Risk of 0.05. Furthermore, it is impossible for two indif- 
ference curves to intersect since a given combination of initial allocation in equities 
and normal contribution rate can only lead to one value of Excess contribution rate 
risk. 
Decision-making under the Excess Contribution rate risk 
As in the Mean Shortfall case, let LM be the best-fit line through all the minimum 
points of the indifference curves in Figure 6.2. Then, as we observed in the Mean 
Shortfall case, for positions in region I, for a given normal contribution rate the 
decision maker can improve their position by increasing the allocation in equities 
i. e. by moving from left to right towards (or onto) the line LM. While for positions 
in region II, for a given normal contribution rate the decision maker can improve 
their position by decreasing their allocation in equities i. e. by moving from right to 
left towards (or onto) the line LM. 
Other possible movements, like C to B and F to D, lead to lower Excess Contribution 
Rate Risk positions (i. e. 0.05 to 0.035 and 0.045 to 0.035, respectively) but the 
normal contribution rate increases from 0.087 to 0.157 and 0.15 to 0.215, respectively. 
Whilst movements like A to C and E to F lead to higher Excess Contribution Rate 
Risk positions (i. e. 0.04 to 0.05 and 0.04 to 0.045, respectively) but the normal 
contribution rate decreases from 0.157 to 0.087 and 0.215 to 0.15, respectively. Such 
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movements can only be analysed by considering their effect on the Mean Shortfall 
Risk. This will be covered in a later section. 
6.2.3 Comparisons at the end of the Second Period 
In this section we compare the asset allocations under the two risk measures by 
considering the situation at the end of the second intervaluation period. Figure 6.3 
shows a comparison of Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution Rate Risk levels at 
the end of 6 years. The minimum points for the curves for Mean Shortfall risk are 
in the region of 60% initial allocation in equities. On the other hand, the minimum 
points for the curves for Excess Contribution Rate Risk are centred around 40% 
initial allocation in equities. 
This means that for a given normal contribution rate, we would initially invest 
more in equities if our decision were based only on the Mean Shortfall risk; and we 
would initially invest less in equities if our decision were based only on the Excess 
Contribution Rate Risk. This conflict has to be reconciled and in a subsequent 
section we will show how this can be done. 
6.2.4 Comparisons at the end of the Fifth Period 
In this section we conduct similar comparisons as in the previous section of the Mean 
Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate risk results but for projections over 
15 years. 
Figure 6.3 also shows a comparison of Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution Rate 
Risk levels at the end of 15 years. The minimum points for the curves for Mean 
Shortfall risk are in the region of 80% initial allocation in equities. On the other 
hand, the minimum points for the curves for Excess Contribution Rate Risk are 
centred around 55% initial allocation in equities. 
This implies that, as we observed in Section 6.2.3, there is a conflict between deci- 
sions based only on Mean Shortfall Risk and decisions based only on Excess Con- 
tribution Rate Risk. Additionally, we observe that the minimum points are at a 
higher initial allocation in equities for the 15-year projections than for the 6-year 
projections (i. e. 80% versus 60% and 55% versus 40%). This means that if we were 
seeking to minimize risk we would initially invest more in equities if our projection 
period were 15 years than if our projection period were 6 years. 
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Figure 6.3: Comparison of risk levels at the end of 6 and 15 years 
6.3 Decision making 
In this section we introduce the idea of an Efficient Region as a way to reconcile 
the conflicts in the asset allocations under the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess 
Contribution rate risk. 
6.3.1 Reconciling the risks 
In Section 6.2.1 we showed how the decision maker could choose a combination of 
initial asset allocation and normal contribution rate by considering only the Mean 
Shortfall Risk. And in Section 6.2.2 we showed how the decision maker could choose 
a combination of initial asset allocation and normal contribution rate by considering 
only the Excess Contribution Rate Risk. However, in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4, we 
observed that there is a conflict between decisions based only on Mean Shortfall 
Risk and decisions based only on Excess Contribution Rate Risk. 
We will now show how the two risks can be reconciled in the decision making process 
so that the decision maker can achieve an efficient combination of initial asset allo- 
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cation and normal contribution rate. 
In Figures 6.4 and 6.5 below we plot the Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution 
Rate Risk levels at the end of 15 years on the same graph. Corresponding figures 
would emerge for comparisons at other time horizons. Thus we use the 15-year 
horizon for illustrative purposes only. 
The lines LM and PQ are the best-fit lines through the minimum points for the 
Excess Contribution Rate and the Mean Shortfall Risk levels, respectively. LM and 
PQ are not necessarily parallel. These lines split each of the graphs into three re- 
gions. Region I contains all points which are to the left of the minimum points of 
both the Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution Rate Risk levels. Points in Region 
II are to the right of Excess contribution rate risk minimum points and to the left 
of Mean Shortfall risk minimum points. Meanwhile points in Region III are to the 
right of both sets of minimum points. 
In Figure 6.4, we identify points as (x, y) where x is the initial allocation in equities 
and y is the normal contribution rate. Thus for a given point the values x and y 
can be calculated from the x- and y-axes. In Figure 6.5, we identify points as (z, w) 
where z is the Mean Shortfall Risk and w is the Excess Contribution Rate Risk. 
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 must be used concurrently. Obviously, we could have shown 
all the information on one graph instead of two. However, we use two graphs in 
order to show, separately, the choices that are available and the consequences of 
such choices. Figure 6.5 shows the consequences of the choices made in Figure 6.4. 
We consider some examples, 
Example 1: for a normal contribution rate of 0.15 and initial allocation in equities 
of 7% we would expect a Mean Shortfall risk of 0.10 and Excess contribution 
risk of 0.055 after 15 years (point A in Figures 6.4 and 6.5); 
Example 2: for a normal contribution rate of 0.215 and initial allocation in equities 
of 68% we would expect a Mean Shortfall risk of 0.029 and Excess contribution 
risk of 0.0315 after 15 years (G in Figures 6.4 and 6.5); 
Example 3: for a normal contribution rate of 0.021 and initial allocation in eq- 
uities of 60.5% we would expect a Mean Shortfall risk of 0.088 and Excess 
contribution risk of 0.069 after 15 years (E in Figures 6.4 and 6.5); and 
Example 4: for a normal contribution rate of 0.15 and initial allocation in equities 
of 98% we would expect a Mean Shortfall risk of 0.051 and Excess contribution 
risk of 0.053 after 15 years (K in Figures 6.4 and 6.5). 
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6.3.2 Choosing an Efficient Combination 
We now demonstrate how an efficient combination of initial asset allocation and 
normal contribution rate can be chosen. We do this by considering the three regions 
presented in Figure 6.5. 
Region I 
Assume, without loss of generality, that a decision maker chooses point A. Such a 
decision maker can change their position in several ways. 
Firstly, by moving to higher points e. g. point B. Since we are dealing with indiffer- 
ence curves, this move would lead to a point which has lower Mean Shortfall risk 
and lower Excess contribution rate risk. Our example corresponds to arrow AB in 
Figure 6.5. In this case Mean Shortfall risk decreases from 0.10 to 0.035 and Excess 
contribution rate risk decreases from 0.055 to 0.0275. Moving from A to B can be 
effected by increasing the normal contribution rate from 0.15 to 0.21 and increasing 
the initial allocation in equities from 7% to 43.4%. 
Secondly, by moving to 
-points which lie horizontally to the right e. g. point C. Since 
we are moving horizontally towards the minimum points of both sets of indiffer- 
ence curves, both risks, Mean Shortfall Risk and Excess Contribution Rate Risk, 
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the end of 15 years 
will decrease. Our example corresponds to arrow AC in Figure 6.5. Mean Shortfall 
Risk decreases from 0.10 to 0.05 and Excess Contribution Rate Risk decreases from 
0.055 to 0.0368. We can accomplish this by leaving the normal contribution rate 
unchanged and increasing the initial allocation in equities from 7% to 48.5%. 
Thirdly, by moving to lower points. For example, moving from A to D or moving 
from A to E. We analyse these cases separately: 
" moving from A to D: Mean Shortfall Risk decreases from 0.10 to 0.068 and 
Excess Contribution Rate Risk decreases from 0.055 to 0.0525. We can ac- 
complish this by reducing the normal contribution rate from 0.15 to 0.086 and 
increasing the initial allocation in equities from 7% to 55%. 
" moving from A to E: Mean Shortfall Risk decreases from 0.10 to 0.088 but 
Excess Contribution Rate Risk increases from 0.055 to 0.069. We can accom- 
plish this by reducing the normal contribution rate from 0.15 to 0.021 and 
increasing the initial allocation in equities from 7% to 60.5%. 
The examples above show that positions in region I can be improved by moving 
towards region II. However, as highlighted in the last example, we cannot just move 
arbitrarily to any point lower than A, for instance, without increasing at least one 
of the risks. 
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Region III 
The scenario in region III is similar to that in region I. The main difference is that 
in region III all the movements involve reducing the initial allocation in equities: 
moving from K to G is similar to moving from A to B; 
moving from K to H is similar to moving from A to C; and 
moving from K to I is similar to moving from A to D. 
Moving from K to J is also similar to moving from A to E, but, in this case, both 
risks increase. The Mean Shortfall Risk increases from 0.051 to 0.064 and the Excess 
Contribution Rate Risk increases from 0.053 to 0.059. 
Region II 
We have observed that positions in regions I and III can be improved by moving 
towards region II. Now we will answer the crucial question: what happens if a deci- 
sion maker chooses a position in region II? 
Assume, without loss of generality, that the decision maker chooses point F i. e. a 
normal contribution rate of 0.15 and 60% initial allocation in equities. Then we 
would expect, after 15 years, a Mean Shortfall risk of 0.046 and Excess contribution 
rate risk of 0.0375. Can this position be improved? 
Firstly, we can not move to lower points (e. g. D, E, I and J) without increasing 
both risks; secondly, moving to higher points (e. g. B and G) reduces both risks but 
involves increasing the normal contribution rate; and thirdly, moving horizontally, 
for example to C or H, maintains the normal contribution rate at 0.15. However, 
one of the risks decreases whilst the other risk increases: 
" 
by moving from F to C the Mean Shortfall Risk increases from 0.046 to 0.05 
and the Excess Contribution Rate Risk decreases from 0.0375 to 0.0368; and 
. 
by moving from F to H the Mean Shortfall Risk decreases from 0.046 to 0.044 
and the Excess Contribution Rate Risk increases from 0.0375 to 0.042. 
It is important to notice that we can not only move from regions I and III towards 
region II but we can actually move into region II. For example, 
Example 1: moving from A to F. In this case both risks decrease: the Mean Short- 
fall Risk decreases from 0.10 to 0.046 and the Excess Contribution Rate Risk 
decreases from 0.055 to 0.0375. (this move corresponds to increasing initial 
allocation in equities from 7% to 60%); 
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Example 2: moving from K to F. Again both risks decrease: the Mean Shortfall 
Risk decreases from 0.051 to 0.046 and the Excess Contribution Rate Risk 
decreases from 0.053 to 0.0375. (this move corresponds to decreasing initial 
allocation in equities from 98% to 60%). 
6.3.3 Conclusions 
This analysis leads us to the following conclusions. Firstly, positions in region I 
and region III are inefficient. This is because, for a given normal contribution rate, 
both the Mean Shortfall Risk and the Excess Contribution Rate Risk can be reduced 
by moving to a position in region II. And secondly, positions in region II cannot 
be improved without either increasing one of the risks or increasing the normal 
contribution rate. 
6.4 Cost measure: Average Contribution Rate 
In this section we show how the average contribution rate can be used as a perfor- 
mance measure in the context of indifference curves. As in the case of the Mean 
Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate risk, the goal will be to find the as- 
set allocation strategies which minimize the average contribution rate over a given 
projection horizon and for a given Normal contribution rate. 
6.4.1 Average Cost 
The sponsor will be interested in the average cost over the funding period. The 
average cost for a given asset allocation strategy and Normal contribution rate can 
be measured by considering the average contribution rate over a given projection 
horizon. The underlying idea is that strategies which lead to lower average contri- 
bution rates are less costly and hence optimal. 
We calculate the average contribution rate over a given horizon as: 
ACT(lr, NC) 
=T1 
T-1 
E Eo [c(t)] (6.3) 
t=o 
where c(t) is the contribution rate in the year (t, t+ 1) payable at time t. 
We only consider the results of projections over 6-year and 15-year horizons in order 
to compare with the results obtained for the Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribu- 
tion rate risks. Figure 6.6 shows the average contribution rate levels at the end of 6 
years and 15 years. 
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Figure 6.6: Average contribution rate levels at the end of 6 and 15 years 
Each curve in Figure 6.6 shows all the combinations of initial allocation in equities 
and normal contribution rate that lead to a given average contribution rate. 
We observe that combinations along higher curves lead to higher average contribu- 
tion rates. For example, at the end of 6 years, combinations along the top curve 
lead to an average contribution rate of 0.18 whilst combinations along the lowest 
curve lead to a lower average contribution rate of 0.12. And at the end of 15 years, 
combinations along the top curve lead to an average contribution rate of 0.13 whilst 
combinations along the lowest curve lead to a lower average contribution rate of 0.10. 
The curves in Figure 6.6 are indifference curves since the decision maker would be 
indifferent between all combinations along a given curve. These curves can be used 
as a measure of the cost. In our analysis of Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution 
Rate Risks, we have concluded that a decision maker could improve their position 
by choosing combinations in the efficient region. For every choice of normal contri- 
bution rate and initial asset allocation, the decision maker could use Figure 6.6 to 
determine the average contribution rate over the projection period. 
It is interesting to observe in Figure 6.6 that for a given normal contribution rate, 
if we move horizontally towards the maximum point we reduce the average contri- 
bution rate. The shape of the curves in Figure 6.6 is due to the zero lower bound 
on the recommended contribution rate. We would expect the shape of these curves 
to change if this lower bound was omitted. 
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6.4.2 Average contribution rate curves and the efficient re- 
gion 
In the reconciliation of the optimal asset allocations under the Mean Shortfall risk 
and the Excess Contribution rate risk in Section 6.3 we showed that asset allocations 
that are optimal under both risks are located within an efficient region. The reason 
for this was that a decision maker could improve his/her position by moving towards 
or into the efficient region. 
We have further shown in Section 6.4.1 that the maximum points for the average 
contribution rate curves lead to the lowest average contribution rate for a given 
Normal contribution rate. That is, a decision maker could reduce the average con- 
tribution rate, for a given Normal contribution rate, by moving horizontally towards 
the maximum point. 
In this section we investigate whether, for a given Normal contribution rate, the 
asset allocations that lead to the lowest average contribution rates coincide with the 
asset allocations in the efficient region. To this end, we depict the efficient region 
and the average contribution rate curves on the same axes. Figure 6.7 shows the 
average contribution rate levels and the efficient region at the end of 15 years. 
We observe that the maximum points for the average contribution rate curves lie in 
the efficient region LMPQ. Therefore, Figure 6.7 implies that, by moving towards 
the efficient region, the decision maker will be reducing the Mean Shortfall Risk, the 
Excess Contribution Rate Risk and the average contribution rate. 
Thus the asset allocations located in the efficient region are optimal not just for the 
two risk measures but also for the cost measure. 
6.5 The Effect of Amortization Periods on the In- 
difference Curves 
In this section we investigate the effect of amortization periods on the Mean Short- 
fall and Excess contribution rate risk levels. We consider the spread method and 
investigate two examples: spreading of surpluses and deficits over 3 years and over 
12 years. In the previous sections we have assumed that surpluses and deficits are 
spread over 3 years. 
We only examine the indifference curves at the end of the second and fifth projection 
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Figure 6.7: Average contribution rate levels and the efficient region at the end of 15 
years 
periods. The curves at the end of the first projection period are equivalent for the 
two cases of a3 year and 12 year spread period since the pension scheme is initially 
fully-funded. 
6.5.1 Mean Shortfall Risk 
Figure 6.8 shows the Mean Shortfall Risk indifference curves at the end of 6 and 15 
years. 
End of 6 years 
We observe that, firstly, for a given combination of normal contribution rate and 
initial allocation in equities, the Mean Shortfall Risk is lower for amortization over 
3 years than for amortization over 12 years (except, perhaps, for very low values of 
initial allocation in equities). And secondly, the minimum points of the indifference 
curves are in the region of 60% initial allocation in equities in both cases. 
End of 15 years 
We observe that, firstly, for a given combination of normal contribution rate and 
initial allocation in equities, the Mean Shortfall risk is lower for amortization over 3 
years than for amortization over 12 years, especially for initial allocation in equities 
higher than 20%. And secondly, the minimum points are in the region of 80% initial 
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allocation in equities for amortization over 3 years and 60% for amortization 12 
years. 
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(100% initial funding level; static asset allocation) 
6.5.2 Excess Contribution Rate Risk 
Figure 6.9 shows the Excess contribution rate risk indifference curves at the end of 
6 and 15 years. 
End of 6 years 
We observe that, firstly, for a given combination of normal contribution rate and 
initial allocation in equities, amortization over 3 years leads to higher Excess con- 
tribution rate risk than over 12 years. And, secondly, the minimum points are in 
the region of 40% initial allocation in equities in both cases. 
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End of 15 years 
We observe that, firstly, for a given combination of normal contribution rate and 
initial allocation in equities, amortization over 3 years leads to higher Excess con- 
tribution rate risk than over 12 years. And, secondly, the minimum points are in 
the region of 50% to 60% initial allocation in equities in both cases. 
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Figure 6.9: Comparison of Excess contribution rate risk levels at the end of 6 and 
15 years (100% initial funding level; static asset allocation) 
6.5.3 How do the Amortization Periods Compare? 
These results are intuitive: if deficits and surpluses are amortized over 3 years, the 
scheme would be expected to attain full-funding more quickly than if the amorti- 
zation was over 12 years. This explains the better Mean Shortfall risk position for 
amortization over 3 years than for the 12 years case. 
However, the `penalty' for this is the poor Excess Contribution Rate Risk positions 
for amortization over 3 years: we would expect higher recommended contribution 
rates for amortization over 3 years than over 12 years, all things being equal. 
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6.5.4 Efficient Regions 
Figure 6.10 below shows the efficient regions for projections over 15 years for amor- 
tization over 3 and 12 years. ABCD is the efficient region for amortization over 12 
years whilst LMPQ is the efficient region for amortization over 3 years. 
The efficient region is much more tightly defined when amortization takes place 
over 12 years rather than over 3 years. Furthermore, the righthand boundary shifts 
from PQ to CD implying an increase in the bond proportion in the optimal asset 
allocations as the spread period increases. 
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Figure 6.10: The efficient regions for 15-year projections for amortization over 3 and 
12 years 
6.6 Effect of Investment Strategies on the Indif- 
ference Curves 
In this section we investigate the effect of investment strategies on the indifference 
curves. We consider a static strategy and two dynamic strategies: 
Static asset allocation: this is the case we have been considering in the previous 
sections. The asset allocations are fixed and annually rebalanced; 
Dynamic asset allocation (DS1): in this case the asset allocations are changed 
at the end of every 3 years as follows: for each 10% increase in the funding 
level (relative to the initial value), the allocation in equities is decreased by 
5%, and vice versa; and 
Dynamic asset allocation (DS2): in this case, for each 10% increase in the fund- 
ing level (relative to the initial value), the allocation in equities is increased 
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by 5%, and vice versa. 
We note that DS1 is a counter-intuitive strategy where funds are switched into 
equities as the funding level becomes more adverse and into bonds as the funding 
level becomes more favourable. Although the choice of values for the percentage 
changes (that is, 10% and 5%) is arbitrary, the set up of these dynamic strategies 
will allow us to compare with the results for the dynamic programming problem in 
Chapter 4 and elsewhere in the actuarial literature. 
6.6.1 Mean Shortfall Risk 
Figure 6.11 shows the Mean Shortfall risk indifference curves at the end of 6 and 
15 years2. We observe that for a given combination of normal contribution rate and 
initial allocation in equities, the Mean Shortfall risk is lowest under DS1 and highest 
under DS2 (except for very low values of initial allocation in equities). 
static asset allocation; end of 6 years 
0.30 
---------------------------------------------------- 
2A 
----ý--------'-------- ------- --------'--- 
!ý 
---1--------1-: ------------ 0.18 ö ös 
006 
0.12 ate' 
2 
0.00 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
0.30 
024 
0.10 
0.12 1006 
0.00 
dynamic asset allocation (DS11; and o18 years 
- ----------------- 
----------------- 
._! ________-___. ___'________r 005 
00 
b 06 
0 
----- - ------------ i 
0% 
0.30 
0.24 
0.18 
0.12 
Z 
0.06 
0.00 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
dynamic aaset allocation (DS2); end of 6 years 
------------------------------------------------ 
oos 
0 
0.06 
------------ 
---------------------- 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
Initial allocation in Equities Initial allocation in Equities 
Figure 6.11: Comparison of Mean Shortfall risk levels at the end of 6 and 15 years 
(100% initial funding level) 
2At the end of 3 years the indifference curves are similar since all asset allocations in the first 
period are as in the static case 
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6.6.2 Excess Contribution Rate Risk 
In this case the results at the end of 6 years (i. e. end of the second period) the 
indifference curves are similar for all 3 asset allocations. However, as shown in Fig- 
ure 6.12, for longer projection periods for a given combination of normal contribution 
rate and initial allocation in Equities, the Excess Contribution Rate Risk is lowest 
under DS1 and highest under DS2. 
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6.6.3 How do the Investment Strategies Compare? 
We have observed that the Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution Rate Risks are 
lowest under DS1 and highest under DS2, for a given combination of normal contri- 
bution rate and initial asset allocation. This holds for all projection periods except 
for three-year projections for the Mean Shortfall risk and six-year projections for 
the Excess Contribution Rate risk where the results are similar. 
Hence, we conclude that dynamic strategy DS1 performs consistently better than 
the other two strategies; whilst the static strategy performs better than dynamic 
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strategy DS2. These results are consistent with the results emerging from theoretical 
models. In Chapter 4 we presented a solution for a dynamic programming problem 
involving a criterion with quadratic and linear factors. We showed that the optimal 
investment strategy is counter-intuitive in that it involves increasing the allocation 
in the risky asset as the pension fund deficit increases and vice versa. The analysis 
in this section further reinforce that finding. 
6.7 Effect of the Initial Funding Level on the In- 
difference Curves 
In Chapter 4 we showed that as the projection period increases we get a convergence 
in the optimal asset allocations for the cases where there are different levels of 
initial funding. In this section we study the effect of the initial funding level on the 
indifference curves. 
6.7.1 Initially under-funded and over-funded schemes 
We have so far analysed the results for an initially fully-funded scheme. We now 
consider the effect of other initial funding levels: a scheme initially in deficit and 
a scheme initially in surplus. We compare the results for the 100% initial funding 
level with the results for 80% and 120% initial funding levels. 
We spread any surpluses and deficits, including the initial surplus or deficit, over 3 
years. In our stochastic pension fund simulations, we use a recommended contribu- 
tion rate, which is just the normal contribution rate plus an adjustment generated 
by the spread formula (as discussed in an earlier section). 
A problem arises, however, if the adjustment is negative and larger, in absolute 
value, than the normal contribution rate. In practice this would mean a refund of 
contribution to the sponsor. In stochastic simulations, however, a refund of contri- 
butions would introduce unnecessary complications and, hence, we impose a lower 
bound of zero on the recommended contribution rate. 
This feature has a significant impact on the results of a scheme which initially is 
in surplus. When the initial surplus, 20% in our case, is amortized over 3 years, 
the arising adjustment is so large and negative that in the first 3-year period we 
recommend a contribution rate of zero for most of the normal contribution rates. 
This has three significant implications: 
Mean Shortfall Risk indifference curves would be impossible to calculate at the 
end of 3 years. The Mean Shortfall Risk would be the same, for a given asset 
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allocation, for all normal contribution rates where the recommended contribu- 
tion rate is zero. This complication only arises in the first 3-year period due to 
the initial surplus. However this does affect the Excess contribution rate risk 
calculations at the end of the second 3-year period, as we shall show below; 
Excess Contribution Rate Risk indifference curves would be impossible to cal- 
culate at the end of 3 years3. This is due to the fact that there is no excess 
contribution in the first 3-year period since the scheme has an initial surplus. 
Thus whatever the initial funding position of the scheme, the Excess Contribu- 
tion Rate Risk indifference curves cannot be calculated at the end of 3 years; 
and 
Excess Contribution Rate Risk indifference curves would be impossible to cal- 
culate at the end of 6 years for a scheme, which has a (significant) initial 
surplus. This demands careful explanation. We have noted above that, at the 
end of 3 years, the Mean Shortfall Risk is the same, for a given asset alloca- 
tion, for all normal contribution rates where the recommended contribution 
rate is zero in the first 3 years. This implies that when we spread surpluses 
and deficits at the end of 3 years the adjustments will be the same wherever 
we had a zero recommended contribution rate. In such cases, differences will 
only arise due to the initial asset allocation. Thus, at the end of 6 years, we 
would calculate the Excess Contribution Rate Risks but we would not be able 
to derive the indifference curves4. 
Figure 6.13 shows the Mean Shortfall Risk and the Excess Contribution Rate Risk 
indifference curves at the end of the 15 years for the 3 initial funding levels. We 
observe the following features: 
Mean Shortfall Risk 
Firstly, for a given combination of normal contribution rate and initial allocation 
in equities the Mean Shortfall risk is highest for the 80% case and lowest for the 
120% case; and secondly, the minimum points are in the region of 70% to 85% initial 
allocation in equities. 
Excess Contribution Rate Risk 
We observe that, firstly, for a given combination of normal contribution rate and 
initial allocation in equities the Excess contribution rate risk is highest for the 80% 
3For a scheme which is initially in deficit, we can calculate the Excess Contribution Rate Risk at 
the end of 3 years. But we cannot derive the indifference curves because this risk level is the same 
for all choices of the normal contribution rate, because there is only one value for the adjustment 
factor. 
4However it is important to note that some of these problems arise due to the amortization 
period for the initial surplus or deficit; and/or the amount of the initial surplus or deficit. 
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initial funding case and lowest for the 120% initial funding case; and secondly, the 
minimum points are in the region of 50% to 60% initial allocation in equities. 
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Figure 6.13: Mean Shortfall and Excess contribution 'rate risk levels at the end of 
15 years (static asset allocation) 
6.7.2 The Efficient Regions 
As observed above, the minimum points in Figure 6.13 lie in similar regions for the 
three initial funding cases. Thus the efficient regions for the three cases are not 
significantly different. 
This result is not surprising. we obtained a similar result for a theoretical model in 
Chapter 4. Hence, the findings in this section are due to the projection period: as 
the projection period increases we get a convergence in the optimal asset allocations. 
6.8 Efficient Frontier Analysis 
In this section we reconsider the problem of seeking optimal asset allocation strate- 
gies. However, instead of using indifference curves, we re-cast the problem as one of 
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seeking Pareto optimal policies in a multi-objective setting. 
As defined in Chapter 5, a strategy is said to be Pareto optimal if any other strat- 
egy leads to worse values for at least one of the objective functions. Although we 
have three objective functions we simplify the analysis by considering two objective 
functions at a time. 
We firstly consider decision-making in the case where the Normal contribution rate 
is not a free variable. This analysis is extended to the case where the Normal 
contribution rate is a free variable. Furthermore, we consider different choices of 
asset classes: equities and fixed-interest bonds, and equities and index-linked bonds. 
6.8.1 The Normal contribution rate as a fixed variable 
We firstly consider the case where the decision-maker is not allowed to vary the 
Normal contribution rate and we assume, without loss of generality, that the Nor- 
mal contribution rate is fixed at 10%. As before we carry out stochastic projections 
over a given period, say 15 years. We assume a fixed asset allocation (with annual 
re-balancing) in Equities and Fixed-Interest Bonds. A range of different initial asset 
allocations is considered and for each allocation we calculate the Mean Shortfall and 
Excess Contribution Rate risks. 
Figure 6.14 shows a curve depicting the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contri- 
bution Rate risk for 21 initial asset allocations. We plot the Mean Shortfall risk on 
the x-axis and the Excess Contribution Rate risk on the y-axis. 
We can illustrate this graph by considering several examples: 
Example 1: Point A represents the case where we invest 100% in equities. The 
Mean Shortfall risk is 0.111 whilst the Excess Contribution Rate risk is 0.089; 
Example 2: Point B represents the case where we invest 60% in equities and 40% 
in bonds. The Mean Shortfall risk is 0.091 whilst the Excess Contribution 
Rate risk is 0.065; 
Example 3: Point C represents the case where we invest 40% in equities and 60% 
in bonds. The Mean Shortfall risk is 0.0989 whilst the Excess Contribution 
Rate risk is 0.061; and 
Example 4: Point D represents the case where we invest 100% in bonds. The Mean 
Shortfall risk is 0.157 whilst the Excess Contribution Rate risk is 0.080. 
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Figure 6.14: Mean Shortfall risk and Excess Contribution Rate risk trade-off at the 
end of 15 years for 10% Normal contribution rate. 
Decision Making 
Consider the arcs AB, BC and CD. We can draw similar conclusions as in Figure 3 
with the three arcs representing the regions I, II and III, respectively (see Figures 6.4 
and 6.5). Thus, we can conclude that asset allocations along AB and CD are in- 
efficient because we can reduce both the Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution 
Rate risks by shifting towards asset allocations along arc BC. Meanwhile, along arc 
BC, a change of asset allocation leads to a simultaneous reduction in one risk and 
increase in the other risk. 
Alternatively, we could argue as follows. Firstly, consider asset allocations along arc 
AB. For a fixed Mean Shortfall risk we can find an asset allocation either on BC 
or on CD that has a lower Excess Contribution Rate risk. Hence asset allocations 
along AB are inefficient. 
Secondly, consider asset allocations along arc CD. For a fixed Excess Contribution 
Rate risk we can find an asset allocation either on AB or BC that has a lower Mean 
Shortfall risk. Hence asset allocations along CD are inefficient. 
And thirdly, consider asset allocations along arc BC. For a fixed Mean Shortfall 
risk the asset allocation with the lowest Excess Contribution Rate risk is along BC. 
Similarly, for a fixed Excess Contribution Rate risk the asset allocation with the 
lowest Mean Shortfall risk is along BC. 
Hence, only the asset allocations along BC are efficient. Thus, BC is the efficient 
frontier when considering Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution Rate risks for a 
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given Normal contribution rate. 
Performance Measure: Average Contribution Rate 
In Section 6.4 we have shown how the Average Contribution Rate over the projection 
period could be used as a performance measure in Indifference Curve Analysis. In 
this section, we show how the Average Contribution Rate can be used in an Efficient 
Frontier Analysis. 
In Figure 6.15 below, we plot the Mean Shortfall risk at the end of the projection 
period (15 years in this case) on the x-axis and the Average Contribution Rate over 
the projection period on the y-axis. The curve PQRS shows the Mean Shortfall risk 
and the Average Contribution Rate for each of the 21 asset allocations. 
For example, point P shows that if we allocate 100% in equities (and 0% in fixed- 
interest bonds) the Mean Shortfall risk would be approximately 0.11 whilst the 
Average Contribution Rate would be approximately 14.2%. Point S shows that if 
we allocate 0% in equities (and 100% in fixed-interest bonds) the Mean Shortfall 
risk would be approximately 0.155 whilst the Average Contribution Rate would be 
approximately 14.6%. 
Now, consider the arcs PQ, QR and RS. Firstly, consider asset allocations along arc 
PQ. For a fixed Mean Shortfall risk we can find an asset allocation either on QR or 
on RS that has a lower Average Contribution Rate. Hence asset allocations along 
PQ are inefficient. 
Secondly, consider asset allocations along arc RS. For a fixed Average Contribution 
Rate we can find an asset allocation either on PQ or QR that has a lower Mean 
Shortfall risk. Hence asset allocations along RS are inefficient. 
And thirdly, consider asset allocations along arc QR. For a fixed Mean Shortfall 
risk the asset allocation with the lowest Average Contribution Rate is along QR. 
Similarly, for a fixed Average Contribution Rate the asset allocation with the lowest 
Mean Shortfall risk is along QR. 
Hence, only the asset allocations along QR are efficient. Thus QR is the efficient 
frontier under Mean Shortfall and Average Contribution Rate for a given Normal 
contribution rate. 
We observe that the asset allocations along the efficient frontier QR coincide with the 
asset allocations along the efficient frontier, BC, for the case of the Mean Shortfall 
risk and Excess Contribution Rate risk. This is similar to the result in Section 6.4 
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where it was shown that the asset allocations in the efficient region minimize the 
Mean Shortfall risk, Excess Contribution Rate risk and the Average Contribution 
Rate. 
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Figure 6.15: Mean Shortfall risk and Average Contribution Rate trade-off at the 
end of 15 years for 10% Normal contribution rate. 
6.8.2 The Normal contribution rate as a free variable 
Decision Making 
We now consider the case where the Normal contribution rate is a free variable. We 
will consider four different Normal contribution rates: 6%, 10%, 14% and 18%. In 
each case, stochastic projections are carried out over 15 years. We will assume that 
the pension fund is invested in equities and fixed-interest bonds. 
Figure 6.16 shows the curves for the four selected Normal contribution rates. A 
similar analysis as above could be undertaken on each curve to find the efficient 
frontiers for a given Normal contribution rate. 
We observe that the top curve is for the lowest Normal contribution rate (i. e. 6%) 
whilst the lowest curve is for the highest Normal contribution rate (i. e. 18%). This 
result is intuitive: all things equal we would expect a low (high) Normal contribution 
rate to lead to a high (low) Mean Shortfall risk and a high (low) Excess Contribution 
Rate risk. 
Performance Measure: Average Contribution Rate 
Figure 6.17 shows the curves for 3 Normal contribution rates: 6%, 10% and 14%. As 
before we plot the Mean Shortfall risk on the x-axis and Average Contribution Rate 
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Figure 6.16: Mean Shortfall risk and Excess Contribution Rate risk trade-off at the 
end of 15 years for various Normal contribution rates 
on the y-axis. The highest curve is for a Normal contribution rate of 14% whilst the 
lowest curve is for the lowest Normal contribution of 6%. 
As in the previous case of Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution Rate risk, this 
result is intuitive: all things equal we would expect a high Normal contribution rate 
to lead to a low Mean Shortfall risk and high Average Contribution Rate; whilst a 
low Normal contribution rate would be expected to lead to a high Mean Shortfall 
and low Average Contribution Rate. 
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Figure 6.17: Mean Shortfall risk and Average Contribution Rate trade-off at the 
end of 15 for various Normal contribution rates 
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6.8.3 Investing in Index-Linked Gilts 
We now consider the case where the pension fund is invested in Index-Linked Gilts. 
In the previous analysis, we assumed that the fund is invested only in Equities and 
Fixed-Interest Bonds. We now consider two further investment policies. In the first 
policy, the fund is invested only in Equities and Index-Linked Bonds while, in the 
second policy, the fund is invested only in Index-Linked Bonds and Fixed-Interest 
Bonds. 
As before, we assume that the Normal contribution rate is fixed at 10% and that 
stochastic projections are carried out over a period of 15 years. 
Figure 6.18: Mean Shortfall risk and Average Contribution Rate trade-off at the 
end of 15 for different asset allocation policies 
In Figure 6.18, we plot curves for the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contri- 
bution Rate risk for different initial asset allocations for the three policies. Curve 
ABCD represents the case where the fund is invested in equities and fixed-interest 
bonds (i. e. the case discussed previously). Curve AEFG represents the case where 
the fund is invested in equities and index-linked bonds, while curve GHJD represents 
the case where the fund is invested in index-linked bonds and fixed-interest bonds. 
As shown before, the efficient frontier would be BC in the equities and fixed-interest 
bonds case, EF in the equities and index-linked bonds case, and HJ in the index- 
linked and fixed-interest bonds case. However, we observe that the efficient frontier 
EF includes a very small range of asset allocations around 15% initial allocation 
in equities; whilst the other efficient regions, BC and HJ, include a wider range of 
asset allocations. This result agrees with our previous analysis where we observed 
that the efficient region for equities and index-linked bonds was more tightly defined 
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than the efficient region for equities and fixed-interest bonds. 
6.9 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have presented a case study of the risk management approach 
considered in Chapter 5. We have illustrated how the approach can be applied to a 
wide range of issues affecting the management of defined benefit pension schemes. 
We have shown how an indifference curve analysis and an efficient frontier analysis 
can be used in the choice of asset allocation strategies and Normal contribution rates. 
One of the main results arising from this study is that asset allocation strategies for 
a pension scheme can be improved by choosing those strategies that lie within an 
efficient region. Alternatively, one could consider Pareto optimal strategies which lie 
along an efficient frontier. Such strategies have been shown not only to be optimal in 
terms of reducing the solvency and contribution risks but also in terms of reducing 
the cost to the employer. 
Several general results have also been shown to hold in the risk management set- 
ting. Firstly, counter-intuitive strategies, which several actuarial researchers and 
our analysis in Chapter 4 have shown to be optimal, have also been shown to be op- 
timal in our approach. Furthermore, just as in the dynamic programming problem 
of Chapter 4, we have shown that for long projection horizons we get a convergence 
in the optimal asset allocations for different initial funding levels. 
It can be argued that our results depend on the chosen investment model and its 
parameter values and also on the liability structure of the scheme. Hence, in the 
appendices we undertake extensive sensitivity analysis of the various crucial para- 
meters in the investment model. We also consider a completely different investment 
model in Chapter 7. The issue of how the strength of the employer could affect 
the optimal asset allocation strategies is considered in Chapter 8. Meanwhile, the 
problem of different liability structures is left as a future extension of this work. 
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Chapter 7 
Incorporating Model Risk 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we investigate the effect of asset model risk on decision making in 
defined benefit pension schemes. Parameter uncertainty and model risk occurs nat- 
urally in all actuarial modelling problems. 
Parameter uncertainty arises from the uncertainty in estimating the parameter val- 
ues in a chosen asset model. In our decision making framework we investigate 
parameter uncertainty and present the results in Appendices D, E and F. 
Model risk arises from employing an inappropriate asset model in the decision mak- 
ing process. In the discussion of Parker (1997), Andrew J. G. Cairns observes that 
"... the models themselves are not known with certainty and indeed are.. 
. 
only ap- 
proximations to a much more complex world... " (p. 73). 
In this chapter we follow Cairns (2000a) in reserving the term model risk to "... cir- 
cumstances where the results and decisions emerging from an analysis are sensitive 
to the choice of model... " (p. 314). We investigate whether our results hold under a 
different asset model. And in cases where the results hold, we assess the sensitivity 
of the decisions to changes in the asset model. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in Section 7.2 we present some background 
ideas for modern asset pricing. And in Section 7.3 we consider the formulation of 
modern asset pricing models. In Section 7.4 we present a stochastic asset model 
suggested by Smith and Southall (2001). For simplicity we will refer to this model 
as the "Smith-Southall model". Whilst in Section 7.5 we present and discuss results 
of a case study using the Smith-Southall model. Lastly, in Section 7.6 we present 
some concluding remarks. 
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7.2 Background Information 
In this section we present some background information necessary for understanding 
modern asset pricing formulations. We firstly consider the idea of deflators and then 
we discuss the idea of change of numeraire. 
7.2.1 Deflators 
Definition 7.1 Deflator A deflator (also referred to as pricing kernel, stochastic 
discount factor etc) is a stochastic process, (t, such that 
1= Et [(t+i Xt+l] (7.1) 
where Xt+i is the return on an asset in the period t to t+1 and Et [... 1 refers to the 
expectation given information up to time t. 
We shall use the names deflator, stochastic discount factor, pricing kernel and state- 
price density interchangeably. 
Deflators as Stochastic Discount Factors 
The idea behind state-price deflators is fairly simple if we think in terms of stochas- 
tic discount factors. Here we combine the approaches of Duffle (2001, pp. 3-11) and 
Cochrane (2001, p. 9) to discuss deflators in an intuitive manner. 
It is well-known that the price of an uncertain future cash flow can be established by 
considering the expected discounted future value. Suppose we have a finite number 
of future states of the world, {1, "-", S}. Consider a security whose payoff can be 
described by a vector X=V, ), where Xe is the payoff in state s. Let p= (ps) 
be the vector of (actual) probabilities of the states. That is, p, is the probability 
of state s. Furthermore, suppose that instead of a single discount factor we have 
stochastic discount factors for each state of the world C= 
((, ) 
. 
Then the discounted (or deflated) payoff in state s is C9 X8 and this has a probability 
of pe. Thus the price can be established by taking the expectation over all states: 
n 
Price 
= pi (i Xi 
= 
E[cX] (7.2) 
In other words, 1=E [c R] where R is the gross return. 
Deflators as the marginal rate of substitution 
In a so-called representative agent economy, the pricing kernel is formulated as the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. This is the approach followed by Sar- 
gent (1987) and Cochrane (2001) (also see Abel (1990)). The idea is to consider a 
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representative agent's consumption problem, derive a first-order condition for the 
optimal consumption and set the marginal rate of substitution as the pricing kernel. 
Let U(Ct) be the agent's utility function where Ct is the agent's consumption at time 
t. Suppose the agent's goal is to find the optimal consumption policy to maximize 
00 
max Et E Qt U(Ct+i) (7.3) 
=o 
subject to some wealth constraints. 
Then using the technique of dynamic programming (see Chapter 4) it can be shown 
that the first-order condition is: 
U'(Ct) 
= 
Et [ß U'(Ct+i) Xt+i, (7.4) 
where Xt+l is the gross return on investments. 
In this case the pricing kernel is 
U'(Ct+i) Cc+i 
=Q U'(Ct) (7.5) 
Several articles have appeared in the UK actuarial literature on the idea of deflators. 
The most notable amongst these is arguably Jarvis et al. (2001). Most of these 
papers consider how actuaries can use deflators in the valuation problems. 
7.2.2 Numeraire 
Definition 7.2 Numeraire In the financial mathematics literature, a numeraire is 
defined as an asset with a positive price which is taken as a unit of denomination 
for any other asset 
The technique of numeraire change has become very central in financial problems 
where a change in the currency of denomination can lead to an elegant solution. 
Rogers (1997) considers the change of numeraire in the case of countries with freely 
exchangeable assets: country i with state-price density (i and country j with state- 
price density (j. 
He shows that "... at a time ta unit of currency j can be exchanged for Yö Cc /(i 
units of currency i... " (p. 174), where Yöj is the exchange rate at time 0. 
For similar approaches see Geman et al. (1995) and Schroder (1999). This technique 
is crucial to the idea of `gauge transforms' described below. 
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7.3 Asset pricing model formulation 
Cochrane (2001) refers to Equation 7.1 as "the central asset pricing formula". This 
is due to the fact that pricing models for different asset classes can be constructed 
in a similar way, as shown in the examples below for bonds and equities. 
No-arbitrage 
The existence of the pricing kernel is assured due to the absence of arbitrage oppor- 
tunities. Duffle (2001) shows that a pricing kernel exists if and only if there is no 
arbitrage. Thus in the examples below we consider buying at time t and selling at 
time t 
-I-1 with the knowledge that there can be no arbitrage. 
We now consider the pricing of bonds and equities. For more details and other asset 
classes see Cochrane (2001, pp. 10-12). 
pricing of bonds 
Let Pt: t+n be the price at time t of a zero coupon bond paying 1 at time t+n. At 
time t+1 this becomes a zero coupon bond of term n-1. We can thus sell it at 
a price of Pt+l: t+n. Then, by writing the return Xt+l as Pt+l: t+n/Pt: t+n and using 
Equation 7.1, to price bonds we need the solution for the equation: 
1= Et l(Ct+i 
Pt+l: t+nl 
Pt: t+n 
Pt: t+n = Et 
[Ct+l Pt+l: t+n] (7.6) 
pricing of equities 
Let Pt be the ex-dividend equity price and Dt be the dividend at time t. We can 
buy this share ex-dividend at time t for Pt. At time t+1 we receive a dividend 
of Dt+l and sell the share ex-dividend for Pt+l. Thus we can set the gross return 
Xt+l as (Pt+l + Dt+l)/Pt. Then, using Equation 7.1, to price equities we need the 
solution for the equation: 
Pt+i + Dt+il 1= Et [(t+l pt J 
Pt 
= 
Et [Ct+i (Pt+i + Dt+i)]. (7.7) 
Model Formulation 
The central pricing formula has revolutionized the way financial economists formu- 
late asset pricing models. Early models involved specifying the dynamics of the spot 
rate or the forward rate processes from which bond prices could be derived. This is 
the approach taken by such famous models as Vasicek and Cox-Ingersoll-Ross (see 
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Vasicek (1977) and Cox et al. (1985)). 
These approaches have recently come into criticism. Rogers (1996) observes that 
these models can lead to negative interest rates. He argues that this possibility is 
undesirable in certain instances like the pricing of derivatives and long bonds. He 
shows that in cases like these, negative interest rates can lead to exponentially large 
discrepancies. 
To address these problems, Flesaker and Hughston (1996) introduce a pricing ap- 
proach where zero-coupon bond price processes are the basic building blocks. Thus 
the positivity property of interest rates is introduced in the construction of these 
bond price processes. 
They treat the system of bond price processes as being, by assumption, complete 
and arbitrage-free. This implies that every contingent claim can be uniquely priced 
as a linear combination of bond prices. 
They state the condition for interest rates to remain positive (Positive Interest Rate 
Property) as the requirement that at any given time the prices of zero-coupon bonds 
decrease as the term to maturity increases. In other words, Pt: t+no ? Pt: t+nl for 
no < ni. 
Potential approach 
Rogers (1997) introduces an approach to pricing model formulation which has as 
the starting-point the specification of the state-price density (also see Leippold and 
Wu (1999)). He observes that there are several advantages of this approach (which 
he refers to as the potential approach). 
Amongst these advantages are that with the potential approach it is easy to deal 
with yield curves and exchange rates in different countries. Furthermore, one can 
achieve the same tractability as in the spot rate models of, for instance, Vasicek 
whilst ensuring that the interest rates remain non-negative. 
Example: Three-Factor Pricing model 
As an example of the potential approach, Bekaert and Grenadier (2001) suggest a 
three-factor asset pricing model in which the pricing kernel is driven by inflation, 
dividend growth rate and an unobservable factor. From this formulation of the 
pricing kernel, they derive models for pricing bonds and equities. 
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7.4 Smith-Southall Model 
The approach of Smith and Southall (2001) can best be understood by considering 
the idea of gauge transforms as presented by Smith and Speed (1998). 
Gauge Transforms 
The idea of gauges is considered by Smith and Speed (1998). They suggest that 
the basic features of an asset be captured by a `gauge'. They define a gauge as an 
ordered pair ((, P) comprising a deflator and a term structure. 
They consider the deflator, (, as an indicator of the relative value of the gauge 
whilst the term structure, P, is a description of the price process of zero-coupon 
bonds denominated in units of the gauge. Superscripts are used to denote gauges 
for different asset classes. 
Intuitively, we can think of the transactions at any given time in terms of numeraire 
change as shown for different currencies in Section 7.2.2. Consider two gauges: 
(Casset passet) a gauge denominated in units of asset; and ((cash, pcash) a gauge de- 
nominated in units of cash. At time t an investor could buy a zero coupon bond of 
term n for pi sse in units of asset and receive 1 at time t+n in units of asset. 
Now suppose we want to express this cash flow in units of the other numeraire, cash. 
Using the change of numeraire technique described above, we would say that for a 
payment of Pt sse 't 3set/(rash at time tin cash, the investor would receive (aset /Si+n 
at time t+n in cash. 
The return from such a transaction can be analyzed as follows. The total return 
from t to t+n in units of the numeraire, cash, can be written as: 
(t+n asset Passet rasset cash 
bt+n 
ýt 
t: t+n 
= 
bt+n (t 
(cash bt ash bt+n 't sset Pt t+n 
" 
/7.81 
\J 
This can also be expressed in terms of zero-coupon bonds of term 1: 
asset rcash (asset cash 
total return = 
((t+1 bt 1 rbt+2 ýt+l 1r 
(cash asset Passet' IL rcash rasset Passet J II bt+l ýt t: t+l t+2 bt+1 t+1: t+2 
bt+n 
(t+n 
rcash 
bt+n 
rcash 
bt+n-1 1 
rasset Passet 
bt+n-1 t+n-1: t+n 
ýt ash 111 (t+ t 
n 
- Lasset Passet Passet '"" Passet rcash t t: t+l t+1: t+2 t+n-1: t+n bt+n 
cash asset t+n-1 1 ýt -asset [passet l- 
(asset cash s: s+1J 
t 
Q+n 
s=t 
ý7.9) 
For a dividend paying asset we may need to calculate the income return and capital 
return separately. For simplicity consider one term with dividend payable once at 
the end of the term. 
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At time t we have a deflator Ct seer and zero-coupon bond Pt t+i whilst at time t+1 
we have Cr t+and zero-coupon bond Pt+i t+2. As before we will use cash as the 
numeraire. 
Investing Pt t+1 (t 9'et/St ash at time t would mean that we receive (t+let/fit+lh at time 
t+1. The capital component of this is 
asset Passet 
capital = 
Q+1 t+l: t+2 (7.10) 
cnah 
whilst the income component is 
asset asset Passet ( 
t+1 
(t+l 
t+1: t+2 income 
= pcash 
bt+sh basset 
_ 
bt+l asset (1 ," 
\7.111 Gash 
It+l: 
t+2 
lP 
Thus the capital return from time t to time t+1 is 
asset Passet 
(asset 
Passet 
capital return = 
ýt+l 
cash1: 
t+2 t 
rcasht+1 
bt+1 bt 
asset Passet cash (t+l t+l: t+2 (t (7.12) 
cash (11 sset Passet St+1 t: t+1 
Similarly, the income return is 
rtsset 
asset 
c sh 
income return = 
br 
cash 
[1 
- 
Pt+1: 
t+2, rasset passet' 
(7.13) 
bt+1 bt t: t+l 
Adding these two factors in Equations 7.12 and 7.13 leads to the formula for the 
total return from time t to time t+1 in Equation 7.8. 
The Smith-Southall model employs the potential approach where a pricing kernel 
is suggested from which the prices of different asset classes are derived. Smith and 
Southall (2001) suggest the following formula for calculating deflators and zero- 
coupon bond prices: 
(to (Pto: b - Pto: b+i) tonst - (1 + f')b X 
ExP{Q 
" 
(Cto 
- 
Cmin{to, b-r}) +A" Bto 
+ min{b 
- 
to, 7-} Q" Bto 
- 
1(A 
+ QT)' to 
+i2 max{0,7- 
-b+ to} (T + 1- b+ to) x 
[6a 
"A+ (47- + 2b - 2to - 1) Q2J } 
(7.14) 
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where f is the long forward rate and r is a positive integer whilst A and o, are 
5-dimensional vectors. Also Bt,, is a 5-dimensional Brownian motion and Ct0 is an 
accumulation of the history of Bt,,, that is, 
Cto+ý 
= 
Cto + Bto. (7.15 
They consider three asset classes (Cash, Inflation and Equities) and suggest the 
parameter values shown in Table 7.1. The fact that this model is given without 
derivation opens it up to criticism. However, as shown by Smith and Southall 
(2001, p. 3) some important properties are satisfied: no-arbitrage, positive interest 
rates and analytical tractability. 
Cash Inflation Equity 
T=20 T=20 T=20 
f=5.13% f=1.57% f=2.08% 
A aT A Q A Q 
0.366665 
-0.006490 0.236537 0.002906 0.302127 -0.009461 
0 0.007547 0.031203 0.0003599 0.106377 
-0.009761 
0 0 0.118099 
-0.006942 -0.003413 0.000898 
0 0 0 0.000290 0.000840 
-0.000291 
0 0 0 0 0.066525 
-0.004100 
Table 7.1: Suggested parameter values for the Smith-Southall model 
7.5 Case Study 
In this section we apply the Smith-Southall model to the problem of risk manage- 
ment in defined benefit pension schemes. We will follow the framework presented in 
Chapter 5. 
The main aim of this chapter is to consider the effect of model risk on the optimal 
investment and funding strategies. Hence we replace the Wilkie model in order to 
assess the extent of the effect of the chosen model on the results. We thus let all 
aspects of the economic uncertainty surrounding a pension scheme to be governed 
by the chosen investment model. 
7.5.1 Applying the Smith-Southall model 
In applying an investment model to the stochastic modelling of a defined benefit 
pension scheme, there are several aspects that ought to be considered. 
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Firstly, we need to decide on how inflation, both price and wage, will be treated. 
Our approach is to treat inflation as a stochastic process. The Smith-Southall model 
generates output for the Retail Price Index, Q(t). Thus we set the force of price 
inflation at time t, I (t), as 
I(t) 
= 
log(Q(t)/Q(t 
- 
1)). (7.16) 
However, the Smith-Southall model does not generate output for wage inflation. We 
circumvent this problem by setting the average earnings index at time t, W (t), as 
W (t) 
= CYwage I (t) + 1Gwage (7.17) 
where awage and µwage are non-negative parameters. 
This is a fairly basic approach to modelling wage inflation which is based on the fact 
that generally wages tend to increase in line with prices. We adopt this approach 
in order not to disturb the general structure of the Smith-Southall model. 
We set awage and µwage equal to 1.0 and 1.5%, respectively. The estimate for µwage 
comes from a consideration of the long-term mean parameter for wage inflation 
(WMU) under the Wilkie model. Wilkie (1995) suggests an estimated value of 
WMU of 1.6%. We note that setting awage equal to zero would be similar to assum- 
ing that wages grow at a constant rate. 
The second aspect that ought to be considered in stochastic modelling is how to 
treat salary-related liabilities. The basic problem that arises in the treatment of 
these liabilities is that they are not marketable and hence we can not attach a 
unique market price. For more on this see Appendix A of Haberman et al. (2003a). 
Our approach in valuing liabilities is to assume a discontinuance basis and use the 
current real yield on long-term index-linked bonds as the valuation rate of interest. 
Thus in the Smith-Southall model we consider the spot yield on inflation-indexed 
bonds. 
As shown by Smith and Southall (2001, p. 4), let P t+ be the price at time t of an 
index-linked zero-coupon bond of term u. Then the real spot yield at time t is 
1/u (Rt+) t: u J 
In our analysis we consider a 20-year bond. This was chosen in order to correspond 
with our longest projection horizon. 
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The third aspect in stochastic modelling concerns the generation of returns from 
different asset classes. In our case we only consider equities and bonds. The Smith- 
Southall model generates output for returns for both of these asset classes. 
We recall that in the Wilkie model we use the `rolled-up' equity index at time t, 
PR(t), and at time t+1, PR(t + 1). In this case the return on equities between t 
and t+1 is calculated as PR(t + 1)/PR(t) 
-1. 
The equivalent of this in the Smith-Southall model is the formula we illustrate in 
Equation 7.8 and by Smith and Southall (2001, p. 4). Thus we set 
PR(t + 1) Si+iity (cash 
PR(t) eash requity Pequity " (7.19) bt+1 bt t: t+l 
In the case of the return on bonds, we consider zero-coupon bonds of a 20-year term. 
A more rigorous approach would be to construct fixed-interest bonds by considering 
one-year zero-coupon bonds. 
The return between time t and time t+1 on the 20-year zero-coupon bond can be 
established as follows. At time t the price of the 20-year bond is Pt i+2o. At time 
t+1, assuming no arbitrage opportunities, this bond should have a price of Pt+i e+is, 
Hence, as shown by Smith and Southall (2001, p. 4), the return from t to t+1 is 
Pcash t+i: t+19 (7.20) 
Pcash t: t+20 
7.5.2 Results of Stochastic Projections 
We consider stochastic projections over two projection periods: a medium-term hori- 
zon of 6 years and a long-term horizon of 15 years. In each case we let the Normal 
contribution rate and the asset allocation to be free variables. These are fixed at 
the outset (that is, at time 0) by the decision-maker. 
The asset allocation is re-balanced annually until the end of the projection horizon. 
Meanwhile, the recommended contribution rate is fixed for a three-year period. At 
the end of the three years a new contribution rate is recommended depending on 
the gains or losses in the scheme. 
We calculate the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate risk for 
various combinations of Normal contribution rate and asset allocation. This leads 
to the idea of indifference curves showing combinations which lead to a similar level 
of risk. 
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Projections over 6 years 
In Figure 7.1 we show the indifference curves for the Mean Shortfall risk and Ex- 
cess Contribution rate risk for the Smith-Southall model (top left and bottom left 
diagrams) and the Wilkie model (top right and bottom right diagrams) at the end 
of 6 years. 
As explained in Chapter 6, the lines PQ and LM pass through the efficient asset 
allocations under the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate risk, 
respectively. 
Firstly, we observe that changing asset models does not affect the general results. 
For a given asset model and risk measure we get a set of efficient asset allocations 
which lead to the lowest risk for a given Normal contribution rate. Also, for a given 
asset allocation, both the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate risk 
decrease as the Normal contribution rate increases, and vice versa. These general 
result holds under the Wilkie model and under the Smith-Southall model. 
Secondly, we observe that the Smith-Southall model leads to efficient asset alloca- 
tions with a significantly higher weighting in bonds than the Wilkie model. Thus, 
for example, the efficient asset allocations under the Mean Shortfall risk are in the 
region of 20% equities and 80% bonds for the Smith-Southall model. Meanwhile, 
for the Wilkie model the efficient asset allocations under the Mean Shortfall risk are 
in the region of 50% equities and 50% bonds. A similar result is obtained under the 
Excess Contribution rate risk although the weighting in bonds is not significantly 
different under the two asset models. 
A further observation concerns the differences in the efficient asset allocations under 
the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate risk. For this we consider 
the lines PQ and LM. The difference in the location of PQ and LM is much wider 
under the Wilkie model than under the Smith-Southall model. 
This implies that we get a lower trade-off region in the analysis of asset allocations 
that are efficient under both risks in the case of the Smith-Southall model than in 
the case of the Wilkie model. 
Projections over 15 years 
The general results obtained for projections over 6 years also hold for projections 
over a longer period. But an additional result is that the weighting in equities in 
the efficient asset allocations increases for both asset models. 
Figure 7.2 shows the efficient regions for projections over 15 years for the two asset 
132 
Uns Mhw11e1111- 
MWRNUMeN /WM MNM 
ee 
e.. 
......... . ............ .:... ........ 
ý..... 
....... .... _. _... 
Pr 
...... .... ..... .... ........... .......... .............. 
t 
j Pie ... _ ........ ............ . ..................... ........... 
i 
Pu 
... ... _.... .................. ..... ...... ................... 
. 
.... ...... .... ....... ......... ............................. 
io 
"as 
" 
ne wM ýw ý 
ew. ý. rrrýr Nrr" 
Me1lrNullr"M ANM MNN 
P4 
O. N 
........... 
.............. 
..... ........ .... ..... 
._ 
. 
. 
.. 
t 
e 
Figure 7.1: Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution Rate risk levels at the end of 6 
years for the Smith-Southall model and the Wilkie model 
models. The idea of an efficient region was introduced and discussed in Chapter 6. 
Firstly, we observe that for both asset models the lines LM and PQ shift towards 
higher allocations in equities for 15-year projections than for 6-year projections. 
Thus the general result of investing more in equities as the projection horizon in- 
creases holds under both asset models. 
However, as for the 6-year projections, the efficient allocation in bonds is higher 
under the Smith-Southall model than under the Wilkie model. Also the efficient 
region is more tightly defined under the Smith-Southall model leading to higher 
definiteness in the choice of the efficient asset allocations. 
7.6 Effect of Model Uncertainty 
We can conclude from the results in the previous section that the choice of the asset 
model has no effect on the general results. That is, for both asset models we get 
efficient asset allocations and efficient regions. Secondly, as the Normal contribution 
133 
Gae 
......... 
1. l 
...................... ............. . ------------- 
.. 
"" ý ýwu" ": w. r.. w 
.............. ...................... ... 
<------------- ý------------- 
ro eýa" 
.r............ 
.... "". rf......... _.................. _......... 
romw e wla 
a". 
e wal 
w cww" 
. ....................... ... ....... 
' 
............ 
ý............. 
awry 
ea 
--.... 
ý!. ws. ýri   
oM. " OM ' 
sM 
ý'n 
100%MINM I *M I0 S. 
.41, p.. 1 MMawinn: 
W iNY. MWN wiýF DMU 
.OO 
.. e 
...... 
_i. -L .... . ... .............,.. ............ 
.i............. L 
. mow 
0. i- 
-............ 
y 
. .......... ............ .......... ............. 
-rýwýýywrr_ýwi 
O 
OK . Dw 
. OR 1 
wwOri Y1. M... 
Figure 7.2: Efficient regions for projections over 15 years for the Smith-Southall 
model and the Wilkie model 
rate increases the risk (Mean Shortfall or Excess Contribution rate) decreases. And 
furthermore, the weighting of equities in the efficient asset allocations increases as 
the projection horizon increases. 
However, for a given projection horizon, the asset model has an effect on the location 
of the efficient regions. These depend on the characteristics of the asset model. The 
higher bond weighting for the Smith-Southall model could also be understood in 
terms of the calibration. This model was calibrated during an economic downturn. 
The effect of this could be assessed by considering the results obtained when the 
model is calibrated during an economic upturn. 
The shift in the efficient regions could also be explained by considering the volatility 
in the total returns under the two models. The volatility of the total equity return 
is 20% under the Smith-Southall model (see Smith and Southall (2001, p. 7)). How- 
ever, under the Wilkie model the volatility reduces with increasing term (see Wilkie 
(1995, p. 904)). Hence, even though the volatility of the return on bonds also reduces 
with term, equities will tend to be favoured under the Wilkie model for long-term 
projections. 
Another factor that could be considered is the equity risk premium under the two 
models. This is approximately 3.5% under the Smith-Southall model. However, our 
choice of parameter values for the Wilkie model (i. e. DMU = 0) implies that the 
equity risk premium is not significantly different from that under the Smith-Southall 
model'. Thus the differences in the results for the two models could be due to the 
equity risk premium but not to a large extent. 
I See Appendix D for a further analysis of the effect of the equity risk premium in the Wilkie 
model on the main results 
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Chapter 8 
Risk Management: Allowing for 
Probability of Default 
8.1 Introduction 
Asset and Liability modelling in defined benefit pension schemes has been the focus 
of extensive actuarial research over the past decade as noted in Chapter 3. This 
has involved modelling asset returns and liability growth as stochastic processes. 
Thus various investment models have been suggested in the actuarial literature and 
employed in the choice of optimal asset allocations. 
In most cases such asset allocations have been more weighted towards equities than 
fixed-interest bonds. This could be attributed to the long-term nature of the liabili- 
ties and the need to invest in assets that are a good match for salary-linked liabilities. 
In recent times there has been a considerable emphasis on the suitability of a corpo- 
rate finance-based approach to the asset allocation for defined-benefit scheme funds. 
One of the main ideas proposed is that equities are a sub-optimal asset class when 
it comes to pension fund investment. Several reasons are cited to back up this 
idea: Modigliani-Miller irrelevance proposition; failure to prove the equity-salary 
link; and, in some cases, the idea that it is not necessary to consider future salary 
growth rates since sponsoring employers do not make such an allowance in their 
corporate balance sheets. 
It has been argued that pension fund modelling ought to address the financial cir- 
cumstances of a pension scheme's sponsoring employer by recognising the financial 
strengths or weaknesses of the sponsor in relation to equity markets. The under- 
lying argument here is that periods of weak equity markets could coincide (or lead 
to) large pension fund deficits and hence increased scheme contributions at a time 
when the sponsor might be financially weakest. And thus incorporating probability 
of sponsor default explicitly in the risk measurement could lead to optimal asset 
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allocations with low (or even zero) weighting in equities. 
In particular, it is suggested that optimizing pension fund asset allocation using 
stochastic asset-liability modelling to project future long-term cash flows underesti- 
mates the risks inherent in equity investment as a result of the increased volatility 
of return. It is suggested that by ignoring the risk of bankruptcy of the sponsoring 
employer, stochastic asset-liability modelling leads to bias towards higher-risk equity 
investment when determining asset allocations. 
For a defined-benefit pension fund invested largely in equities, consideration of the 
risk of bankruptcy of the sponsoring employer is therefore important as the employer 
may well be required to make large additional contributions (to reduce a funding 
deficit caused by poor asset returns) at the very time when he is financially least 
able to do so. 
These arguments and other factors (including the prolonged downturn in global 
equity markets) have led to some UK pension funds shifting from the traditional 
largely equity-backed asset allocations to asset allocations which are increasingly 
weighted towards bonds. 
As a consequence, some pensions actuaries now advocate bond-only investment 
strategies, asserting that any additional expected return that the shareholders of 
the sponsoring employer could have achieved from exposure to equities should be 
gained directly by the shareholder through re-arranging his/her portfolio. 
In Chapter 5 we presented a framework for risk management and measurement for 
defined benefit pension schemes. This framework involved three main areas: sto- 
chastic projections of the pension fund over different horizons; simultaneous analysis 
of funding and investment strategies 
- 
thus treating both the contribution rate and 
the asset allocation as free variables; and the use of downside risk measures at key 
decision points. In so doing we have assumed the survival of the firm up to these 
decision points and hence ignore the effect of intertemporal probability of firm bank- 
ruptcy (and hence default). 
The need to incorporate market information in a risk measure is well recognized in 
the financial literature. For instance, in their criticism of the VAR (value-at-risk), 
Mt-Sahalia and Lo (2000) observe that a measure of risk ought to include the fact 
that "... a one dollar loss is not always worth the same, and that circumstances sur- 
rounding the loss can affect its economic valuation, something that is completely 
ignored by purely statistical measures of risk [like the VAR]... " 
In this chapter we extend the framework of Chapter 5 in order to assimilate some of 
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these ideas. Optimal funding and asset allocation strategies, over a range of projec- 
tion horizons, are determined by taking into account the probability of default by 
the sponsoring employer. 
This chapter is organized as follows: In Section 8.2 we review the first Modigliani- 
Miller proposition and its early and recent applications to defined benefit pension 
schemes. Then in Section 8.3 we introduce a framework for risk management in 
defined benefit pension schemes which allows for probabilities of sponsor default. In 
Section 8.4 we present a case study and the main results for three projection periods. 
In Section 8.5 we summarize our main findings. In Appendix F we investigate the 
effect on our results of the frequency of pension scheme valuations and the period 
over which gains and losses are spread. 
8.2 Modigliani-Miller Propositions 
8.2.1 Proposition 1 
The Modigliani-Miller propositions were originally set out in a 1958 paper enti- 
tled "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment". 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) developed a theory for the market value analysis of a 
firm's cost of capital problem. To this end they consider a firm's financial structure 
and propose that, within a framework of partial equilibrium, "... the market value of 
any firm is independent of [the firm's] capital structure... " In other words, a firm's 
market value is independent of whether the firm is financed by bonds or equities. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) use arbitrage arguments to prove this proposition un- 
der the assumption that firms can be divided into risk classes in such a way that 
within each class the firms' cash flows are "perfectly correlated" and hence "perfect 
substitutes". Furthermore they assume that bonds and equities are traded in perfect 
markets where perfect substitutes have the same price. 
Stiglitz (1969) developed this proposition further within a general equilibrium frame- 
work. He argued that some of the original assumptions, including the division of 
firms into risk classes, could be relaxed. He thus showed that the Modigliani-Miller 
proposition holds as long as there is no probability of bankruptcy by the firm and 
that individuals and firms can borrow at the same rates. 
The Modigliani-Miller propositions and the underlying assumptions have been sub- 
jected to intense criticisms ever since they were first published. However, as noted 
by Stiglitz (1988, p. 122), some of these criticisms have lead to more "productive 
responses" to the propositions. 
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Stiglitz (1988) lists a number of instances, for example information asymmetries, 
where the assumptions might lead to a failure of the Modigliani-Miller proposition. 
Cuthbertson (1996, p. 186) observes that the proposition might fail if some market 
participants are "noise" traders. Eichberger and Harper (1997, p. 163) also observe 
that the proposition might fail if there is a probability of bankruptcy and the firm 
is a limited company. 
On the empirical side, Miller (1988, p. 100) observes that the "empirical signifi- 
cance" of the proposition is less clear in corporate finance. 
8.2.2 Application to Corporate Pension Funding 
Tepper and Affleck (1974) is one of the earliest applications of the Modigliani- 
Miller proposition to corporate pension funding. They develop analogies between 
the Modigliani-Miller analysis of a firm's capital structure and a firm's funding of 
the corporate pension plan. One of their main assumptions is that bonds and equi- 
ties are taxed at similar personal rates. In this framework bankruptcy costs are not 
introduced. 
Tepper (1981) observes that such assumptions present a `troubling framework' not 
just because in such a scenario it is irrelevant to consider pension fund investment 
as being financed by equities, but also because "... the limitations of the [Modigliani- 
Miller] framework as a robust theory of capital structure... " imply that "... any 
conclusions regarding corporate pension policy which are based upon it should be 
suspect... " 
Thus Tepper (1981) applies a general equilibrium analysis to show the tax advan- 
tages of investing pension fund in bonds rather than equities, if bonds are taxed at 
a higher personal rate than equities. His main assumption is that the pension fund 
can be considered as part of the personal portfolio of a shareholder of the sponsoring 
company. 
Black (1980) also employs taxation arguments, albeit at a corporate level, to show 
that it is advantageous to invest the pension fund in bonds rather than equities. He 
presents a two-part idea where pension fund investment is shifted from equities to 
bonds coupled with an issuing of bonds and share buy-backs by the corporation. 
Smith (1996) applied the Modigliani-Miller proposition in the context of UK ac- 
tuarial asset-liability modelling. Smith (1996, p. 1073) observes that investment 
strategies determined through actuarial asset-liability studies cannot add value to 
a firm's shareholders except possibly in the circumstances where the assumptions 
underlying the proposition do not hold. To this end he considers the effect of trans- 
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action costs. 
He observes that "... in a Modigliani Miller world with no transaction costs, all mar- 
kets have the same expected return after adjusting for risk, and hence there is no 
merit from a shareholder value perspective in participating in one market rather 
than in another... " (p. 1092). 
He concludes that in a world with transaction costs several complications arise. For 
instance, the concept of a shareholder value may be hard to define. Furthermore, it 
may no longer be possible to determine asset value by the market price but rather 
a range of prices in the bid-ask spread. 
Exley and Mehta (1996) apply the Modigliani-Miller proposition to the context of 
defined benefit pension schemes. They argue that "... in the context of pension fund 
investment, [the Modigliani-Miller proposition] can be verified by analogy with an 
investor holding a short position in a corporate bond, which we equate with a pen- 
sion liability... [T]he value of this short position (superficially similar to the market 
cost of the liability) can [not] be reduced or increased by the investor reallocating 
his portfolio of assets to or from equities. If assets are traded at market value then, 
(absent transaction costs), portfolio value at any point in time... must be the same, 
regardless of the choice of allocation [in equities or bonds]... " (p. 641) 
Hence, Exley and Mehta (1996) consider the problem of finding optimal asset alloca- 
tion and optimal funding strategies for a model pension scheme taking into account 
the possibility of corporate bankruptcy. They assume that bankruptcy risk is only 
a function of Poisson jumps in the equity market and that such jumps occur "... on 
average once in every five years... " Bankruptcy risk is calculated by taking into 
consideration scenarios where the value of the firm falls below a given threshold and 
also where the pension fund falls below a statutory minimum funding threshold. 
Pension funding is treated as a "zero-sum-game" between the various stakeholders 
(in this case shareholders and trustees) and the optimal investment strategy from the 
perspective of the shareholder is taken to be one that minimizes the shareholder's 
loss in the event of corporate bankruptcy. 
They conclude that under their model the optimal asset allocation in equities would 
be a function of four factors: the value of the firm and the threshold for the firm, 
the firm's beta (or sensitivity to market returns), and the initial value of the pension 
fund and its statutory threshold. 
The application of the Modigliani-Miller proposition to defined benefit pension 
schemes is explored further in Exley et al. (1997). They argue that in a world 
without transaction costs the economic cost of the pension to the sponsor does not 
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depend on the pension fund's investment strategy. They class this as a "first order" 
result and they advocate that "second order effects" ought to be considered in or- 
der to determine optimal funding or asset allocation strategies. These second order 
effects include the sponsor's credit risk, the effect of future benefit improvement, 
taxation effects, and corporate bankruptcy risk. 
They conclude, for instance, that if one considers the sponsor's credit risk then the 
pension cost would be affected by the investment strategy. One of the reasons being 
that if the pension fund is invested in the sponsor's assets (i. e. self-invested) then 
in the event of the sponsor becoming bankrupt members of the scheme would suffer 
loss. Thus a good investment strategy would be to avoid self-investment. 
Chapman et al. (2001) focus, in the light of the Modigliani-Miller proposition, on 
the interactions between the various stakeholders in a defined benefit scheme set- 
ting. They model the pension scheme not as a single-entity but as part of the 
sponsor's balance sheet and a "closed economic system" with several stakeholders. 
Their methodology centres on assessing the effects of pension funding decisions on 
the stakeholders. 
They conclude, for example, that shifting the investment strategy of the pension 
fund to a bond-backed strategy would have the effect of reducing the chances that 
the sponsor would become insolvent by as much as half in their proposed model. 
Thus such a strategy would be beneficial to, among others, the shareholder. 
These ideas are also considered by Whelan et al. (2002) and Day (2003). 
8.3 Framework for stochastic projections with prob- 
abilities of sponsor default 
We propose a framework for stochastic pension fund projections that takes into 
consideration the probability of sponsor default. Let T be the period (in years) 
over which stochastic projections of a pension fund f (t) are to be undertaken. In 
the approach presented in Chapter 5 and in Haberman et al. (2003a) we implicitly 
assume that the sponsor does not default before the end of the projection period 
i. e. at any time t, t<T. In this chapter we extend this approach by assuming that 
there is a chance that the sponsor could default at the beginning of each year just 
before the next contribution is due. 
8.3.1 Formulation of the Probability of Default 
Our approach is in some ways similar to that of Boyce and Ippolito (2002). They 
investigate the cost of pension insurance under the US PBGC. Since under the 
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PBGC a claim only arises in the event of sponsor bankruptcy, they propose that the 
probability of bankruptcy for a given company be modelled as: 
J 
qt = 1/{1 + exp(-a 
-L bj xj, t_i)} (8.1) 
j=1 
where the factors xj, t include the company's leverage ratio, the cash-flow-to-asset- 
ratio, the pension funding ratio, the level of employment and dummy variables 
dependent on the company's industrial sector. (also see Hardy (1996) for a formu- 
lation of the probability of insolvency for a life insurer). 
The underlying idea in our analysis is that the state of the economy could have a 
significant effect on the strength of the sponsoring employer and the likelihood of 
honouring the scheme contributions. That is, weak financial markets could lead to 
large pension scheme deficits at a time when the sponsor is financially weak and 
thus unable to meet with large additional scheme contributions. 
We thus use the movements in the financial markets as a signal of the strength of 
the scheme sponsor and the prospect of default. 
Cochrane (2001, p. 150) observes that the return on a broad-based portfolio can be 
used to measure the state of the economy. He further suggests that, in general, any 
factor that is related to consumption can be used as a measure. 
This implies that the probability of default ought to have the form: 
Prob[default] 
=1 (8.2) [1+pe' b] 
where p is a given constant, a is a risk aversion coefficient and rb is the force of 
return on a broad-based portfolio. 
Equation 8.2 has the desirable property that the probability of default tends to one 
in bad times (i. e. when the return on the market portfolio is very poor); whilst the 
probability tends to zero in good times. 
In our analysis we will approximate the broad-based portfolio by considering the 
market portfolio consisting of equities and bonds. In a Markowitz mean-variance 
framework, the market portfolio (or tangency portfolio) is defined simply as the 
point of tangency between the Markowitz efficient frontier and the line from the 
risk-free rate (also known as the capital market line). 
We determine the constant p by looking at the possible values of the probability of 
default when the force of return is equal to its expected (or mean) value. Meanwhile 
a could be determined by assuming that we have an investor with an exponential 
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utility function with absolute risk aversion coefficient a and that the asset returns 
are normally distributed. 
Cochrane (2001, pp. 154-155) uses these assumptions to derive the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM). He shows that under this version of the CAPM we obtain 
a link between the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and the market price of risk 
(i. e. the price of systematic risk): 
au 2(rm) = E(rm) 
- 
Si (8.3) 
where rm is the force of return on the market portfolio, o2(rm) is the variance of the 
force of return and E(rm) 
-Jf is the price of systematic risk with Sf as the risk-free 
force of return. 
We thus propose the following formulation for the probability of default over one 
year, given that the force of return on the market portfolio is r,: 
q(r'") 
_11+ po + exp{pl +a (ra 
- 
Sz)} (8.4) 
where 
" rn is the force of return on the market portfolio; 
9 Jm = E(rm), the expected force of return on the market portfolio; 
. po is a non-market-linked component to do with risk specific to the sponsor's 
business; 
" pl is such that if rm is equal to its expected value then the default probability 
1 is just 1+po+e xp{p1} ; and 
"a is as defined in Equation 8.3. 
8.3.2 Parameter Estimates for the Probability of Default 
Market Portfolio 
In our analysis we assume that the investment returns are as generated under the 
Wilkie (1995) model and we adopt Wilkie's recommended parameter estimates and 
`neutral' initial conditions. We assume that the pension fund can only be allocated 
in two asset classes: equities and fixed-interest bonds. As mentioned in a previous 
section, we assume that the market portfolio only contains these two asset classes. 
We estimate the market portfolio over the first year and, for simplicity, we use the 
same market portfolio for all other years. We assume a risk-free rate of interest of 
6.16%. This is equivalent to the mean nominal return on cash over one year in the 
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Wilkie Model. We estimate the mean nominal returns on equities and bonds over 
one year as 12.64% and 7.641%, respectively. Then the market portfolio comprises 
56% equities and 44% bonds, with an expected rate of return of 10.44% and standard 
deviation of 0.128. 
Estimation of a 
To estimate a in Equation 8.3 we need the expected value and the variance of the 
force of return on the market portfolio. We thus use a lognormal approximation to 
obtain: 0.0927 
- 
In 1.0616 
a= 0.01325 
General Conditions on q(rm) 
-2.49. (8.5) 
As observed before, our formulation of the probability of default in Equation 8.4 has 
the desirable property that the probability of default tends to one in poor economic 
times and tends to zero in good times. Furthermore by setting the force of return 
equal to its expected value we get 
9(6) =1 1+po+exp{pl}, (8.6) 
We then use Equation 8.6 to estimate the values of po and pl. In this paper we only 
consider the case where the probability of default has no non-market-linked compo- 
nent i. e. Po = 0. The effect of the non-market-linked component will be investigated 
in a future paper. 
In referring to general company debt, Crosbie and Bohn (2002) observe that "... [t]he 
typical firm has a default probability of around 2% [0.02] in any year. However, there 
is considerable variation in default probabilities across firms. For example, the odds 
of a firm with a AAA rating defaulting are only about 2 in 10,000 [0.0002] per an- 
num. A single A-rated firm has odds of around 10 in 10,000 [0.001] per annum, five 
times higher than a AAA. At the bottom of the rating scale, a CCC-rated firm's 
odds of defaulting are 4 in 100 [0.04], 200 times the odds of a AAA-rated firm... " 
We can infer from this observation that in our analysis the probability of default, 
when the force of return is equal to its expected value, should not be greater than 
0.02. 
Hence from Equation 8.6, with po = 0, we set 
q(6) = 0.02 
1+ex 1 P{pi} = 0.02 
P1 3.89. (8.7) 
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8.3.3 Effect of Market movements on Default Probabilities 
As observed earlier the specification of q(rm) in Equation 8.4 means that the prob- 
ability of default is an inverse function of the return on the market portfolio. Fig- 
ure 8.1 shows the probabilities of default over the first year given the rate of return 
i on the market portfolio (using our parameter estimates). The force of return is 
calculated as ln(1 + i). 
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Figure 8.1: Probability of default over the first year for various rates of return i 
(force of return = ln(1 + i)) 
This figure shows that if the market rises by 10% then the probability of default is 
approximately 0.02 and if the market falls by 20% then the probability of default is 
approximately 0.04. Meanwhile, if the market falls by 50% then the probability of 
default is approximately 0.13. And, if the market falls by 80% then the probability 
of default is approximately 0.60. 
8.3.4 Risk Measurement 
Mean Shortfall risk 
This risk measure was introduced in Chapter 5 (also see Haberman et al. (2003a, b)). 
Under this risk measure we assume that the sponsor does not default before the end 
of the projection period. At the end of the projection period we calculate the aver- 
age solvency deficit whilst treating all surpluses as zero. 
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Let V(T) be the solvency deficit at the end of T years. Then 
L (T) 
-f (T) if there is a deficit at T 
V (T) 
= (8.8) 
0 otherwise. 
The Mean Shortfall risk at the end of T years, MS(T), is calculated as: 
MS(T) 
= fý0) E[V(T) f (0), L(O), c(0)] (8.9) 
where f (t) is the market value of the assets at time t, L(t) is the discontinuance 
liability at time t and c(t) is the contribution rate at time t. In this formula (10- f (0) 
acts as a scaling factor. 
This risk measure is of the form 
Prob(Shortfall) xE [Shortfall I Shortfall has occurred]. (8.10) 
In Chapter 5 (and in Haberman et al. (2003a, b)) we consider the Mean Shortfall 
risk in tandem with an Excess Contribution Rate risk measure. For a given projec- 
tion period and normal contribution rate the Excess Contribution Rate risk is also 
a downside risk measure like the Mean Shortfall risk but is defined as the sum of 
discounted differences between the recommended contribution rate and the normal 
contribution rate, treating all negative excesses as zero. 
However, in this chapter we focus only on optimal asset allocations for the Mean 
Shortfall risk and not on `Efficient Regions'. 
Shortfall & Default risk 
The second risk measure we consider is the Shortfall & Default risk. We define 
the Shortfall & Default risk at the end of T years, SD(T), as the expected amount 
of deficit defaulted by the end of the projection period and we calculate it as follows. 
Consider a projection period of T years. Under the Mean Shortfall risk we would 
only concern ourselves with the discontinuance liabilities, L(T), and the market 
value of assets, f (T), at the end of the projection period. However under the Short- 
fall & Default risk we would take into consideration the possibility that the sponsor 
might default before the end of the projection period. 
We assume that default events only arise at the end a given year, for example year 
(t 
- 
1, t), if there is a shortfall (i. e. L(t) 
-f (t) > 0) and the probability of default 
q(rmt)) is greater than some randomly generated uniform random variable U(t). This 
approach is similar to that of Boyce and Ippolito (2002, p. 133). 
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If the sponsor defaults at time td, say, then we accumulate the shortfall defaulted 
to the end of the projection period using the risk-free force of interest. Thus 
at the end of the projection period the amount of shortfall defaulted would be (L(td) 
- 
f(td)) e(T-td) 8f. 
Let D(T) be the amount of shortfall defaulted at the end of T years. Then 
D(T) 
_ 
L(td) 
-f (td)) e(T-td) 6f if default event occurs at td <T 
(8.11) 
0 otherwise. 
Clearly if the default event arises at the end of the projection period (i. e. td = T) 
then the amount of shortfall defaulted would be L(T) 
-f (T). In particular if the 
projection period is one year then 
L(1) 
-f (1) if default event occurs 
D(1) 
_ 
(8.12) 
0 otherwise. 
The Shortfall & Default risk at the end of T years is calculated as: 
SD(T) 
= f-(0) E{D(T) 
1f (0), L(0), c(0)]. (8.13) 
This risk measure has a similar form to the Mean Shortfall risk: 
Prob(Default event) xE [Shortfall Defaulted I Default event has occurred]. (8.14) 
8.4 Case Study 
8.4.1 Liability Model 
We consider an ongoing Pension Scheme with current pensioners. Further details 
of this model are set out in Appendix B of this thesis and also Appendix C of 
Haberman et al. (2003a). The discontinuance liabilities are evaluated using the 
current real yield on index-linked bonds generated by the asset model. 
8.4.2 Asset Model 
We assume that the investment returns are as generated by the Wilkie model. We 
use the parameter estimates and `neutral' initial conditions as set out in Wilkie 
(1995). We assume that the pension scheme is initially fully funded. The fund 
is allocated in equities and bonds and annually rebalanced. We consider different 
combinations, in steps of 5%, of the two asset classes (no short-selling is allowed). 
146 
8.4.3 Projections 
We consider stochastic projections over 1 year, 6 years and 15 years. We choose 
these projection periods to stand for the short-term, medium term and long-term, 
respectively. We carry out 20,000 simulations and at the end of every projection 
period the Mean Shortfall and Shortfall & Default risks are calculated as explained 
in a previous section. The Shortfall & Default risk is calculated only in the case 
where the non-market-linked component of the probability of default is zero. 
We consider 17 different choices of Normal contribution rate: 0,2%, 4%,..., 32%. In- 
difference curves are calculated for given risk levels and in some cases interpolations 
are necessary. The indifference curves show all the combinations of asset allocation 
and Normal contribution rate that lead to a similar level of risk. Following Chapter 5 
and Haberman et al. (2003a, b) we identify efficient asset allocations by considering 
the minimum points of the indifference curves. 
Short-term Projections 
Figure 8.2 shows the Mean Shortfall MS(1) and Shortfall & Default SD(1) risk 
indifference curves at the end of one year. 
We observe that the indifference curves for the Mean Shortfall risk (left diagram 
in Figure 8.2) have their minimum points located in the region of 15% equities 
(85% bonds). This implies that under the Mean Shortfall risk, for projections over 
one year, the efficient asset allocation is in the region of 15% equities and 85% bonds. 
We further observe that the indifference curves for the Shortfall & Default risk (right 
diagram in Figure 8.2) have their minimum points located around 0% equities. This 
implies that under the Shortfall & Default risk, for projections over one year, the 
optimal asset allocation is 100% bonds. 
We can thus conclude that for projections over one year the inclusion of probabilities 
of sponsor default has a major effect on the indifference curves. We have observed 
that the efficient asset allocations shift from around 85% bonds for the case where 
probabilities of default are not included (i. e. Mean Shortfall risk) to 100% bonds for 
the case where the default probabilities are included and are wholly market-linked. 
These results support the argument that the inclusion of probabilities of default 
should have the effect of reducing optimal equity allocations. As shown in Sec- 
tion 8.3.4, in our framework default events are triggered by poor equity performance 
over the one-year projection period. Our indicator of the state of the economy is a 
broad-based portfolio which has a higher weighting in equities than in bonds. Thus 
poor performances by equities tend to contribute more to the probability of default. 
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This explains why to reduce the amount of shortfall defaulted we initially have to 
invest more in bonds. 
For the case where the default probability comprises of a non-market-linked compo- 
nent and a market-linked component we would expect that, as long as the parameter 
estimates for the two components are comparable, the efficient asset allocation would 
be located between 85% and 100% bonds. 
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Figure 8.2: Mean Shortfall and Shortfall & Default risk levels at the end of 1 year 
Medium-term Projections 
Figure 8.3 shows the Mean Shortfall and Shortfall & Default risk levels at the end 
of a six-year projection period. As illustrated in a previous section the Shortfall & 
Default risk includes scenarios where the sponsor defaulted before the end of the 
projection period. 
We observe that the minimum points for the indifference curves shift towards higher 
bond allocation in the cases where we include probabilities of default. For example, 
the optimal asset allocation under the Mean Shortfall risk are located in the region 
of 60% equities (40% bonds) whilst under the Shortfall & Default risk we get opti- 
mal asset allocations in the region of 40% equities (60% bonds). 
Thus as for the short-term projections we observe that to minimize the expected 
amount of deficit defaulted we would require a higher allocation in bonds than would 
be required to minimize the expected shortfall. In general the optimal asset alloca- 
tion for the Shortfall & Default risk contains approximately 50% more weighting in 
bonds than for the Mean Shortfall risk. 
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Therefore these medium-term results also support the argument that the inclusion 
of probabilities of default would lead to a reduction in the proportion of equities 
in the optimal asset allocation. However, compared to the short-term projections, 
we do not get a full weighting in bonds. This is probably due to a combination of 
several factors. 
The first factor is that better performance by equities would lead to lower average 
deficits in the pension scheme. This would thus imply that we get fewer default 
events and hence lower Shortfall & Default risk. The full effect of this would not be 
appreciated for the one-year projection period due to the short time horizon. How- 
ever, for medium term projections there would be sufficient time for a reduction in 
the average deficits. Thus equities would be seen as an optimal asset class for the 
pension fund. 
The second factor is that shortfalls defaulted before the end of the projection period 
are accumulated at the risk-free rate of interest (see Section 8.3.4). We would expect 
a higher rate of accumulation to have an effect on the optimal asset allocations. 
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Figure 8.3: Mean Shortfall and Shortfall & Default risk levels at the end of 6 years 
Long-term Projections 
Figure 8.4 shows the Mean Shortfall and Shortfall & Default risk levels at the end 
of a 15-year projection period. The optimal asset allocation for the Mean Shortfall 
risk is in the region of 60% to 80% equities. Meanwhile for the Shortfall & Default 
risk the optimal asset allocation is in the region of 45% to 65% equities. 
As for the medium-term, the long-term results also partially support the arguments 
about the effect of probabilities of default on the investment strategy. We get an 
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increase in the bond-weighting under the Shortfall & Default risk; however, we do 
not get full weighting in bonds as was the case for the short-term results. 
This can be explained, as in the case of medium-term projections, by considering 
the performance of equities over the projection horizon. Over the long-term the 
performance of equities would be expected to lead to lower deficits in the scheme. 
In our framework default events depend on both default probabilities and fund 
deficits. Thus in the long-term equities would lead to lower Mean Shortfall risk and 
also lower Default risk. 
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Figure 8.4: Mean Shortfall and Shortfall & Default risk levels at the end of 15 years 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have presented a framework showing how probabilities of spon- 
sor default can be included in stochastic projections of a corporate pension scheme. 
This inclusion has lead to the development of a new risk measure: the Shortfall & 
Default risk measure. This risk measure is in a sense similar to the Mean Shortfall 
risk measure but differs significantly since it also includes instances where the spon- 
sor defaults before the end of the projection period. 
It is a standard result in corporate finance that possibility of bankruptcy by the 
firm could lead to the failure of the Modigliani-Miller proposition. Thus the chance 
of bankruptcy could have an effect on a firm's capital structure in the Modigliani- 
Miller world. 
Our analysis shows that for short-term projections the inclusion of default prob- 
abilities leads to an optimal asset allocation of 100% bonds whilst if the default 
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probabilities are not included we get optimal asset allocations with a lower bond 
weighting. 
In the case of medium to long-term projection periods we have shown that the inclu- 
sion of probabilities of default also leads to optimal asset allocations with a higher 
bond weighting than under the Mean Shortfall risk. However, we do not get full 
(100%) bond investment as in the short-term case. 
In the short-term, our results confirm the argument that the inclusion of probabil- 
ities of default could lead to bond-only optimal asset allocations. However, in the 
long-term equity-backed asset allocations are optimal regardless of whether or not 
probabilities of default are included in the stochastic projections. 
In future we hope to extend this work in several ways. Our formulation of the prob- 
ability of default includes a non-market-linked component. We hope to consider the 
effect of a non-zero value for such a component. An analysis of the effect of the 
various parameters in the asset model is also an area that we hope to consider. For 
example, the inflation parameters could be changed to a low and stable inflation 
scenario. Furthermore we hope to investigate the effect on the investment strategies 
of changing the liability model. For instance, the benefit structure in the current 
model could be changed or a closed and mature scheme could be considered. 
Another interesting area that could be further investigated concerns the interest rate 
for accumulating the defaulted amount. In our analysis we have assumed that in 
the event of a default before the end of the projection period, the defaulted amount 
is accumulated to the end of the projection period at the risk-free rate of interest. 
A different rate of interest could be used in such a scenario. This could affect the 
results for the medium-term and long-term projections. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
In this thesis we have presented a stochastic approach to decision making in defined 
benefit pension schemes. We have shown how existing decision-making methods can 
be extended in order to fully address the objectives of the various stakeholders. 
In Chapter 2 we have discussed the traditional decision making process in defined 
benefit pension schemes. We have shown how actuaries have traditionally addressed 
the main concerns of the stakeholders. We noted that the concerns for security and 
stability are met through, firstly, the establishment of a fund and, secondly, the 
choice of funding method. 
The establishment of a fund ensures that the cost of provision is met during the 
member's working life. It also ensures the separation of the pension scheme from 
the sponsoring employer's business. We have observed that actuaries have tradition- 
ally tended to choose the funding method by taking into account several fundamental 
criteria, including security and stability. 
The security criterion implies that the funding method should ensure that at any 
given time the value of the fund should cover the value of the accrued benefits. 
Meanwhile, the stability criterion implies that the funding method should lead to a 
stable contribution rate. This would then mean that the sponsoring employer would 
not face an uncertain future financial outflow. 
We have also noted that in the traditional framework more emphasis is placed on 
funding methods and very little on the investment strategy. Even though the asset 
allocation strategies of pension funds have generally been responsive to changing 
market conditions, the funding and investment decisions have been treated sepa- 
rately. 
We have also noted that some researchers have suggested that the tradition fund- 
ing methods do not give a `degree of confidence' to the likelihood of meeting the 
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promised benefits. Hence, we have argued that the objective of the stakeholders are 
not properly addressed. 
The traditional decision making techniques are also a deterministic framework. This, 
we have observed, implies that the stochastic nature of the environment in which 
pension schemes operate is not explicitly taken into account. We have thus argued 
for the use of stochastic approaches that can ensure that a full picture of the pension 
scheme and the interaction between various crucial factors is established. 
In Chapter 3 we have discussed the Asset and Liability Modelling (ALM) approach 
to decision making in defined benefit pension schemes. This approach entails the 
use of stochastic models to represent the cash flows in the pension scheme. 
The most common objective criterion for this approach has been the probability of 
failing to meet some target. We have noted that this can be extended by including 
the severity of the consequence of failing to meet the target. 
Also, presentational problems arise in ALM. This is due to a number of factors. 
Firstly, the recipients of the results of a study might require that the results be de- 
picted in a simplified form. This might imply the discarding of crucial information 
when presenting results through, for example, percentiles. 
We have further noted that although the ALM approach goes a long way to address 
the problem of finding investment strategies for the pension scheme, such a decision 
is nevertheless treated separately from the funding decision. We have concluded 
that this need not be the case since these two crucial decisions can, and do, affect 
each other. 
We have further observed that stochastic asset and liability modelling has also been 
criticized for failing to explicitly take into account the sponsoring employer's fi- 
nancial ability to maintain contributing into the scheme. Thus we argued for a 
framework that addresses and assesses these criticisms. 
In Chapter 4 we have presented a dynamic programming approach to the problem 
of pension funding and investment. We have considered a criterion with quadratic 
and linear factors. We have shown that such a criterion leads to higher funding 
levels and lower contribution levels than a purely-quadratic criterion. 
Although we have considered the asset allocation as the only control variable, this 
approach can easily be extended to include that contribution policy as a second 
control variable. In our analysis we have assumed that the fund is invested in a risk- 
free asset and a risky asset. We showed that the optimal asset allocation strategy is 
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counter-intuitive: that is, it involves investing more in the risky asset as the pension 
fund deficit increases and investing more in the risk-free asset as the pension fund 
surplus increases. 
This approach can be extended by considering more risky assets or, indeed, consid- 
ering more realistic distributions for the return on the risky asset. Additionally, we 
could have considered a continuous-time approach employing stochastic differential 
equations and the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation rather than the discrete-time 
approach. 
Lastly, we have argued in that chapter that for analytically-tractable criteria the 
actuary's understanding of the effect of crucial variables can be greatly enhanced. 
However, the simplifications involved imply that in most cases realistic applications 
of this approach might be limited. 
In Chapter 5 we have presented a stochastic approach to decision making. Under 
this approach the funding and investment strategies have been considered as simul- 
taneous decisions. We have presented downside risk measures for solvency risk and 
contribution rate risk. 
The solvency risk measure is an end-of-horizon risk measure that treats pension fund 
surpluses differently from pension fund deficits. The risk measure incorporates both 
the probability of fund deficit and the severity of the fund deficit should it occur. 
The contribution rate risk measure deals with contribution rate excesses: positive 
excesses are treated differently from negative excesses. To further differentiate this 
from the solvency risk measure we set up the contribution rate risk measure to in- 
corporate all the expected excesses over the given horizon. 
Furthermore, we have considered a performance measure for the cost of pension 
provision to the sponsoring employer. This performance measure is the average con- 
tribution rate over the given horizon. 
These three risk and performance measures should, in tandem, address all the main 
objectives of the stakeholders: these being security of the accrued benefits, stability 
of the contribution and minimization of the cost. 
We also showed how we can offer choices in the setting of the `Normal contribution 
rate' (that is, the fixed part of the total contribution rate). This enabled us to 
consider a large spectrum of possible funding strategies. Furthermore, each of these 
choices was combined with a choice for the asset allocation strategy. 
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These combinations were then analysed by considering their effect on the risk and 
performance measures over pre-set projection horizons. The choice of different pro- 
jection horizons also offered the decision maker flexibility to tailor the analysis to 
the needs or specifications of the stakeholders. 
We suggested two approaches to choosing efficient combinations of the asset allo- 
cation and funding strategies. Firstly, there is the indifference curve approach. In 
this approach we showed that combinations which lead to similar level of risk (or 
cost) lie along the same indifference curve. And thus, for each choice of Normal 
contribution rate, the optimal asset allocation was determined by considering the 
point of intersection with some indifference curve. 
The second approach involved recasting the pension fund problem as a stochastic 
multi-objective problem. To simplify the analysis we showed that the main problem 
could be split into two sub-problems: firstly, by considering only the risk measures, 
i. e. solvency risk and contribution rate risk; and secondly, by considering the sol- 
vency risk and the performance measure (that is, the average contribution rate). 
In both cases the stochastic multi-objective formulation led to Pareto optimal so- 
lutions. These were solutions such that any other solution could not reduce one of 
the measures without increasing the other measure. 
The stochastic approach described in that chapter presented a significant step for- 
ward in the management of defined benefit pension schemes. Firstly, the integration 
of the funding and investment decisions implied, at the very least, that separate 
exercises in the form of valuations and asset and liability modelling would not be 
necessary. 
Secondly, the needs of all the stakeholders were met in a more satisfactory way: 
through the risk and performance measures we address security, stability and cost. 
And also through different choices of the Normal contribution rate we provided the 
sponsoring employer with flexibility in the running process. Furthermore, through 
different choices of the projection horizons the sponsor's financial strength could be 
addressed. 
In Chapter 6 we presented a case study illustrating the stochastic approach to de- 
cision making. We showed that there was a conflict between strategies that were 
optimal under the solvency risk only and those strategies that were optimal under 
the contribute rate risk only. We argued that a way to resolve this conflict was to 
combine the indifference curves for the solvency risk with those for the contribution 
rate risk. 
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In so doing we obtained strategies that were efficient under both the solvency risk 
and the contribute rate risk. These were the kind of strategies that the decision 
maker could not improve: that is, choosing different strategies would involve in- 
creasing at least one of the risks. 
We also showed that, interestingly, such efficient strategies were also efficient under 
the cost performance measure. This was because such strategies led to the lowest 
average contribution rate for a given Normal Contribution rate. 
We also investigated the effect of different amortization periods. We showed that 
if deficits were spread over a short period the scheme attains full-funding quickly. 
This was demonstrated by better solvency risk positions when the spread period 
was short than when the spread period was long. 
However, we also showed that there was a penalty to this since we got a higher 
contribution rate risk for the case when the spread period was short than when the 
spread period was long. 
In that chapter we also demonstrated how the investment strategy could be changed 
to incorporate dynamic strategies. These were investment strategies that were 
changed dynamically depending on the funding position of the pension scheme. 
We showed that counter-intuitive strategies were optimal under the stochastic ap- 
proach. Such counter-intuitive strategies entailed shifting the fund into risky assets 
as the funding level deteriorated; and shifting the fund into risk-free or less risky 
assets as the funding level improved. Thus the stochastic approach results agreed 
with and reinforced the theoretical results from the dynamic programming approach 
in Chapter 4. 
The case study also showed that for a scheme with different initial funding levels we 
got a convergence in the efficient strategies for long projection horizons. This result 
also agreed with a result obtained under the theoretical model. 
We also illustrated the stochastic multi-objective approach. We showed that Pareto 
optimal solutions were located along an efficient frontier for a given Normal contri- 
bution rate. We also showed that flexibility in the choice of Normal contribution 
rate could be introduced as a natural extension. 
In Chapter 7 we considered the incorporation of asset model risk in the decision 
making process. We observed that model risk could arise from using an inappro- 
priate model and also from the fact that an asset model is essentially a model of a 
complex, real investment world. 
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In our analysis we considered an asset model built on modern asset pricing theory 
using the idea of pricing kernels. This was done in order to compare the results to 
those obtained under the Wilkie model which is a statistical model with parameters 
estimated from historical data. 
We showed, interestingly, that the general principles underlying the stochastic ap- 
proach held regardless of the asset model. Thus, for example, the results showed 
that indifference curve analysis could be used to establish efficient strategies under 
both asset models. 
In Chapter 8 we extended the stochastic approach to decision making by considering 
the probability that the sponsoring employer might default on the pension obliga- 
tions. Our approach was based on the argument that periods of weak equity markets 
could coincide with and/or lead to large pension fund deficits and hence increased 
sponsor contributions at a time when the sponsor might be financially weak and 
thus most likely to default. 
Using this argument we considered the proposal that incorporating the probability 
of sponsor default in the stochastic approach to decision making could lead to opti- 
mal asset allocations with low (or zero) weighting in equities. 
We designed the probability of default by considering the return on a tangency 
portfolio. The sponsor was taken to have defaulted if the probability of default was 
higher than some randomly generated uniform random variable and if the pension 
scheme had a deficit. We analysed this framework by considering different projec- 
tion horizons. We assumed that the sponsor could default at the end of the year and 
if a default occurs, the defaulted deficit was accumulated to the end of the project 
horizon. And we introduced a default risk measure, which took into account the 
probability of default event and the amount of defaulted deficit should a default 
occur. 
Our results showed that for short-term projections investment strategies with full- 
weighting in bonds were optimal under the default risk. Meanwhile, for medium- 
term and long-term projections the optimal investment strategies under the default 
risk were not significantly different from the optimal strategies under the solvency 
risk. These results implied that the arguments for the inclusion of sponsor default 
hold for the short-term projections. However, this was not the case for other pro- 
jection horizons. 
This thesis could be extended in several ways. Firstly, possible extensions for the 
dynamic progressing problem have already been noted above. Secondly, the sto- 
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chastic approach to decision making could be extended by considering other ways of 
treating the funding strategy. Other asset classes could also be considered: in this 
thesis we have only looked at equities, fixed-interest bonds and index-linked gilts. 
But we could also have considered overseas equities, cash and property. 
Although we have considered two asset models, other models could also be consid- 
ered. For instance, the ARCH model could be used for inflation. On the other hand, 
other complete asset models could also be employed. 
Different risk measures could also be considered for the solvency and contribution. 
Furthermore, it is possible to apply the stochastic approach to other actuarial areas. 
For instance, problems involving with-profits guarantees in life insurance could be 
analysed using the principles presented in this thesis. 
Another interesting area that could be further investigated concerns the approach 
to incorporating default risk. Firstly, a different rate of interest could be used to 
accumulate the defaulted deficits. This could affect the results for the medium-term 
and long-term projections. Secondly, a different formulation for the probability 
of deficit could be used. For instance, the sponsor's financial strength could be 
incorporated directly in the probability of default. 
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Appendix A 
Derivation of Coefficients for the 
Optimal Cost 
In this appendix we consider the dynamic programming problem of Chapter 4. We 
show that the optimal cost is quadratic in f (t) and we derive its coefficients. 
From Equations 4.30 on page 59 
J al (NC(t) 
- 
02 + a3 (N(Ct(t) 
-1) +v Rt+i + (a2 + a4) v 
+v Xt+l AL(t + 1)'1(1 + 92) (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t)) 
+v Xt+l AL(t + 1)-1(µi 
- 
µ2)7r(t) (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t)) 
+vYt+l AL(t + 1)-2 (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t))2 x 
{ß(t)2 
v1 + (1 + µ2 + (Al 
- 
µ2)ß(t))2}. (A. 1) 
and from Equation 4.34 on page 59 
7r(t) = S21 1 SZ3 
-2 
(Al 
- 
µ2) 11j 1 AL(t + 1) Xt+l Y+', (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t))-1. 
(A. 2) 
We can write 
C(t) k {AL(t) f(t)] NC(t) -1 NC(t) - 
=k 
AL(t) 
-k 
.f 
(t) (A. 3) NC(t) NC(t) 
and 
ý(t) 12= -2 AL(t) 2 
-2k 2 
AL(t)2 
.f 
(t) + k2 f (t)2. ýNC(t) NC(t) 2 NC(t)2 
(A. 4) 
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Thus 
C(t) 2c (t) ai ýNc(t) 
-1) + cis (NC ) - 1) = ai k2 
2 
NC(t)2 + a3 k NC(t) 
-[2k 2 NC(t)2 al +- NC(t) a3] f (t) 
sk 
+ai NC(t)2 f (t)2. 
(A. 5) 
Using the equation for the contribution at time t, c(t), we can write 
f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t) 
= 
(1 
- 
k) f (t) + NC(t) +k AL(t) 
- 
B(t). (A. 6) 
Thus 
v Xt+l AL(t + 1)-1 (1 + µ2) (f (t) + c(t) 
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(A. 9) 
where 
v Yt+l AL(t + 1)'2 (1 + µ2)2 (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t))2 
=v Yt+l AL(t + 1)'2 (1 + µ2)2(l - k)2 f (t)2 
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+ vYt+l AL(t + 1)'2 (1 +/12 )2 [NC(t) +k AL(t) 
- 
B(t)] 2 
(A. 1O) 
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Hence 
v Yt+l AL(t + 1)'2 S 7r(t)2 (f (t) + c(t) 
- 
B(t)) 2 
=v Yt+I AL(t + 1)-2 Ir' 13 (1- k)2 f (t)2 
+ 2v Yt+1 AL(t + 1)-2 Q-1 I (1 
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- 
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-v Xt+l AL(t + 1)-1(µl -µ2)c 1 SZ3 (NC(t) +k AL(t) - B(t)) 
1 
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(A. 13) 
We can thus write J as a quadratic in f (t). The coefficient for f (t)2 can be obtained 
from equations A. 5, A. 10, A. 11 and A. M. This gives 
al NCk (t)2 +v Yt+l AL(t + 1)-2 (1 + µ2)2 (1- k)2 
+ 2v Y+1 AL(t + j)-2(l + µz) (Al 
- 
µa) SZi 103 (1 
- 
k)2 
+v}+IAL(t+1)_2fl 1S23(1-k)2 
Z 
al NC(t)2 + vYt+l AL(t + 1)-21 1j 1(1- k)2 (1 + µ2). (A. 14) 
The coefficient for f (t) can be obtained from equations A. 5, A. 7, A. 8, A. 10, A. 11 
and A. 13. This gives 
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Appendix B 
Modelling Framework 
In this appendix we outline the modelling framework to illustrate the decision- 
making approach presented in Chapter 5. 
B. 1 Model Pension Scheme 
B. 1.1 Benefits Provided 
We assume that the model pension has the following benefit structure: 
Normal Retirement: a pension on normal retirement age of 65 of 1/60th of fi- 
nal pensionable salary at the date of retirement for each year of pensionable 
service; 
Pensions in payment: pensions in payment are assumed to be increased in line 
with a Limited Price Indexation; 
Withdrawal: on withdrawal a deferred pension, revalued up to normal retirement 
age, is payable; 
Death in service: no benefit is provided. 
B. 1.2 Membership Profile 
We assume that the scheme membership is stable over time with respect to age, 
pensionable salary in real terms and past pensionable service. Thus, the number of 
active members at each age prior to normal retirement age is based on Table B. I. 
We assume that the youngest age is 25. Members retiring at the normal retire- 
ment age and deaths amongst active members are replaced by new entrants at the 
youngest age. Meanwhile, withdrawals prior to normal retirement age are replaced 
by new entrants at the same age. 
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At each age the past service is calculated recursively as a weighted average of the 
past pensionable service for those active members remaining in the scheme from the 
previous age and the zero past pensionable service assumed for the new entrants at 
the current age. 
B. 2 Asset Model 
The choice of asset model is crucial to the stochastic approach described in this the- 
sis. This is due to the fact that the results obtained will depend on the underlying 
asset model. 
We assume that all the economic factors are as generated by the Wilkie (1995) 
model. We use Wilkie's recommended parameters and neutral initial conditions. 
B. 3 Funding Strategy 
We assume that the contribution rate in the year (t, t+ 1), payable at time t, is 
given by 
c(t) = NC +- (AL(t) -f (t)) (B. 1) 
where AL(t) is the discontinuance liability at time t and f (t) is the market value of 
the fund at time t. 
At time 0 the decision maker sets the spread period m for regular amortization of 
gains and losses. As observed in Chapter 2 this method is referred to as the Spread 
Method. 
To ensure flexibility in the funding strategy, we let the decision maker set the Normal 
contribution rate, NC (see Definition 5.1 on page 76). Thus we will consider a range 
of values for NC from 0% to 32% 
- 
this range could be changed depending on the 
circumstances of the decision-maker. 
B. 3.1 Investment Strategy 
In most cases we have assumed that the fund is invested in Equities and Fixed- 
Interest Bonds. However, strategies involving Equities and Index-Linked Bonds are 
also considered. 
We assume, unless otherwise stated, that the pension fund follows a fixed (or static) 
investment strategy with annual rebalancing. This implies that the proportions to 
be invested in each asset class are set at time 0. These proportions are then annually 
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rebalanced. 
For the sake of comparison, an analysis involving dynamic strategies is also pre- 
sented. In these strategies the proportions invested in each asset class are changed 
over time depending on some pre-determined rule. 
B. 4 Cash Flows 
B. 4.1 Fund Growth 
Let f (t) be the fund at time t, C(t) be the contribution for the year (t, t+ 1) as- 
sumed payable at the beginning of the year, and B(t) be the benefit outgo at time 
t. We also assume that the fund is to be invested in 2 assets. Let the return on 
the ith asset be r1(t) and the proportion invested in the ith asset be x; (t). These 
proportions sum to one: that is, x1(t) + x2(t) = 1. 
Then the fund at time t+1 is given by 
2 
f (t + 1) 
_[x (t) (1 + ri(t))] [f (t) + C(t) - B(t)] (B. 2) 
i=l 
where f (0) = fo is given. 
In our analysis we assume that the fund is invested in either equities and fixed- 
interest bonds or equities and index-linked bonds. In the Wilkie model we use the 
total nominal return series: PR(t), CR(t) and RR(t) for equities, fixed-interest 
bonds and index-linked bonds, respectively (see Wilkie (1995, p. 901)). 
Thus, if the fund is invested in equities and fixed-interest bonds, we get: 
PR(t + 1) 
,f 
(t + 1) = [X, (t) PR(t) + xi(t) 
CR(C, t 
R(t 
+) 1) ] [f (t) + C(t) 
- 
B(t)] (B. 3) 
and, if the fund is invested in equities and index-linked bonds, we get: 
RR(t + 1) f (t + 1) = [X, (t) 
PR(t + 1) 
PR(t) + x, (t) RR(t) 
] [f (t) + C(t) 
- 
B(t)]. (B. 4) 
In both cases for the static asset allocation strategy we have xl (t) = xl and 
x2(t) =1- x1, but annually rebalanced. 
The contribution amount, C(t), at time t is given by 
C(t) 
= 100 x c(t) x TS(t) (B. 5) 
where TS(t) is the total salary roll at time t. 
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B. 4.2 Liability Growth 
The total discontinuance liability for the scheme is calculated as the sum of the total 
discontinuance liability for the active members and the total discontinuance liability 
for the current pensioners. The total liability for the active members is calculated 
as the sum of the individual discontinuance liabilities. These are calculated, for a 
member aged x at time t, as the product of the accrual rate (j), the average past 
service, the salary at time t, and a deferred annuity, (NRA-XI ä, '(t)), evaluated using 
the current real yield on index-linked bonds, R(t). 
Meanwhile, the total discontinuance liability for the current pensioners is calculated 
as the sum of the individual liabilities for the pensioners. For a pensioner aged 
x at time t, the liability is given by the product of the benefit amount at time t, 
B(x, t), and an immediate annuity, ä., (t), calculated using the current real yield on 
index-linked bonds. 
The benefit amounts are assumed to increase in line with the LPI. Thus 
B(x, t) = B(x -1, t- 1) Max 
[1, Min (exp(I (t)), LPICeit)] (B. 6) 
where I (t) is the force of inflation at time t and LPICeji is the ceiling for the LPI 
assumed to 5% (in current legislation LPI j has been reduced to 2.5%). 
B. 5 Simulations 
The problem outlined in Chapter 5 is not amenable to analytical techniques. Hence, 
we use Monte Carlo simulations. 
We have mostly assumed that 1,000 simulations are used to project the capital values 
and scheme liabilities. However, in cases where we are considering the probability 
of default we have used 20,000 simulations (see Chapter 8). 
We use the so-called path approach where for N simulations we get N projected 
scenarios at any given horizon (see Booth and Ong (1994, p. 231)). 
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Table B. 1: Service table and Salary scale 
Age, x ix wx dx ix r, sx 
16 1000000 100000 500 0 0 1.000 
17 899500 89950 450 0 0 1.200 
18 809100 80910 405 0 0 1.404 
19 727786 72779 364 0 0 1.606 
20 654643 65464 327 65 0 1.810 
21 588786 58879 236 118 0 2.013 
22 529554 52955 212 106 0 2.218 
23 476281 47628 191 95 0 2.421 
24 428367 40695 171 86 0 2.626 
25 387415 34867 155 116 0 2.828 
26 352277 29944 106 106 0 3.026 
27 322122 25770 97 97 0 3.226 
28 296159 22212 89 118 0 3.433 
29 273739 19162 82 109 0 3.635 
30 254386 16789 76 102 0 3.845 
31 237418 14720 95 119 0 4.043 
32 222485 12904 89 133 0 4.249 
33 209358 11305 84 147 0 4.454 
34 197823 9891 79 178 0 4.654 
35 187674 8633 94 206 0 4.848 
36 178741 7507 107 214 0 5.041 
37 170912 6495 120 222 0 5.226 
38 164076 5579 115 246 0 5.398 
39 158136 4744 127 269 0 5.553 
40 152997 4131 138 306 0 5.692 
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Age, x 1, wx dx ix rx sx 
41 148422 3562 134 341 0 5.813 
42 144385 3032 144 375 0 5.922 
43 140833 2535 155 408 0 6.011 
44 137735 2066 165 441 0 6.101 
45 135062 1621 176 473 0 6.192 
46 132793 1195 186 505 0 6.285 
47 130908 785 223 550 0 6.387 
48 129350 517 259 621 0 6.482 
49 127953 256 281 717 0 6.579 
50 126699 0 317 824 0 6.676 
51 125559 0 352 942 0 6.784 
52 124265 0 385 1081 0 6.885 
53 122799 0 430 1253 0 6.986 
54 121117 0 472 1453 0 7.099 
55 119191 0 513 1681 0 7.203 
56 116998 0 550 1930 0 7.309 
57 114517 0 584 2199 0 7.426 
58 111734 0 626 2481 0 7.535 
59 108628 0 673 2781 0 7.656 
60 105174 0 726 3103 36811 7.768 
61 64535 0 497 2194 5163 7.881 
62 56681 0 493 2228 4534 8.006 
63 49426 0 484 2244 3954 8.123 
64 42743 0 474 2248 3419 8.252 
65 36601 0 0 0 36601 8.371 
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Appendix C 
Analysis of various asset classes 
C. 1 Introduction 
In this section we investigate the allocation of the pension fund in different asset 
classes. We consider three asset classes: Equities, Fixed-Interest Bonds and Index- 
Linked Bonds. We could also have considered Cash, Property and Overseas Equities 
but we have left that as a future extension of this work. 
Allocating the fund in Equities and Fixed-Interest Bonds is the asset allocation 
policy we firstly considered in Chapter 6. However, in that chapter we employed 
Wilkie's (1995) "neutral" estimates for all parameters. One such estimate is for 
the long-term mean dividend growth (DMU) and is set at 0.016. By reducing this 
estimate to zero it means that effectively we have reduced the equity risk premium. 
The general effect of various values of DMU is investigated in depth in Appendix D. 
In this section we only deal with the case where DMU is zero in order to analyze an 
economic scenario where the equity risk premium is very low. 
As a further investment problem, we consider a third asset class: Index-Linked 
Bonds. These type of bonds were introduced in the UK in 1981 mainly for investors 
who need to hedge against the effect of price inflation. Index-linked bonds are thus 
a crucial asset class for defined benefit pension schemes due to the nature of pension 
liabilities (that is, they are real rather than nominal) and, indeed, the first issues 
were only limited to pension schemes (Lofthouse (2001, p. 331)). 
In our case we also have the assumption that the valuation rate of interest is equal 
to the current real yield on index-linked bonds. Hence we would expect index-linked 
bonds to be a good match for our liabilities. 
Thus allocating the pension fund in index-linked bonds and equities is the second 
asset allocation policy we consider in the second part of this section. There is 
a similarity in these asset classes in the sense that, just like index-linked bonds, 
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equities offer a real return. Hence we are interested in the location of the efficient 
region. 
C. 2 Modelling Framework 
We employ the same framework as in Chapter 6. We assume that the investment 
returns are generated under the Wilkie Model as set out in Wilkie (1995) but with 
DMU set to zero. We consider a range of possible combinations of Normal contri- 
bution rates and asset allocations. 
For each combination we carry out stochastic projections of the pension scheme over 
6 years and 15 years. At the end of each projection period we calculate the Mean 
Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution Rate risk. We analyze the results using 
the idea of indifference curves that was introduced in Chapter 6. Although crucial 
to the decision-making process, we do not show the results for the cost measure due 
to space constraints. 
C. 3 Investing in Equities and Fixed-Interest Bonds 
We firstly consider the policy of investing the pension fund in equities and fixed- 
interest bonds. As noted above, we assume that the long-term mean dividend growth 
estimate is zero in the Wilkie model. However, for fixed-interest bonds we use the 
recommended "neutral" estimates. 
We firstly show the results for the Mean Shortfall risk. 
C. 3.1 Mean Shortfall risk 
Figure C. 1 shows the indifference curves for the Mean Shortfall risk at the end of 
6 years. Each curve shows the combinations of Normal contribution rate and asset 
allocation that lead to the same Mean Shortfall risk. For instance, the top curve 
shows that by setting the Normal contribution rate equal to 18% and allocating 5% 
of the fund in equities we obtain the same Mean Shortfall risk of 0.07 as in the case 
where we set Normal contribution rate equal to 12% and allocate 60% of the fund 
in equities. 
As shown in Section 6.2.1, for the case of Mean Shortfall risk, the efficient combina- 
tions of Normal contribution rate and asset allocation can only lie along the best-fit 
line PQ. This is due to the fact that for a given Normal contribution rate one can 
reduce the Mean Shortfall risk by shifting horizontally towards an asset allocation 
on PQ. 
170 
For instance, for a Normal contribution rate of 18%, the efficient asset allocation 
under Mean Shortfall risk is approximately 45% in equities whilst for a Normal con- 
tribution rate of 6% the efficient asset allocation is approximately 55% in equities. 
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Figure C. 1: Mean Shortfall risk indifference curves at the end of 6 years 
Now we turn to the results for the Excess Contribution Rate risk. 
C. 3.2 Excess Contribution Rate risk 
Figure C. 2 shows the indifference curves for the Excess Contribution Rate risk at the 
end of 6 years. As in the Mean Shortfall risk case, each curve shows the combina- 
tions of Normal contribution rate and asset allocation that lead to the same Excess 
Contribution Rate risk. For instance, the top curve shows all the combinations of 
Normal contribution rate and asset allocation that lead to an Excess Contribution 
Rate risk of 0.04. 
The best-fit line LM represents the efficient asset allocations for the case of Excess 
Contribution Rate risk. For instance, for a Normal contribution rate of 18% the 
efficient asset allocation is approximately 25% in equities; whilst for a Normal con- 
tribution rate of 6% the efficient asset allocation is about 33% in equities. 
As in Chapter 6, this analysis indicates a potential conflict between efficiency for the 
case of the Mean Shortfall risk and efficiency for the case of the Excess Contribution 
Rate risk. For example, we have shown that with a Normal contribution rate of 
18%, allocating 45% in equities is efficient under Mean Shortfall risk; however under 
Excess Contribution Rate risk 25% in equities is efficient. Indeed, the two risks will 
conflict whenever the best-fit lines PQ and LM do not overlap. In the next section, 
we show how this conflict can be resolved in the case of stochastic projections over 
15 years. 
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Figure C. 2: Excess Contribution Rate risk indifference curves at the end of 6 years 
C. 3.3 Efficient region 
In the last section, we have demonstrated that, by considering the Mean Shortfall 
and the Excess Contribution Rate risks separately, we obtain a conflict since asset 
allocations that are efficient under Mean Shortfall risk are not necessarily efficient 
under Excess Contribution Rate risk. In this section we show that, by combining 
the indifference curves for the two risks, the conflict can be resolved. 
0 
In Figure C. 3, we combine the indifference curves for the Mean Shortfall and Excess 
Contribution Rate risks at the end of 15 years. The lines LM and PQ are the best-fit 
lines for the Excess Contribution Rate risk and the Mean Shortfall risk, respectively, 
as in the previous section. By combining the indifference curves we identify three 
regions: Region I, Region II and Region III as shown in Figure C. 3. 
Regions I and III 
The asset allocations in Region I and Region III are inefficient since for a given Nor- 
mal contribution rate we can decrease both risks by shifting towards lines LM and 
PQ, respectively. For instance, consider the arrow AC in Region I and the arrow 
KH in Region III. 
At point A, the Mean Shortfall risk is 0.115 and the Excess Contribution Rate 
risk is 0.06; however, if we shift to point C the risks decrease to 0.079 and 0.048, 
respectively. Meanwhile, at point K the Mean Shortfall risk is 0.088 and the Excess 
Contribution Rate risk is 0.07; however if we shift to point H the risks decrease to 
0.074 and 0.0515, respectively. 
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Region II 
The asset allocations in Region II are efficient since, for a given Normal contribu- 
tion rate, by shifting towards LM or PQ we can only reduce one of the risks whilst 
increasing the other risk. 
For instance, consider the arrows FC and FH. At point F the Mean Shortfall risk 
is 0.076 and the Excess Contribution Rate risk is 0.0495. Thus shifting to point 
C leads to an increase of the Mean Shortfall risk to 0.079 and a decrease of the 
Excess Contribution Rate to 0.048. Meanwhile, shifting from point F to point H 
leads to a decrease of the Mean Shortfall risk to 0.074 and an increase of the Excess 
Contribution Rate to 0.0515. 
Thus, Region II (LMPQ) is the efficient region. 
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Figure C. 3: The efficient region at the end of 15 years 
C. 3.4 Summary of Main Results 
There are several results that have been shown to hold in both the high equity risk 
premium scenario of Chapter 6 and in the low equity risk premium of this section. 
Firstly, we obtain indifference curves for both risk measures and in both scenarios. 
Secondly, an efficient region still exists for the optimal asset allocations under the 
two risks. Interestingly, the efficient region is centred in the region of 50% equities 
and 50% bonds for projections over 15 years in the low equity risk premium. Thus, 
even though we have set the long-term mean dividend growth to zero, the optimal 
allocation in Equities is still high for long-term projections. 
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C. 4 Investing in Equities and Index-Linked Bonds 
In this section, we consider the second asset allocation policy: that is, investing 
the pension fund in equities and index-linked bonds. As noted above, since the 
pension liabilities are discounted using the current real yield on index-linked bonds 
and the pensions-in-payment are linked to the retail price index, we would expect 
that index-linked bonds would be a better match for the liabilities than either the 
fixed-interest bonds or equities. 
Hence, intuitively, we would expect that, firstly, for a given Normal contribution 
rate and asset allocation in equities, both the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess 
Contribution Rate risk would be lower in the case where we invest in equities and 
index-linked bonds than in the case where we invest in equities and fixed-interest 
bonds. 
And secondly, for a given Normal contribution the efficient asset allocation would 
lie in a lower equities region if we invest in equities and index-linked bonds than if 
we invest in equities and fixed-interest bonds. 
As in the first part of this appendix, we employ the framework summarized in 
Section C. 2. Firstly, we consider the Mean Shortfall risk. 
C. 4.1 Mean Shortfall risk 
Figure C. 4 shows the indifference curves for the Mean Shortfall risk at the end of 
6 years. We observe that, for efficient asset allocations for the case of the Mean 
Shortfall risk, we would invest less in equities if we allocate the assets in equities 
and index-linked bonds than in the case where we allocate the assets in equities and 
fixed-interest bonds. 
This is clearly illustrated by considering the best-fit line PQ. PQ lies in the region 
of a 10% to 20% initial allocation in equities if we allocate assets in equities and 
index-linked bonds; whilst in the equities and fixed-interest bonds case the best-fit 
line lies in the region of a 40% to 60% initial allocation in equities (see Figure C. 1). 
For example, consider Normal contribution rates of 6% and 12%. Firstly, for a 6% 
Normal contribution rate, in the case where we invest in equities and index-linked 
bonds the efficient asset allocation would be approximately 15% in equities; whilst 
in the case where we invest in equities and fixed-interest bonds the efficient asset 
allocation would be approximately 55% in equities. 
And secondly, for a 12% Normal contribution rate, in the case where we invest in eq- 
uities and index-linked bonds the efficient asset allocation would be approximately 
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15% in equities; whilst in the case where we invest in equities and fixed-interest 
bonds the efficient asset allocation would be approximately 50% in equities. 
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Figure C. 4: Mean Shortfall risk indifference curves at the end of 6 years 
We now consider the Excess Contribution rate risk. 
C. 4.2 Excess Contribution Rate risk 
Figure C. 5 shows the indifference curves for the Excess Contribution Rate risk at 
the end of 6 years. As in the Mean Shortfall risk case, the efficient asset allocations 
for the case of the Excess Contribution Rate risk have lower allocation in equities if 
we invest in equities and index-linked bonds than if we invest in equities and fixed- 
interest bonds. 
As in the previous section, the best-fit line LM illustrates this point. In the case 
where we invest in equities and index-linked bonds LM lies in the region of a 5% 
to 15% initial allocation in equities; whilst in the case where we invest in equities 
and fixed-interest bonds LM lies in the region of a 20% to 35% initial allocation in 
equities (see Figure C. 2). 
For example, as for the Mean Shortfall risk, consider Normal contribution rates of 
6% and 12%. Firstly, for a 6% Normal contribution rate, the efficient asset alloca- 
tion for the case of Excess Contribution risk would be approximately 12% allocation 
in equities in the case where we invest in equities and index-linked bonds; whilst 
in the case where we invest in equities and fixed-interest bonds the efficient asset 
allocation for the case of Excess Contribution Rate risk would be approximately 
37% allocation in equities. 
And secondly, for a 12% Normal contribution rate, the efficient asset allocation 
for the case of Excess Contribution risk would be approximately 10% allocation in 
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equities in the case where we invest in equities and index-linked bonds; whilst in the 
case where we invest in equities and fixed-interest bonds the efficient asset allocation 
for the case of Excess Contribution Rate risk would be approximately 30% allocation 
in equities. 
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Figure C. 5: Excess Contribution Rate risk indifference curves at the end of 6 years 
C. 4.3 The efficient region for equities and index-linked bonds 
As shown in Chapter 6, efficient asset allocations can only be determined by combin- 
ing the indifference curves for the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution 
Rate risk to form an Efficient Region. Figure C. 6 shows the efficient region LMPQ 
for stochastic projections over 15 years in the case where we invest in equities and 
index-linked bonds. 
We observe that, as expected, the efficient asset allocations would have lower allo- 
cations in equities in the case where we invest in equities and index-linked bonds 
than in the case where we invest in equities and fixed-interest bonds (see Figure C. 3 
for comparison). 
We also observe that, although for our pension scheme index-linked bonds could be 
considered as the asset that best matches the liabilities, the efficient region does not 
include 100% asset allocation in index-linked bonds for our chosen range of Normal 
contribution rates. This illustrates the benefits of diversification. Thus, assuming 
as we have done that index-linked bonds were sufficiently available, allocating our 
entire pension fund in index-linked bonds would not necessarily be an efficient static 
asset allocation strategy. 
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Appendix D 
The Effect of the Equity Risk 
Premium 
D. 1 Introduction 
In this appendix we investigate the sensitivity of our results to changes in the Equity 
Risk Premium. This investigation is carried out by considering three different values 
of the long-term mean rate of real dividend growth' in the Wilkie Model. Wilkie 
(1995, p. 845) comments that using his original model "a 95% confidence interval 
for [the mean rate of real dividend growth] could be from about 
-0.9% to about 
+4.0%11. We thus consider the following dividend growth rates: 0,0.02, and 0.04. 
Intuitively, we would expect the following results. Firstly, for a given normal contri- 
bution rate and initial equities allocation we would expect the Mean Shortfall risk, 
the Excess Contribution rate risk and the Average contribution rate to be lower in 
the high mean real dividend growth rate case than in the low (or zero) dividend 
growth case. 
Secondly, if we initially allocate 0% to equities (i. e. 100% to gilts), then reducing 
(or increasing) the mean real dividend growth rate has no effect on both the risk 
levels and the Average contribution rate. 
And thirdly, if the mean real dividend growth rate were high, then we would expect 
the decision maker to opt for a higher initial equities allocation. This is due to the 
fact that we would expect the efficient region to shift towards higher initial equities 
allocation in the high dividend growth case. 
In the stochastic projections we consider a range of possible combinations of Normal 
contribution rates and asset allocations. Due to space constraints we only consider a 
l We adopt Wilkie's notation and signify the long-term mean rate of real dividend growth as 
DMU in Figures D. 1 and D. 2 
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projection horizon of 15 years. At the end of the projection horizon we calculate the 
Mean Shortfall risk, the Excess Contribution Rate risk and the Average Contribution 
rate. We analyze the results using the idea of indifference curves that was introduced 
in Chapter 6. 
D. 2 Mean Shortfall and Excess Contribution rate 
risks 
We firstly consider the results for the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribu- 
tion rate risk. Figure D. 1 shows risk levels at the end of 15 years. 
As expected, for a given normal contribution rate and initial allocation in Equities, 
a higher mean real dividend growth rate leads to lower risk (except at 0% equities). 
Furthermore, the reduction in the risk level is very considerable since, for instance, 
by doubling the dividend growth rate the Mean Shortfall risk is almost halved. We 
illustrate this finding in the following examples. 
Example 1 
To illustrate the results, consider a normal contribution rate of 0.18 and 50% initial 
allocation in equities. This stands for a balanced asset portfolio. We observe that 
the Mean Shortfall risk is 0.062 for a dividend growth rate of 0; but the risk is almost 
halved to 0.037 for a dividend growth rate of 0.02; and the risk is further reduced 
to 0.018 for a dividend growth rate of 0.04. 
Meanwhile, the Excess Contribution rate risk is 0.042 for a dividend growth rate of 
0; but reduces to 0.029 for dividend growth rate of 0.02; and is further reduced to 
0.019 for dividend growth rate of 0.04. 
Example 2 
As a second example of the effect of the dividend growth parameter we consider a 
normal contribution rate of 0.12 and 100% initial allocation in equities. This repre- 
sents an asset portfolio with the whole fund invested in equities. 
We observe that the Mean Shortfall risk is 0.104 for dividend growth rate of 0; but 
is more than halved to 0.048 for dividend growth rate of 0.02; and is further greatly 
reduced to 0.020 for dividend growth rate of 0.04. 
Whilst the Excess Contribution rate risk is 0.084 for dividend growth rate of 0; it 
reduces to 0.054 for dividend growth rate of 0.02; and is further reduced to 0.032 
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for dividend growth rate of 0.04. 
Thus both the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate risk levels are 
very sensitive to the changes in the dividend growth rate. In the next section we 
deal with the effect on the efficient region. 
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Figure D. 1: Mean Shortfall and Excess contribution rate risk levels at the end of 15 
years (static asset allocation) 
D. 3 The Efficient Regions 
Figure D. 2 shows the efficient regions at the end of 15 years for different estimates 
of the mean real dividend growth rate. ABCD is the efficient region if the mean 
real dividend growth rate is 0; EFGH is the efficient region if the mean real 
divi- 
dend growth rate is 0.02; and JKLM is the efficient region if the mean real dividend 
growth rate is 0.04. 
As expected, the efficient region shifts towards higher initial equities allocation as 
the mean real dividend growth rate increases. For instance, the minimum points of 
of the Mean Shortfall risk shift from BC (when DMU is 0) to KL (when DMU is 
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0.04). Whilst the minimum points for the Excess Contribution rate risk shift from 
AD to JM. And the efficient regions ABCD and JKLM do not overlap. 
Furthermore, even though the efficient regions when DMU is 0 and when DMU is 
0.02 (that is, ABCD and EFGH) overlap, their region of intersection (EBCH) is not 
significantly large in comparison to the efficient regions. 
This means that the optimal asset allocations are very sensitive to changes in the 
dividend growth parameter. This is especially the case when we change the para- 
meter from 0 to either 0.02 or 0.04. 
However, in changing the parameter from 0.02 to 0.04, we might say that the optimal 
asset allocations are not very sensitive. Firstly, the region of intersection (JFGM) 
is comparable to the size of the efficient regions. And secondly, the shifts in the 
minimum points are not very large. For example, for the Mean Shortfall risk we get 
a shift from FG to KL which is not as large as in the case of BC to FG or BC to 
KL. 
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Figure D. 2: The Efficient regions for a 15-year projection period for different esti- 
mates of the dividend growth rate (DMU) 
D. 4 Average contribution rate levels 
We do not show the results for the Average contribution rate due to space con- 
straints. However, in a similar way to the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Con- 
tribution rate risk, the results for the Average contribution rate show a significant 
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sensitivity to changes in the dividend growth rate. Furthermore, as expected, the 
Average contribution rate decreases as the mean real dividend growth rate increases. 
D. 5 Concluding Remarks 
We have shown that the Mean Shortfall risk, the Excess Contribution rate risk and 
the Average contribution rate are sensitive to the risk premium on equities. In the 
low equity risk premium scenario, optimal asset allocations have a low proportion in 
equities and both the Mean Shortfall risk and the Excess Contribution rate risk are 
high. Furthermore, the cost as measured by the Average contribution rate is high. 
On the other hand, in the high equity risk premium scenario, optimal asset alloca- 
tions have a high proportion in equities and the risks as well as the cost are low. 
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Appendix E 
The Effect of Low and Stable 
Inflation 
E. 1 Introduction 
In this section we consider the effect of low and stable inflation on the indifference 
curves. Instead of considering the effect of an entirely different investment model, 
we have decided to consider only different estimates for the parameters in Wilkie's 
autoregressive inflation model. 
ýýý 
Wilkie (1995) estimated the parameters by considering the economic data for the 
period 1923-1994. The parameter estimates for the long-term inflation mean and 
the inflation volatility are 0.047 and 0.0425, respectively'. 
In this sensitivity analysis we consider a lower long-term inflation mean of 0.025 and 
a lower inflation volatility of 0.01548. The 0.01548 inflation volatility estimate is 
based on economic data for the period 1982-1994 (see Khorasanee (1999)). 
The need for caution in setting the values of the mean parameters in asset allocation 
problems is accentuated by Chopra and Ziemba (1993). They study the effect on 
optimal asset allocation in a mean-variance framework of errors in the estimation of 
the values for the mean, variances and covariances of asset distribution. 
They observe that "... misspecification of the parameters of the return distribu- 
tion. 
.. 
does make a significant difference. Specifically, errors in means are about 
ten times as important as errors in variances and covariances... " (p. 7). 
'We adopt Wilkie's notation and refer to the long-term inflation mean as QMU and the long- 
term inflation volatility as QSD 
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E. 2 Modelling Framework 
We employ the same framework as in Chapter 6. We assume that the investment re- 
turns are generated under the Wilkie Model as set out in Wilkie (1995) with various 
values for QMU and QSD. We consider a range of possible combinations of Normal 
contribution rates and asset allocations. 
For each combination we carry out stochastic projections of the pension scheme over 
3 years and 15 years. At the end of 3 years we only calculate the Mean Shortfall 
risk; whilst at the end of 15 years we calculate the Mean Shortfall risk, the Excess 
Contribution Rate risk and the Average contribution rate. 
For comparison purposes we split the inflation scenarios we are considering into four 
cases: 
Case 1: QMU 
= 
0.047 and QSD = 0.0425 (standard case) 
Case 2 QNIU 
= 
0.047 and QSD = 0.01548 (intermediate case) 
Case 3: QMU 
= 
0.025 and QSD = 0.0425 (intermediate case) 
Case 4: QMU = 0.025 and QSD = 0.01548 (low and stable inflation case) 
In Cascs 1 to 4, all other factors are kept the same. 
In Case 1 versus Case 2 and Case 3 versus Case 4, we leave the long-term inflation 
mean unchanged whilst the long-term inflation volatility is reduced from 0.0425 to 
0.01548. Lower inflation volatility implies lower uncertainty in the inflation. Thus, 
we would expect lower Mean Shortfall risk and lower Excess Contribution rate risk 
in Cases 2 and 4 than in Cases 1 and 3, respectively. Furthermore, in the cases 
where inflation volatility is low, we would expect fixed-interest bonds to provide a 
better match for the liabilities than equities. Hence, we would expect lower initial 
allocation in equities in Cases 2 and 4 than in Cases 1 and 3, respectively. (In other 
words, the efficient region would shift towards a lower equities allocation in Cases 2 
and 4). 
In Case 1 versus Case 3 and Case 2 versus Case 4, we leave the long-term inflation 
volatility unchanged whilst the long-term inflation mean is reduced from 0.047 to 
0.025. In this situation, we would expect our results to be complicated because of 
the definition of Limited Price Indexation (LPI). In the model, we have assumed 
that pensions-in-payment are increased at the lower of 5% and the Retail Price Index 
(RPI) with a lower bound of 0. In the cases where the inflation mean is low and 
the inflation volatility is high, for instance Case 3, we would expect to obtain more 
scenarios of negative inflation. With the current definition of the LPI, the scheme 
would not `benefit' from negative inflation since the pensions-in-payment would be 
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kept constant whilst the inflation is negative. However, this could be a short-term 
problem only, since over the long-term we expect the inflation to revert towards the 
mean (given the properties of the Wilkie model). 
E. 3 Results of Stochastic Projections 
We firstly present the results for the Mean Shortfall risk. 
E. 3.1 Mean Shortfall Risk 
Projections over 3 years 
Figure E. 1 shows the Mean Shortfall risk indifference curves at the end of 3 years. 
For the intermediate cases, we observe that firstly as expected, leaving the long-term 
inflation mean unchanged whilst decreasing the volatility (i. e. Case 1 versus Case 2 
and Case 3 versus Case 4) implies that the low inflation volatility leads to a lower 
Mean Shortfall Risk (except for higher equities allocation). 
And secondly, leaving the inflation volatility unchanged whilst decreasing the long- 
term inflation mean (i. e. Case 1 versus Case 3 and Case 2 versus Case 4) implies, 
surprisingly, that the low long-term inflation mean leads to higher Mean Shortfall 
risk. 
For Cases 1 and 4, we observe that, for a given normal contribution rate and asset 
allocation, the low and stable inflation case (Case 4) leads to lower Mean Shortfall 
risk than in the standard inflation case (Case 1). However, the differences in the 
risk levels are not very considerable. This implies that, for 3-year projections, the 
risk levels are not very sensitive to the change from the standard inflation case to 
the low and stable inflation scenario. 
Projections over 15 years 
The results for the Mean Shortfall risk for projections over 15 years are shown in 
Figure E. 2. For the intermediate cases we observe that, as expected, leaving the 
long-term inflation mean unchanged whilst decreasing the volatility (i. e. Case 1 
versus Case 2 and Case 3 versus Case 4) implies that low inflation volatility leads 
to a lower Mean Shortfall risk (this is more obvious for lower initial allocations in 
equities). 
Meanwhile, leaving the inflation volatility unchanged whilst decreasing the long- 
term inflation mean (i. e. Case 1 versus Case 3 and Case 2 versus Case 4) implies 
that low long-term inflation mean leads to a lower Mean Shortfall risk (this is more 
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Figure E. 1: Mean Shortfall risk levels at the end of 3 years 
evident for higher initial allocations in equities). 
And for Cases 1 and 4, we observe that, as for the 3-year projections, the low and 
stable inflation case leads to lower Mean Shortfall risk than in the standard inflation 
case. Furthermore, there are substantial differences in the risk levels. This means 
that, for projections over 15 years, the risk levels are fairly sensitive to the change 
from the standard inflation case to the low and stable inflation scenario. 
E. 3.2 Excess Contribution Rate Risk 
Figure E. 3 shows the Excess Contribution rate risk indifference curves at the end 
of 15 years. For the intermediate cases, we observe that, as expected, leaving the 
long-term inflation mean unchanged whilst decreasing the volatility- (i. e. Case 1 
versus Case 2 and Case 3 versus Case 4) implies that low inflation volatility leads 
to a lower Excess Contribution Rate Risk. 
Also, leaving the inflation volatility unchanged whilst decreasing the long-term in- 
flation mean (i. e. Case 1 versus Case 3 and Case 2 versus Case 4) implies that low 
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Figure E. 2: Mean Shortfall risk levels at the end of 15 years 
long-term inflation mean leads to a higher Excess Contribution rate risk. 
And for Cases 1 and 4, we observe that the low and stable inflation case leads to 
higher Excess Contribution rate risk than in the standard inflation case. Neverthe- 
less, the differences in the risk levels are not very considerable. This implies that, 
compared to the Mean Shortfall risk, the Excess Contribution rate risk levels are not 
very sensitive to the change from the standard inflation case to the low and stable 
inflation scenario. 
E. 3.3 Average contribution rate levels 
The results for the Average contribution rate for projections over 15 years are il- 
lustrated in Figure E. 4. For the intermediate cases, we observe that leaving the 
long-term inflation mean unchanged at 0.047 whilst decreasing the volatility (i. e. 
Case 1 versus Case 2) implies that low volatility leads to slightly higher average 
contribution rate. 
However, leaving the long-term inflation mean unchanged at 0.025 whilst decreas- 
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Figure E. 3: Excess Contribution rate risk levels at the end of 15 years 
ing the volatility (i. e. Case 3 versus Case 4) implies that low volatility leads to a 
lower average contribution rate. And furthermore, leaving the inflation volatility 
unchanged whilst decreasing the long-term inflation mean (i. e. Case 1 versus Case 
3 and Case 2 versus Case 4) implies that low long-term inflation mean leads to a 
higher average contribution rate. 
Lastly, for Cases 1 and 4, we observe that the low and stable inflation case leads to 
a higher average contribution rate than in the standard inflation case. Nevertheless, 
the differences in the average contribution rate levels in the two cases are not signif- 
icant. This implies that the average contribution rate levels are not very sensitive 
to changes in the inflation scenario. 
E. 3.4 The Efficient Regions 
Figure E. 5 shows the efficient regions for projections over 15 years for the standard 
case (Casel) and the low and stable inflation case (Case 4). LMPQ is the efficient 
region for the standard case whilst ABCD is the efficient region for the low and 
stable inflation case. 
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Figure E. 4: Average contribution rate levels at the end of 15 years 
We observe that in a low and stable inflation scenario the efficient region shifts 
towards less initial allocation in equities as compared to the standard inflation sce- 
nario. Thus, as expected, in the low and stable inflation case we obtain a shift in 
asset allocation towards fixed-interest bonds. Furthermore, in the low and stable 
inflation case, we get a `smaller' efficient region (i. e. the efficient region `shrinks' 
slightly). This result follows from the fact that there is less uncertainty when the 
inflation is low and stable. 
However, the difference in the positions of the efficient regions is not substantial. 
This implies that the asset allocation decisions will be similar in the two inflation 
scenarios. Thus, the efficient region is not very sensitive to the change from the 
standard inflation case to the low and stable inflation scenario. 
In the intermediate cases (Cases 2 and 3), we also conclude that the efficient regions 
are not very sensitive. This is because Figure E. 2 shows that the Mean Shortfall 
risk minimum points are located in a similar region. Furthermore, Figure E. 3 shows 
that the minimum points for the Excess Contribution rate risk curves are also in a 
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E. 3.5 Pension increases at Retail Price Index (RPI) 
Due to space constraints, we have not endeavoured to include a detailed section on 
the sensitivity analysis of the results to changes in the definition of the LPI. Thus, we 
will only summarize the results which we have obtained when pensions-in-payment 
are increased at the RPI. 
We compare results from two new cases: in the first case we set the inflation mean 
and volatility at 0.047 and 0.0425, respectively; whilst in the second case we set 
the inflation mean and volatility at 0.025 and 0.0425, respectively. In both cases 
pensions-in-payment are increased at the RPI only. 
The following results were obtained. Firstly, for projections over 3 years, the Mean 
Shortfall risk is higher in the second case (the low inflation mean case) than in the 
first case only for low initial allocation in equities (i. e. for equities allocations less 
than approximately 40%); whilst the Mean Shortfall risk is lower in the low inflation 
mean case (second case) than in the first case for initial allocation in equities greater 
than approximately 40%. 
Meanwhile, for projections over 15 years, the Mean Shortfall risk is lower in the low 
inflation mean case than in the high mean case; whilst both the Excess Contribution 
rate risk and the Average contribution rate are higher in the low inflation mean case 
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than in the high mean case. 
These results shows that our conclusions are similar in the RPI case and LPI case 
except for projections over 3 years. Thus, in the 3-year projections the LPI com- 
plicates the results. However, these results also show that, as observed above, this 
problem occurs in the short-term only. 
E. 4 Concluding Remarks 
For projections over 3 years, we get the surprising result that reducing only the 
long-term inflation mean leads to a higher Mean Shortfall risk. This result is due to 
the limited price index (LPI). In Section E. 3.5 we have shown a further sensitivity 
analysis of the effect of the LPI by increasing pensions in payment at only the Retail 
Price Index. This analysis shows that keeping the inflation volatility unchanged at 
0.0425 whilst decreasing the long-term inflation mean from 0.047 to 0.025 leads to 
a lower Mean Shortfall risk (except for a very low initial allocation in equities). 
For projections over 15 years, the low and stable inflation scenario leads to a lower 
Mean Shortfall risk than in the standard inflation scenario; the Excess Contribution 
rate risk is higher in the low and stable inflation case than in the standard inflation 
case. Also, the Average contribution rate is higher in the low and stable inflation 
scenario. However, although the Mean Shortfall risk is fairly sensitive to the inflation 
scenarios, the Excess Contribution rate risk and the Average contribution rate are 
not very sensitive. Furthermore, the asset allocation decisions are not very sensitive 
to the inflation scenarios because of the lack of sensitivity of the efficient regions. 
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Appendix F 
Effect of Valuations on the 
Shortfall & Default Risk 
F. 1 Introduction 
In Chapter 8 we considered risk management in the presence of sponsor default. 
We presented optimal investment strategies under the Mean Shortfall risk which 
assumes that the sponsor does not default during the projection period and under 
the Shortfall & Default risk where we seek to minimize defaulted shortfalls. 
In this section we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the results in Chapter 8 to changes 
in the frequency of pension scheme valuations and the period over which gains or 
losses are spread. In Chapter 8 we assumed that a valuation of the pension scheme 
is undertaken every three years and that all gains or losses arising at the valuation 
date are spread over a three year period. Thus at the valuation date we recommend 
a contribution rate by adjusting the normal contribution rate depending on whether 
gains or losses have arisen in the scheme. The recommended contribution rate is 
kept constant during the intervaluation period. 
In this section we consider two further scenarios. In the first scenario triennial val- 
uations are carried out but the arising gains or losses are spread over a period of 
12 years. In the second scenario annual valuations are undertaken and the arising 
gains or losses are spread over one year. 
Thus the first scenario is similar to our standard scenario in that in both scenarios a 
recommended contribution rate is established at the triennial valuation and is then 
kept constant during the intervaluation period. However, all things equal, the rec- 
ommended contribution rate will defer in the two scenarios due to the spread period. 
Meanwhile, in the second scenario a recommended contribution rate is set annually 
and is thus effective for only one year. 
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The first scenario was considered in Chapter 6 and Haberman et al. (2003a) for the 
Mean Shortfall risk in tandem with the Excess Contribution Rate risk. Thus the 
results were interpreted in terms of the effect of the spread period on the efficient 
region for the solvency and contribution rate risks. 
In this section we consider the effect of the frequency of valuations and spread periods 
on the Mean Shortfall risk and the Shortfall & Default risk and on the optimal asset 
allocations under these two risk measures. 
F. 2 Intuitive Results 
F. 2.1 Mean Shortfall risk 
As shown in Chapter 6 and in Haberman et al. (2003a), we would expect that for 
triennial valuations, all other things equal, for a given Normal contribution rate and 
initial asset allocation spreading gains or losses over three years (standard scenario) 
would lead to lower Mean Shortfall risk than when the spread period is twelve years. 
We would further expect that, all other things equal, undertaking annual valuations 
and spreading gains or losses over one year would lead to lower Mean Shortfall risk 
than in either of the triennial valuation scenarios. 
As shown in Equation 8.10 the Mean Shortfall risk depends on the probability of 
shortfall and on the expected amount of shortfall in the event that a shortfall has 
occurred. The frequency of valuations and the spread period would have an effect 
on both components of the Mean Shortfall risk. 
For instance, all other things equal, if the frequency of valuations is high any arising 
losses will tend to be recouped quicker than when the frequency is low. Thus both 
the probability of shortfall and the amount of shortfall would decrease. 
Furthermore, for a given frequency of valuation (for instance, triennial) spreading 
losses over the intervaluation period will lead to losses being recouped quicker than 
when losses are spread over a period longer than the intervaluation period. 
F. 2.2 Shortfall & Default risk 
The Shortfall & Default risk is composed, like the Mean Shortfall risk, of two com- 
ponents: the probability of default events and the expected amount of shortfall 
defaulted given that a default event has taken place. Furthermore, the probability 
of a default event is dependent on the performance of the market portfolio and the 
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probability of a shortfall. 
The performance of the market portfolio is independent of the frequency of valua- 
tions and spread period. However, the frequency of valuation and the spread period 
would affect the probability of shortfall and the defaulted amount in the same way 
as for the Mean Shortfall risk. 
Thus we would expect, all other things equal, that the Shortfall & Default risk would 
be lower in the annual valuations scenario than in the triennial valuations scenario. 
Furthermore, for the triennial valuations scenario we would expect that the Shortfall 
& Default risk would be lower in the case where the spread period is equal to the 
intervaluation period than in the case where the spread period is much longer (i. e. 
twelve years). 
F. 3 Stochastic Projections results 
Figures F. 1 and F. 2 show the risk levels at the end of 6 and 15 years, respectively, 
for all the three scenarios. We do not show the results at the end of one year since 
we assume that our pension scheme is initially fully-funded. Hence, differences in 
the initial valuations would have no effect on the financial position of the scheme at 
the end of the first year. 
F. 3.1 Risk Levels 
The results in the two figures confirm our initial expectations. For the triennial val- 
uations, for a given Normal contribution rate and asset allocation, both the Mean 
Shortfall risk and the Shortfall & Default risk increase as the spread period is in- 
creased from three to twelve years. This result holds for both projection periods. 
Furthermore, as expected, our results show that the annual valuations scenario leads 
to lower Mean Shortfall risk and lower Shortfall & Default risk than either of the 
triennial valuations scenarios. 
On the other hand, our results do not show the effect of the frequency of valuations 
and spread period on the contribution rate risk and the average contribution rate. 
We can however infer from Chapter 6 and Haberman et al. (2003a) that for those 
cases where the Mean Shortfall risk decreases the `penalty' would be a high Excess 
Contribution Rate risk. 
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F. 3.2 Asset allocation 
The results also show that the optimal asset allocations under the two risk measures 
do not change massively as the frequency of valuation and spread period are varied. 
However, a close comparison of the standard scenario (triennial valuations with 
3-year spread period) and the annual valuations scenario shows that the optimal 
asset allocations change differently under the two risk measures. Although these 
differences are not very significant further investigation would be necessary to check 
whether this observation holds in general. 
We observe that, for both projection periods, changing from the standard scenario 
to the annual valuations scenario leads to slightly higher weighting in equities under 
the Mean Shortfall risk. Meanwhile, under the Shortfall & Default risk changing 
from the standard scenario to the annual valuations scenario leads to slightly lower 
weighting in equities. 
This implies that the difference in the optimal asset allocation under the two risk 
measures is much less in the triennial valuations (with three-year spread period) 
scenario than the difference in the optimal asset allocation under the two risk mea- 
sures in the annual valuations scenario. 
On the other hand, the optimal asset allocations exhibit different variability as the 
spread period is changed. The optimal asset allocations obtained when we assume 
triennial valuations and a twelve year spread period show the greatest variability. 
Meanwhile the optimal asset allocations in the case of annual valuations show the 
least variability. 
F. 4 Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, our results show that both the optimal asset allocations and risk levels 
are sensitive to choices for the frequency of valuation and spread period. Although 
the optimal asset allocations are much less sensitive than the risk levels, it is ev- 
ident that the two risk measures lead to different optimal asset allocations as the 
frequency of valuation is varied. 
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